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                          SUMMARY   
 
A study is done on the protection of sound recordings in the decentralized peer-to-peer 
(DP2P) file sharing in the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. This 
study reveals that because sound recordings have unique features different from other 
copyright works, the illegal sharing of sound recordings can ordinarily be filtered, 
identified, and detected by the Internet service providers (ISPs) before granting access to 
users and without infringing the users‟ right to privacy. However, the ISPs have failed in 
this regard, hence, they are strictly held liable under the contributory, vicarious and 
inducing infringements notwithstanding the statutory law which prohibits ISPs from 
monitoring, and intercepting their networks. In fact and law, the terms filtering, 
identifying and detecting on the one hand and monitoring and intercepting on the other 
hand are different in relation to sound recordings and as such ISPs are not prohibited 
from filtering, identifying and detecting illegal sound recordings on their networks, thus, 
ISPs are not protected under the limitation law as it is generally believed. However, 
several recommendations are made for reform, inter alia: a review of the limitation law 
to include the terms filtering, identifying and detecting in pursuance of the terms 
monitoring, and intercepting, if the intention of the legislators was meant to include the 
latter terms; protection of access right in digital sound recordings, protection of the 
neighbouring rights of ISPs in the digital world, imposing levies on all recording 
equipment, the insurability of sound recordings and ISPs‟ signals, and bandwidth.     
 
 
KEY WORDS: Access, communication, decentralized peer to peer (DP2P) file sharing, 
distribution, infringement, Internet service providers (ISPs), limitation of liability, 
network, reproduction, software application, sound recordings and users.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Technological change has been and is an issue in copyright law. Intellectual property law 
arose in part as a response to the technological challenges that the printing press posed.
1
 
Computer software has similarly challenged copyright law, particularly in peer-to-peer 
(P2P) file-sharing, a software application developed by Shaun Fanning which has the 
capacity for commercially significant copyright-infringing (as well as non-infringing) 
uses. 
Of all the classes of works eligible for copyright protection, sound recordings are 
perhaps the most threatened and infringed by technological developments. The ordinary 
meaning of the concept of “sound recording” was aptly described by the Advisory 
Committee on the Copyright Act in the report on “Needle Time” and “Blank Tape Levy” 
as follows: “A sound recording(embodied in a record, CD or tape) is usually the product 
of many talents: a)  the musical work of the composer; b) the literal work of the poet or 
lyricist; c) the performance of the artist; and d) the arrangements made for its making by 
its producer, but a sound recording need not contain music or, if it does, it may not have 
words.”
2
    
The second-generation P2P network – decentralized peer-to-peer (DP2P) network 
is a major concern to rights-holders. A DP2P network allows software applications to be 
freely distributed by software distributors thus enabling end users to participate in the 
sharing of files otherwise than through a centralized or dedicated index and a content 
server. ISPs give users access to the Internet generally without taking routine technical 
precautions
3
 such as filtering,
4
 identification
5
 or detection.
6
 Legislative provisions 
                                                          
1
  Leaffer Understanding Copyright Law at 4. 
2
 Advisory Committee on the Copyright Report on “Needle Time” and “Blank Tape Levy” 5 November 
1993.   
3
 These precautions are done through a frequency identification process, message digest, and track record or 
history, see paragraph 2.7 of this study. 
4
 Filtering is purely technical and automatic. ISPs can use their search function to identify infringing sound 
recordings and police their own network. Filtering is generally a process that screens network traffic for 
certain characteristics such as source addresses, destination addresses, or protocols and determines 
whether to forward or discard that traffic on the basis of established criteria. For example, one of the 
filtering models, CopySense Appliance, seeks to identify protected sound-recording content in P2P flows. 
Another filtering model is Gold-file flood filtering which enables ISPs to curtail but probably not to 
prevent completely – the sharing of copyright files which are infringing. See A & M Records, Inc v 
Napster, Inc 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) at 1027 (herein after referred to as A & M Records, Inc v 
2 
prohibit ISPs from monitoring
7
 and intercepting
8
 works on their network. Failure to take 
these technical precautions results in uncontrollable infringements and consequently 
economic loss to copyright owner.
9
 It is posited in this study that, though arguably, sound 
recordings can be filtered, identified or detected on DP2P network without monitoring or 
intercepting same on the network based on the features of sound recordings in contrast 
with other copyrighted works.     
 
        The strides which technology has made in developing new methods and media for 
fixing and reproducing recorded sounds and delivering them to the user have made it very 
difficult for statutes, precedents, common law and even law-makers around the world to 
keep up and to provide adequate protection to rights-holders.
10
 At the domestic level, 
various countries have inadequately responded to online distribution by enacting laws 
protecting both rights-holders and ISPs, in particular, under the concept of the safe-
harbour rule, limiting the liability of ISPs.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Napster, Inc 1 case ); US Court of Appeal case- Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd 380 
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.2004) at 1166 (herein after referred to as Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio, Inc v 
Grokster Ltd 11 case); Newton Newton‟s Telecom Dictionary at 390; Rosenberg “Controlling access to 
the Internet: The role of filtering” at 35–37; Dixon “Liability of users and third parties for copyright 
infringements on the Internet” at 38–39; Ginsburg “Copyright control v compensation: The prospects for 
exclusive rights after Grokster and Kazaa” at 117 and 119; Austin “Global networks and domestic laws: 
Some private international law issues arising from Australian and US liability theories” at 129 and 144. In 
SABAM v SA Tiscali (Scarlet) No. 04/8975/A at 4, the court found that filtering could recognize 90 per 
cent of the illegal sound recordings exchanged on the Internet and could be scaled up to deal with 
Scarlet‟s large volume of Internet traffic. Several courts have endorsed filtering devices (see, for example, 
A & M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc II case supra at 1027 and Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v 
Sharman License Holdings Ltd at 59. 
5
  To identify is to establish the identification of, pinpoint, place, recognize or prove the identity of a person 
or thing, see Roget‟s II The New Thesaurus at 499, Garner (ed.) Black‟s Law Dictionary at 748, The 
Collins Concise Dictionary of the English Language at 558. 
6
 To detect is to perceive, especially barely or fleetingly or spot, see Roget‟s II The New Thesaurus at 264   
and Rogets II The New Dictionary (Expanded Ed) at 271.  
 
7
  To monitor means to check, follow, record, watch, survey, observe, scan, oversee, supervise, keep an eye 
on, keep track of, see Collins Thesaurus A-Z Discovery at 461. Furthermore, in my opinion, the term 
”monitoring” includes the activities of examining, decrypting, viewing, unveiling, opening up, using a 
„microscopic‟ or „telescopic‟ device to see a content. 
   
8
 To intercept means to catch, take, stop, check, block, arrest, seize, cut-off, interrupt, head-off, deflect, 
obstruct, block the progress of and force to change direction, see Collins Thesaurus A- Z Discovery at 385 
and Rogets II The New Dictionary (Expanded Ed) at 554.  
 
9
  Pistorius “Copyright in the information age: The catch-22 of digital technology” at 2. 
10
 See Dean “Sound recordings in South Africa: The Cinderella of the copyright family” at 913; Lehman  
“Intellectual property and the national and global information infrastructure” at 80; Von Seidel (ed.)  
Intellectual Property – The John & Kernick Guide at 73 and 85. 
3 
However, these laws have been interpreted and applied differently. The liability for 
indirect infringement in the offline world is applied to the online world with difficulty. 
For instance, in the US, commentators – including the courts – have posited that actual 
knowledge of the infringement should apply in cases of contributory infringement. 
However, this position applies in the offline world
11
 as opposed to the digital world. In 
the latter case, it is argued that an ISP has constructive knowledge of the infringement in 
accordance with P2P technology. Secondly, with reference to requirements regarding the 
duty of ISPs  to control infringing acts on their network, the general view is that because 
of the large number of users it is impracticable for ISPs to detect the activities of users on 
users‟ networks.
12
 However, this general statement does not apply to sound recordings 
because the distribution of sound recordings on an ISP‟s network can be detected by ISPs 
routinely. Thirdly, while rights-holders rely on inducement theory, courts are divided on 
the applicability of this theory.
13
  
Adding to the concern are conflicting views on the legality of P2P file-sharing. 
For example, whereas in Canada and France P2P file-sharing is legal,
14
 in Sweden, after 
members of parliament intensely debated its legality, the law making file sharing illegal 
was enacted
15
  and in the US, the recent ruling by Judge Kimba Wood in Manhattan 
federal court halts one of the world's biggest services for letting consumers share music, 
movies and TV shows for free over the Internet. Prior to this, two high courts debated the 
legality of uploading and downloading in the context of file sharing.
16
  In contrast, there 
has been no such debate in South Africa. 
In the light of the foregoing, I examine the rights in sound recordings. I then 
investigate the role ISPs play in indirect infringement of sound recordings in DP2P file-
sharing and examine the extent to which such ISPs may be held liable in terms of theories 
                                                          
11
  See Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studios at 774.  
12
  See Mee and Watters “Detecting and tracing copyright infringements in P2P networks” at 6.   
 
13
  For instance, in the US Court of Appeal, the court decided  not to recognize the theory and subsumed it 
into vicarious liability in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio, Inc v Grokster Ltd 11 case (at 1166) while at the 
US Supreme Court case in Metro-Goldwyn – Mayer Studios  Inc. v Grokster Ltd  III case  at 2768- 2769, 
2774, 2777, 2779-2780 and 2782( herein after referred to as Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio, Inc v 
Grokster Ltd 1I1 case), the court deliberated more on this theory.  
14
 A Canadian federal court in 2004 gave a ruling legalizing P2P file-sharing, making a comparison 
between P2P technology and photocopying. The French parliament voted in favour of P2P file-sharing 
on 22 December 2005. See Hayward “Grokster unplugged: It‟s time to legalize P2P file sharing” at 3. 
15
 See Jones “Swedish politicians strike blows at copyright lobby”. The law illegalizing file sharing was 
enacted on April 1, 2009, see Yonah “Police Raids File Sharers in Sweden” at 1. 
     
16
  See Jewell “Courts disagree on legality of uploading” and Sunuvmann “US court shuts down Limewire” 
at 1.   
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of indirect infringement liability and the extent to which the “safe harbour” law limits 
their liability. I examine these issues with reference to the relevant law in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and South Africa.  
Chapter 2 examines the Internet as a distribution channel and describes the general 
concept of file-sharing with particular reference to DP2P networks. It also distinguishes 
between, on the one hand, filtering, identification and detection and, on the other hand, 
monitoring and interception of sound recordings. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the protection of sound recordings but also examines the 
copyright protection of musical and literary works under international treaties and 
agreements. The rights of reproduction, distribution and communication to the public in 
the treaties are examined in relation to the online world. The chapter concludes by 
examining the role of ISPs in the limitation of liability under international treaties. 
Chapter 4 examines the principles of copyright law in relation to DP2P networks in 
the US. Firstly, it examines the rights of reproduction, distribution and communication to 
the public as set out in the 1976 Copyright Act and the extent to which the courts in the 
US have interpreted these rights under the international treaties. Secondly, it investigates 
the concept of DP2P file-sharing in the seminal cases in the three types of infringement, 
namely: contributory, vicarious and inducing types. The chapter ends with an 
examination of the much-talked-about Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 
terms of the “safe harbour” clause which prohibits ISPs from monitoring their networks.  
Chapter 5 examines the rights of reproduction, distribution and communication to 
the public in the United Kingdom, as set out in the Copyright, Design and Patent Act of 
1988 (CDPA), and how they are implemented according to the international treaties and 
European Directives. It also investigates the liability of ISPs for the three types of indirect 
infringement, namely: contributory, vicarious and inducing types in DP2P networks with 
reference to the Communications Act as amended by the Digital Economy Act (DECA). 
The chapter concludes with an examination of the limitation of ISPs‟ liability in the 
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 which implement article 12 of the 
EC Directive on E-Commerce. 
 
5 
Chapter 6 explores the rights of reproduction, distribution and communication to 
the public of sound recordings as set out in the South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
It further examines the liability of ISPs in DP2P networks in South African copyright law 
and the law of delict under the three types of infringement, namely: contributory, 
vicarious and inducing types. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the limitation of liability of 
ISPs in DP2P file-sharing in terms of the Electronic Communication and Transaction Act 
25 of 2002 (ECTA) and the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision 
of Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002 (RICA).  
Chapter 7 generally restates the liability of ISPs in DP2P file-sharing of sound 
recordings in accordance with delictual principles which serve as the basis of copyright 
infringement.  
Chapter 8 concludes this study by summarising the findings and finally making 
recommendations for law reform. 
6 
CHAPTER 2 
INTERNET TECHNOLOGY  
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter examines the nature, features and operation of the Internet, the services 
provided by ISPs and the role played by other participants (such as software designers or 
developers, software distributors and seeders). These role players all impact on the operation 
of ISPs on the Internet. Open and closed networks are also investigated. With reference to 
closed networks, the four types of P2P networks are examined with emphasis on DP2P file-
sharing and the role ISPs play in the network. Furthermore, the technical ability of ISPs to 
filter, identify, detect and consequently block illegal transmission of sound recordings will 
be investigated and contrasted with monitoring and intercepting. This contrast forms the 
gravamen of this study.  
2.2   Nature, features and overview of the Internet 
According to Yen
1
 the Internet is one of the twentieth century‟s most important innovations. 
The Internet, also called the Information Super Highway or Global Information 
Infrastructure,
2
 is an interconnected or global network of computer networks using the same 
protocol.
3
 Hopkins
4
 notes that “The Internet is a cooperative networking effort that spans the 
globe. It is a network of millions of computers around the world that communicate with each 
other using the same telecommunication links (satellites, broadcast towers and cables) that 
carry telephone conversations and television programmes”.
5
  
                                                          
1
  Yen “Internet service provider liability for subscriber copyright infringement, enterprise liability, and the 
First Amendment” at 1. 
2
  The Internet originated in the US in 1969 when the US Department of Defence established the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) with the aim of dispatching orders to all ballistic missile 
bases. The network started operation in 1972. See Lehman “Intellectual property and the national and 
global information infrastructure” at 76; Hance Business and Law on the Internet at 39–40; Pistorius 
“Formation of Internet contracts: An analysis of the contractual and security issues” at 282; Gringras The 
Laws of the Internet at 2. See also Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 243. 
 
3
  A protocol is a language format that enables computers to communicate. A LAN is a local area network 
which       is a collection of interconnected group of computers geographically close to each other. A WAN 
is a collection of interconnected networks covering a relatively large geographical region. See Gringras The 
Laws of the Internet at 2–3; Hopkins The Nonprofits‟ Guide to Internet Communications Law at 3; Delta 
and Matsuura Law of the Internet at 1 - 4. 
4
    Hopkins The Nonprofits‟ Guide to Internet Communications Law at 3. 
5
  The decentralized nature of the Internet as a network of networks means that it functions without a 
centralized gatekeeper in charge of storage of data or better still, there are many gatekeepers rather than one 
almighty gatekeeper overseeing/administering the whole of the Internet. Globalization of the Internet 
7 
The Internet comprises both a transport network transferring data (in the form of 
voice, video, data and images) all over the world and a network of computers which enables 
users to access, retrieve, process and store all manner of information.
6
 In short, the Internet 
is user-centred, interactive and participatory.
7
 Each computer
8
 connected to the Internet has 
a unique numerical address or Internet Protocol (IP) address.
9
 The Internet operates in such a 
way that information can be readily accessed or sent by any computer based on the 
information stored on one of the computers which can be connected to other computers 
anywhere in the world.
10
  
   Several forms of communication are available on the Internet, including electronic 
mail (e-mail), Telnet, FTP (File Transfer Protocol), gophers, mailing lists, discussion groups 
such as newsgroups and social networking sites such as Face book and Twitter. 
2.3   Internet operation in terms of the OSI model 
Data communication is the transfer of information from one computer to another. In order 
for communication to take place, several aspects of the communication processes are 
standardized.
11
 The Open System Interconnection (OSI) model
12
 is helpful for understanding 
and developing computer-to-computer communications. It defines the seven layers at which 
decisions are to be made, namely: physical,
13
 data link,
14
 network,
15
 transport,
16
 session,
17
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
makes possible immediate access to information around the world and the abundance of information on the 
Internet benefits an unlimited number of speakers. The affordability of the Internet permits the mass 
dispatch of e-mails to hundreds of thousands of individuals at relatively little cost, in addition to free 
communication via web pages. The Internet‟s interactive nature allows one-to-one, one-to-many and many-
to-one communication. See Grossman et al. “Square pegs and round holes: Applying campaign finance law 
to the Internet/Risks to free expression and democratic values”. 
 
6
   Newton Newton‟s Telecom Dictionary at 490. 
 
7
   Hopkins The Nonprofits‟ Guide to Internet Communications Law at 3. 
 
8
   Gringras The Laws of the Internet at 3. 
 
9
 The IP address is the numeric address of a machine, in the format used on the Internet (see Downing et al. 
Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 247). It is a unique number akin to a telephone number, used 
by machines (usually computers) to refer to each other when information is sent through the Internet using 
the Internet protocol. It allows the machine passing the information onwards on behalf of the sender to 
know where to send it next and for the machine receiving the information to know that it is the intended 
destination. See Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (with corrigendum 
dated 22   September 2005) [2005] FCA 1242 at 37 and 109. 
10
   Gringras The Laws of the Internet at 2. 
11
   See Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 120–121. 
12 
 See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – Basic reference    
model: The basic model” at 49. 
13
  See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – Basic reference   
model: The basic model”, at 49; Newton Newton‟s Telecom Dictionary at 785; Reed Internet Law: Text 
and Materials at 27; Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 120–121; Lee and 
Davidson Intellectual Property for the Internet at 21. 
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presentation
18
 and application.
19
 Each layer has its own set of functions and interacts with 
the layer directly above and below it. The functions of each layer take place simultaneously 
as one comprehensive operation without users‟ noticing at which layer the operation is 
taking place. This does not mean, however, that the functions in the OSI model are 
indivisible.
20
 It is however submitted that the operations outlined in the OSI model require 
special skill, labour and expertise from the ISPs. 
2.4   Main players on the Internet 
2.4.1   Introduction  
To identify the main players on the Internet, Koelman and Hugenholtz
21
 describe the chain 
of activities on the Internet thus: 
“[An] Internet transaction involves a chain of intermediate service providers. 
Having acquired an account with a hosting service provider, an information 
provider will upload web pages onto the host‟s server-which is best thought of as 
a very large hard disk accessible from the network. Upon storage on the server, 
the uploaded documents become instantly available to everyone with a connection 
to the Internet. Access to the Internet, in turn is provided by an access provider. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
14
  See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – Basic reference 
model” at 46; Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 120–121; Dean Network+ 
Guide to Networks at 38.  
15
  See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – Basic reference 
model”, at 41; Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 120–121; Dean Network+ 
Guide to Networks at 40. 
16
  The transport layer may be considered the most important layer in the OSI model because without it data 
cannot be verified or interpreted by their recipients. It is the most important layer in this study as it is 
primarily responsible for ensuring that data are transferred from one point to another which may or may not 
be in the same network segment. At the transport layer, data are divided into smaller pieces to each of 
which a sequence number is assigned. This enables the data to be reassembled in the correct order by the 
receiving nodes. This process is called sequencing. In a network, the transport layer arranges data in the 
correct sequence. See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – 
Basic reference model”, at 37; Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 120–121; 
Dean Network+ Guide to Networks at 4. 
17
  The session layer is responsible for establishing and monitoring communication between two nodes. Dean 
notes that in this sense a session layer acts as a judge in a debate competition, Dean  Network+ Guide to 
Networks at 41–42; See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – 
Basic reference model” at 35; Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 12. 
18
  See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – Basic reference 
model” at 33; Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 120–121. Dean Network + 
Guide to Networks at 42. 
19
  See ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, “Information technology – Open systems interconnection – Basic reference 
model” at 32. The application layer enables software applications to use network services; Dean Network+ 
Guide to Networks at 43; Downing et al. Dictionary of Computer and Internet Terms at 121. 
20
  Personal communication between the author and T R Karem on 15 December 2007 and March 28- 
30,2011with T R Karem, a researcher at the Wireless Mesh Network Unit of the Meraka Institute, an 
appendage of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, and is now an MSS Core Network 
Integrator at Ericsson in South Africa. 
21
   Koelman & Hugenholtz “Online service provider liability for copyright infringement” at 1–2. 
9 
On the way from host to access provider to end user, the transported documents 
pass through the infrastructure of a network provider, who apart from providing 
the physical facilities to transport a signal will also transmit and route it to the 
designated recipient. It is not uncommon that a single (legal) entity provides a 
complete range of these services.” 
The content in the network passes from the host to the access provider and ultimately to the 
subscriber or user through the infrastructure of a network provider who in addition to 
providing the physical facilities to transport the signal, will transmit and route the content to 
the designated client.
22
 The network provider is the superior gatekeeper that possesses 
controls or provides the core facilities through which the access provider operates.  
Notwithstanding the confusion regarding the underlying role played by these 
intermediaries, their core technical functions are the provision of core network services, 
access to the network and hosting services.
23
 These may or may not be performed by a 
single entity.
24
 Generally these services will be offered or functions performed by content 
providers, navigation providers, administrators, transaction facilitators, infrastructure and 
network providers and access providers (ISPs or OSPs).
25
 Sometimes these intermediaries 
play conflicting roles on the Internet.
26
 
2.4.2   Internet service providers  
In the early 1990s a distinction was made between Internet access providers (IAPs) and 
Internet service providers (ISPs). However, the convergence of technologies in digital 
markets has blurred this distinction.
27
 ISPs can also be referred to as online service providers 
(OSPs).
28
  
                                                          
22
  See Koelman “Online intermediary liability” at 8; See also Sieber “Responsibility of Internet providers: 
Comparative analysis of a basic question of information law” at 235 and Newton Newton‟s Telecom 
Dictionary at 706.   
23
   Ibid.   
24
   See Koelman “Online intermediary liability” at 7-8. In any of these functions, the question of ISP liability 
will inevitably occur, particularly when there is an allegation of infringement (see Sterling World Copyright 
Law at 536). Illegal P2P file-sharing has expanded the number of service providers of the core functions of 
the Internet to include software developers, designers, distributors, trackers, locators and users. 
25
  Reed Internet Law at 27; Dratler Cyberlaw: Intellectual Property in the Digital Millennium at 6-44; 
Gringras The Laws of the Internet at 9; Smith Internet Law and Regulation, 2nd ed. at 8, 10 and 11. 
26
   Smith Internet Law and Regulation, 2nd ed. at 10. 
27
   Elkin-Koren “Making technology visible: Liability of Internet service providers in peer-to-peer traffic” at 
15. 
28
   OSPs include Microsoft, Network, CompuServe and America Online. Other companies provide services 
other than mere connection to the Internet through their servers; they ensure the provision of materials and 
services on their server, see Gringras The Laws of the Internet at 3 and 4. 
10 
In the telecommunications world, ISPs are also known as telecommunication service 
providers (TSPs) or Internet telephony service provider (ITSPs).
29
  
ISPs provide domestic and commercial users with access to the Internet. They 
obviously play a vital role in Internet transactions. The services provided by ISPs go beyond 
allocating e-mail addresses and granting access to the network.  
2.5   File-sharing 
2.5.1   Introduction  
File-sharing is the making available of files from one‟s own computer for copying and 
transmission to other users over the Internet and receipt of files made available this way.
30
 
File-sharing thus involves uploading as well as downloading. File-sharing generally takes 
place in the social networks which allow a group of users to generally transact with one 
another. Third parties have developed services and technologies to connect users to 
networks to enable them to carry out file-sharing activities in their peer-to-peer networks.
31
 
The basic principles underlying the concept of file-sharing are not new. File-sharing 
can entail copyright works distribution. File-sharing does not entail an infringing act unless 
works protected by copyright are shared without authorization.
32
 
2.5.2   Open or centralized networks  
File-sharing may take place in an open or centralized network. The open network is the 
traditional Internet operation which allows users to source and obtain both “index and 
content resources” from a central server through ISPs.
33
 Schollmeier
34
 describes the open 
network as “a distributed network which consists of one higher performance system, the 
                                                          
29
 Newton Newton‟s Telecom Dictionary at 494. Because service provider is a general term which is also 
applicable in the telecommunications world, I refer to Internet service provider (ISP) throughout. 
30
 Dixon “Liability of users and third parties for copyright infringements on the Internet: Overview of 
international developments” at 14. 
31
   Ibid at 14–15. 
32
  Congressional Research Service (CRS) “CRS- Statutory Damage Awards in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing 
Cases Involving Copyrighted Sound Recordings: Recent Legal Developments” 
33
  See Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 472. Albert et al. Intellectual Property Law in Cyberspace 
at18. According to Friederich and Pokorny “Peer to peer networking and filesharing” at 6, open network is 
a “discovery, look-up and content server” network. By this they mean that the server provides the names of 
the peers that are connected and a list or index of the contents and all resources stored in the central server. 
It should be noted that Friederich and Pokorny‟s definition is an illustration of peer-to-peer file-sharing, but 
that the features they describe are more reminiscent of an open network. 
34
  See Schollmeier “A definition of peer-to-peer networking for the classification of peer-to-peer architectures 
and applications” at 2. 
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server and several mostly lower performance systems, namely the clients. The server is the 
central registering unit as well as the only provider of content and services. A client only 
requests content or the execution of services without sharing any of its own resources”.
35
  
2.5.3   Peer-to-peer file-sharing or closed networks  
File-sharing may also take place in peer-to-peer networks, which are decentralized or closed 
networks. The court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case 
36
 said that 
peer-to-peer file-sharing differs from typical Internet use. In peer-to-peer file-sharing a 
search query is sent to other computers on the network and forwarded to other individual 
users connected to the network. The process continues until a computer with the right file is 
located, to which the original requester is then directly connected for the transfer of the 
file.
37
 In peer-to-peer connections numerous independent devices interact as 
contemporaries.
38
 
Peer-to-peer network architecture allows users of any given peer network to share 
files with the use of the software application created in June 1991.
39
 Only users who are 
members of a given network can make use of the networks. Prior to P2P file-sharing, 
distribution in an intranet was limited to small communication groups which allowed 
distribution of information within their local area network managed by a local administrator. 
Intranets are widely used as network equivalents of the Internet. Since the invention 
of P2P file-sharing, intranet service no longer experience the limitation of resources or 
networks subject to terms or protocols. The local administrator must ordinarily seek consent 
from the ISP
40
 to connect to the ISP‟s network and hence to other intranets and networks on 
the Internet that also wish to connect beyond their local networks.  
As mentioned earlier,
41
 there are four types of P2P file-sharing: centralized,
42
 
decentralized,
43
 hybrid
44
 and absolute. This study focuses on decentralized P2P file-sharing.  
                                                          
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case supra at 1158. 
37
 Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 476. 
38
 Daly “Life after Grokster: Analysis of US and European approaches to file sharing”; Flint et al. A User‟s 
Guide to Copyright at 472. 
39
 See Hayward “Grokster unplugged: It‟s time to legalize P2P file sharing” at 1. 
40
 A protocol is a set of rules that guides communication. 
41
 See para. 2.1 of this study. 
42
 See Flint et al A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 473- 475. 
43
 Ibid at 476. 
44
 See Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 476 for the first three types of P2P mentioned. 
12 
2.5.3.1   Centralized peer-to-peer (CP2P) file-sharing 
When a user runs P2P software on his or her client machine a connection is made to a 
central index server and the client machine is identified by a unique nickname on the 
server.
45
 A user‟s computer automatically sends a list of its shared content and information 
(for instance, sound recordings) and its exact location on the network (i.e. the computer‟s IP 
address) to the index server. Other users may use the P2P software to search for a copy of a 
particular sound recording, for example.
46
 A search request initiated by a user is sent to the 
index server by the central server which searches or goes through a list of all users currently 
on the network with the correct sound recording. As soon as a search is concluded and the 
correct sound recording is found by the central index server in an offering user‟s computer, 
this is indicated to the requesting user. The requesting user may then request directly from 
the offering user for the transfer of the sound recording to his or her computer.
47
 
It is important to note that no infringing content (in this example, a sound recording) 
is ever stored on the central server run by the operator of the P2P network. The CP2P 
network was popularized by file sharing systems like Napster  which was widely used for 
sharing, locating and downloading digital sound recordings the vast majority of which were 
unauthorized copies of copyright works.
48
 
2.5.3.2   Decentralized peer-to-peer (DP2P) file-sharing 
DP2P file-sharing is referred to as the second-generation peer-to-peer file-sharing
49
 which is 
the concept behind DP2P networks. Gnutella is an example of a DP2P system. The US 
District Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case
50
  examined the 
concept. DP2P file-sharing is based on open-source software, meaning that the source code 
is either in the public domain or subject to copyright and distributed under an open-source 
licence that allows modification of the software, subject to some restrictions.
51
  
In DP2P networks every machine acts as a client (requesting data), a server (offering 
data) or a servent (i.e. as both client and server) at different times. As part of a peer-to-peer 
                                                          
45
  See A & M Records Inc v Napster Inc II case supra at 1027; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc v Grokster 
Ltd II case supra at 1159; Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 473. 
46
 Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 473. 
47
 Ibid at 473–474. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Sigurdsson et al. “Potentials and challenges of peer-to-peer based content distribution” at 348- 365. 
50
 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc v Grokster Ltd II case supra at 1159. 
51
 Ibid.  
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network, a user is able to share both contents and resources through the connections between 
machines, without a central server.
52
 One of the disadvantages of DP2P networks is that the 
number of peers may not be extensive because of the lack of a central server. In addition, 
direct communication between peers is a security risk to users since there is no central server 
to take care of the security risks or threats between peers and because peers may not be able 
to assume the professional role of an ISP who is charged with such responsibility, thus users 
are exposed to risks.
53
  
DP2P network exhibits the following features. 
(a) Decentralized peer (user) index  
 A “peer index” serves an important function namely to find peers on the network.
54
 A 
user provides a list of other peers in a decentralized network. Peers talk to one another 
directly, and there is no restraint in communication.
55
 
  (b) Decentralized file index 
 DP2P network employs decentralized “file index” servers, also known as querying 
servers.
56
 The server provides the list of files available for sharing. In DP2P network, 
the roles of peers change. A peer who is requesting material is called the client, but 
would be called the host or server when content is requested from him or her.
57
  
 (c) Decentralized sharing content  
 A user is able to share the content and computer resources of others by virtue of direct 
connections between the computers, without having to source the content from a central 
or dedicated file server. In a DP2P network, every peer (computer) has equal status as 
both client and server of the network whereby a peer sends a query to another peer.  
When the latter peer has the content being requested, it is sent across the network to the 
client   by the host who is the decentralized user. The peer that is being queried is the 
one that opens up the connection between the two peers.
58
  
                                                          
52
 Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 472. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Friederich and Pokorny “Peer to peer networking and file-sharing” at 9. 
55
 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case supra at 1158–1159; Friederich and Pokorny  
“Peer to peer networking and file-sharing” at 7. 
56
 Friederich and Pokorny “Peer to peer networking and file-sharing” at 9. 
57
 Ibid; Sterling World Copyright Law at 536. 
58
 Friederich and Pokorny “Peer to peer networking and file-sharing” at 11 and Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to 
Copyright at 476. 
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(d)    Scalability and elasticity  
 DP2P networks are scalable and elastic. Networks are able to expand and accommodate 
new entrants with new and diverse contents. Peers have their resources distributed in 
different servers.
59
 
2.5.3.3   Hybrid peer-to-peer (HP2P) file-sharing  
The third type of P2P file-sharing is hybrid P2P, the third-generation P2P which is still 
evolving.
60
 HP2P networks are based on both centralized and decentralized networks.
61
 
HP2P networks are versatile in that they borrow a number of dedicated users‟ own client 
computers to retain indexes of contents which are called supernodes.
62
 These nodes provide 
access to other computers on the network which allow each client machine to forward a list 
of its shared files to its local supernodes, along with any of the user‟s search requests.
63
 
After the supernodes provide access to other computers, the supernodes forward the 
request to other supernodes. When a successful match is found, the requesting computer 
connects directly to the computer with the desired content and begins to transfer the 
requested file.
64
 
2.5.3.4   Absolute peer-to-peer (AP2P) file-sharing  
AP2P file-sharing is a futuristic innovation which is a transformation of or improvement on 
Bluetooth technology. Bluetooth was specifically designed for connecting headsets to 
cellular phones and printers or mice to computers and operates over a short distance (in a 
radius of less than 100 metres) in the 2, 4 GHz band. It is very similar to Wi-Fi, and all the 
devices connected to the Bluetooth share the bandwidth.
65
 ISPs are not involved in the 
transportation or sharing of files between or among Bluetooth users. Thus AP2P technology 
is capable of bypassing the Internet and other wired networks.  
A recent development, Netsukuku, an ad hoc software application built around an 
address system designed to handle large numbers of nodes while requiring minimal CPU 
                                                          
59
 Ramaswamy et al. “A distributed Approach to Node Clustering in Decentralized Peer-to-peer Networks” at 
1-2, 5, 12 and 28. 
60
 See Sigurdsson et al. “Potentials and challenges of peer-to-peer based content distribution” at 348- 365. 
61
 Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 476. 
62
 Ibid.; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case supra at 1159. 
63
 Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 476. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 See Thornton et al. Telecommunication Law in South Africa at 58; Geer Pocket Internet at 46. 
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and memory resources, does just that. It could be used to build a worldwide distributed, 
anonymous, user-controlled, self-configuring, censorship-resistant network fully 
independent of the Internet which does not need any central server or routers to direct 
traffic.
66
 In Netsukuku, a user is required to install an antenna within a range of other local 
nodes and run the software on their network to link peers on the network. Netsukuku is 
elastic in nature. Where a node is not covered within the coverage area of other Wi-Fi 
signals, a device called a “virtual tunnel” would intervene over the normal Internet 
connection and supply the missing link.
67
 
2.6   Identity of other participants in DP2P file-sharing  
DP2P file-sharing has led to the emergence of new role-players, other than users
68
 and ISPs, 
such as designers, developers and distributors of software. Software designers and 
developers write and develop programs capable of being used on the Internet for the 
distribution, uploading and downloading of files and software distributors are involved in 
the facilitation of file-sharing via DP2P technology.
69
 In addition,  seeders participate in the 
sharing of sound recordings via DP2P file-sharing. A seeder is a person who either starts the 
process of distribution by uploading a complete file or is an initial provider of an infringing 
copy.
70
  
2.7 Technical ability of ISPs to filter, identify or detect the communication of sound 
recordings without monitoring or intercepting communications in DP2P networks  
2.7.1   Introduction  
Although the concepts of monitoring and intercepting, on the one hand and filtering, 
identifying and detecting, on the other hand are generally misunderstood as meaning the 
same  there is a remarkable distinction between them. In this chapter I explain why and how 
sound recordings can be filtered,
71
 identified
72
 and detected
73
 in DP2P networks and the role 
                                                          
66
  See Hasslberger “Netsukuku‟s fractal address system for P2P cloud” at 1–2. 
67
  Ibid. 
68
  Users are now able via DP2P file-sharing to provide services and content on the Internet.  
69
  Protocol developers develop software and are not involved in overseeing infringement as ISPs would do 
(see Vincent “Secondary liability for copyright infringement in the BitTorrent platform: Placing the blame 
where it belongs” at 6). 
70
  See Adcock and Redfearn “Made for sharing?” at 18. 
71
  Filtering is purely technical and automatic; ISPs can use their search function to identify infringing sound 
recordings and police their own network. Filtering is generally a process that screens network traffic for 
certain characteristics such as source addresses, destination addresses, or protocols and determines whether 
to forward or discard that traffic on the basis of established criteria. For example, one of the filtering 
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ISPs play in technically identifying sounding recordings. In this respect ISPs can block 
illegal transactions in sound recordings in DP2P networks and take other measures.  
However, it is important to define blocking.
74
 Doing so will assist in the examination 
of issues in this study particularly whether or not an ISP has the power to block users who 
infringe copyright without infringing on the users‟ rights to access to information. To block 
is to preclude access to potentially infringing files listed in the servers‟ search index. ISPs 
have the right to bar users from accessing the servers or prevent users from engaging in the 
transmission of infringing sound recordings.
75
 ISPs are able to block infringers‟ access to a 
particular environment or website for any reason
76
 which must be within the limits of best 
practice as determined by law. Blocking has been endorsed, encouraged, and approved by 
the courts,
77
 albeit with some opposition from human-rights groups.
78
 Like filtering, 
blocking does not entail identification of users.
79
 Blocking is a consequential act of filtering, 
identifying and detecting to infringing acts. 
 
It is submitted that the activities of filtering, identifying and detecting are activities 
that are inherent in, and incidental to the routine operation of the Internet. They require 
                                                                                                                                                                       
models, CopySense Appliance, seeks to identify protected sound-recording content in P2P flows.  Another 
filtering model is gold-file flood filtering which enables ISPs to curtail– but probably not to prevent 
completely – the sharing of copyright files which are infringing. It is technically possible to flood search 
results page with gold files as an effective means of inhibiting the downloading of unauthorized blue files. 
This may include blank pages or “Don‟t steal copyright” messages, see Bowrey - Law & Internet Cultures 
at 1; A & M Records Inc v Napster Inc II case supra at 1027; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster 
Ltd II case supra at 1166; Newton Newton‟s Telecom Dictionary at 390; Rosenberg “Controlling access to 
the Internet: The role of filtering” at 35–37; Dixon “Liability of users and third parties for copyright 
infringements on the Internet” at 38–39; Ginsburg “Copyright control v compensation: The prospects for 
exclusive rights after Grokster and Kazaa” at 117 and 119; Austin “Global networks and domestic laws: 
Some private international law issues arising from Australian and US liability theories” at 129 and 144. In 
SABAM v SA Tiscali (Scarlet) No. 04/8975/A at 4 the court found that filtering could recognize 90 per cent 
of the illegal sound recordings exchanged on the Internet and could be scaled up to deal with Scarlet‟s large 
volume of Internet traffic. Several courts have endorsed filtering devices (see, for example, A & M Records, 
Inc v Napster, Inc I case supra at 1027 and Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings 
Ltd [2005] FCA 1242 (5 September 2005) at 59). 
72 To identify is to prove the identity of a person or thing, see Garner at 748.See Garner (ed.) Black‟s Law 
Dictionary at 748; Hanks  et al. The Collins Concise Dictionary of the English Language at 558.  
 
74
 See SABAM v SA Tiscali (Scarlet) No. 04/8975/A at 4, 5 and 7. In the English interpreted version of this 
case, the independent judicial experts identified eleven solutions technically pertinent in the short term for 
filtering P2P in which seven were applicable to Scarlet‟s network, see page 30 of the expert report. 
75
  See A & M Records Inc v Napster Inc I case supra at 1027; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster 
Ltd II case supra at 1166. 
76
  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case supra at 1165. 
77
  See IFPI Danmark v Tele2 A/S case no. F1-15124/2006 (25 October 2006); Universal Music Australia Pty 
Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (with corrigendum dated 22 September 2005) [2005] FCA 1242 at 59. 
78
  See Reichman et al. “A reverse notice and takedown regime to enable public interest uses of technically 
protected copyrighted works” at 279. 
79
   See SABAM v SA Tiscali (Scarlet) No. 04/8975/A at 9. 
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minimal efforts to perform. In contrast, monitoring or intercepting requires broader and 
greater tasks or efforts to accomplish. In the latter activity, a comprehensive function is 
performed which includes the former. Essentially, the former is independent of the latter 
while the latter is dependent on the former. In other words, the former is a primary function 
performed by an ISP on the network while the latter is a secondary function of an ISP. 
The following submissions will further show whether or not there is inherent and 
exclusive technical ability to filter, identify, and detect sound recordings on P2P network 
without monitoring, or intercepting the network, if the latter activity is not intended, and if 
there is such ability, whether the former activities can be carried out routinely by an ISP 
without monitoring, and intercepting the communication on the network. These submissions 
illustrate the distinctions between the two concepts in relation to sound recordings. 
2.7.2    Identifying sound recordings through message digests  
According to Mee and Watters,
80
 there is a technical rebuttal to the legal perception that P2P 
file-sharing is not detectable. They focus on the detection of the specific act of transferring a 
file and on identifying the parties involved through a message digest which is a device that 
identifies a work. The result of detection and identification can be used in court.
81
  
The process used in a message digest is that the DP2P networks transmit files by 
opening a transmission control protocol (TCP) connection between two peers and passing 
the whole or part of the file according to the P2P protocol being used. The TCP breaks down 
the long data sequences into identifiable packets at the point of transmission. The packets 
are reassembled into a file after transmission. In this process, a message digest allows the 
detection of a specific file reproduction in an easily computed manner by describing a 
known work and its owner in a database from the fact that every file in the network has a 
unique identifier. Each P2P network uses its own digest algorithm which is expressed 
mathematically.
82
 An extract of the message digest is put into effect from the packet which 
can be checked against a database of known copyright works.
83
  
                                                          
80
 Mee and Watters “Detecting and tracing copyright infringements in P2P networks” at 1. 
81
 Ibid.  
82
 Ibid. at 3. 
83
 Ibid. at 4. 
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Mee and Watters conclude that in a P2P network sharers are disguisable while the 
files are not.
84
 Sound recordings are identifiable at a glance through the outband signal 
channel whereas further steps are required to identify a user, subject to protection of the 
right to privacy.
85
 
2.7.3   Frequency identification of sound recordings through the outband signal 
channel  
Technically, an ISP can, through the outband signal channel,
86
 identify a sound recording on 
its network by its frequency, and statistics. There are two components of the outband signal 
channel, namely: the signal and message channels.  
Firstly, before a work passes through a message channel, it is identified, and measured 
by a signal channel. A signal channel is an advance traffic check which provides the details 
of a work through frequency analyser, frequency spectrum or synthesizer. This process 
reveals the statistics (i.e. components, particulars of the sender, the type of message or work, 
the intended receiver, size of the message, description or components) of the work (but not 
the content of the work). In explaining frequency in this context, every electronic work has a 
frequency which distinguishes it from other works based on the statistics of the work.
87
  
Secondly, once the statistics of a work are determined by the synthesizer, the message 
channel directs a work to the appropriate channel and such work passes through a dedicated 
outband signal channel which makes it impossible for works that are not in the frequency 
category to pass through.
88
  
Sound recordings consisting of music are different from voice recorded messages in 
that the former content comprises of unique identifier different from the latter content. In 
addition, the files that contain music sound recordings are much larger than recordings that 
contain no music. An ISP can easily identify a sound recording on her network by such 
statistics.   
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 Ibid. 
85
 See paras 2.7.3 and 2.7.4 below. 
86
 An outband signal channel is a device that enables each piece of categorized work to pass through one 
channel of transportation in the OSI model, while an inboard channel allows all kinds of information to 
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Because of the distinguishing frequency of sound recordings, there would not be any 
need for interception nor monitoring.  
  
 2.7.4  The ISP’s complete technical knowledge to detect a breach of protocol by users    
 
In DP2P networks sound recordings are shared among the peers through an unconventional 
procedure on the network.
89
 The conventional procedure is that when one searches for a 
sound recording, one does so through an ISP. When a user requests transmission of a sound 
recording from a peer; the track record, origin or history of the sound recording shows that a 
user did not obtain the file from an ISP.
 
This transaction shows a breach of protocol which 
can be detected by an ISP without monitoring or intercepting the communication.
90
 Thus, 
during transmission, an ISP would have complete knowledge of the breach of protocol by 
the user involving the sound recording particularly where the network of the ISP shows that 
a file with particular description or detail is transmitted frequently. 
2.8   Conclusion  
It is obvious that the role of ISPs in the functioning of the Internet cannot be 
overemphasized. However, the role of new players such as software designers, distributors, 
seeders and users is controversially becoming more prominent, especially in DP2P 
applications and because of the various risks they pose to ISPs and rights-holders alike. 
 
Notwithstanding these risks, it is certain that more technological developments will 
emerge in future, such as AP2P file-sharing, which will pose even greater risks for 
stakeholders.  
                                                          
89 The sound recording goes through the host‟s ISP despite the fact that the ISP knows that the file comes 
directly from a peer in its network. It then goes through the network of the client‟s ISP to the client‟s 
computer at the other end. Each file transported has a track record or history starting from the first 
transaction to the current transaction. This fact implies that the recipient‟s ISP also knows (by means of the 
track record) that the transported file comes from a peer and not from another ISP. 
90 Breach of protocol in a DP2P network is sufficient to identify the illegality of such digital or electronic 
music recording which can easily be detected by the ISPs on the network. According to Dean Network+ 
Guide to Networks at 44, in his description of the OSI model, the data-link layer adds to the file a header 
incorporating inter alia the source addresses and the code of the sound recording showing the ISP that the 
file does not come from another ISP but from a user. A source address from a source other than an ISP is a 
strong indication that the communication protocol has been breached. Further, the IP address of a user is 
different from that of the ISP. This indicates to an ISP that a sound recording does not come from another 
ISP but from a peer or seeder on a DP2P network who is not authorized to transfer files in that manner. 
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This study will examine whether the role and liability of ISPs in DP2P software 
applications should change due to the fact that sound recordings have unique technical 
characteristics
21 
CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS 
3.1   Introduction 
Protection of copyright is based on a need to strike a balance between rights owners and the 
public interest, ultimately founded on the four “philosophies” of copyright law which can be 
traced to the Statute of Anne of 1710. They are the natural law, a return on labour and skill, 
an incentive to create and the advancement of the society.
1
  
The skill and labour of a producer (of sound recordings) is as fundamental to the 
enjoyment of literary and musical works as the motivation and efforts of the authors of these 
primary works. Traditionally, however, the rights enjoyed by the owners of copyright in 
sound recordings have generally been subordinate to the copyright rights enjoyed by 
primary rights-holders.
2
  
Copyright is divided into two categories of rights: moral and economic rights.
3
 Moral 
rights consist of the right to claim authorship and to object to the derogatory treatment of the 
copyright work.
4
 Economic rights, also referred to as exploitation rights in sound recordings, 
consist mainly of the right to (1) make, directly or indirectly, a record embodying the sound 
recording, (2) let or offer or expose for hire by way of trade, directly or indirectly, a 
reproduction of the sound recording and (3) communicate the sound recording to the public.
5
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 See Pistorius “Copyright in the Information Age: The catch-22 of digital technology”. 
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Copyright Act of 1976, section 16(1)(a)–(e) of the UK Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988. See also 
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In examining the liability of ISPs in DP2P file-sharing of sound recordings – which 
has not been decided in any case law
6
 – it is important to lay the basic foundation upon 
which the objectives in this study can be achieved. This entails a range of things from 
defining the object of protection to examining international treaties and agreements 
concerning the reproduction, distribution and communication rights related to sound 
recordings. 
   3.2   The object of protection 
   In each sound recording,
7
 there may be three copyrightable works: a sound recording, a 
musical work and a literary work.
8
 The focus of this dissertation is on sound recordings, 
which may stand on their own as separate works.
9
 Copyright law grants the copyright 
owner of a sound recording a bundle of rights in accordance with the general rights granted 
in the treaties and agreements: the right to reproduce, to distribute and to communicate 
work to the public. Although member countries enact these rights in their domestic 
copyright law, the scope of rights and their interpretation has not been uniform, 
particularly with reference to words and phrases such as a “copy”, “communication to the 
public” and “making available” to mention a few.  
  3.3   Sound recordings  
  In furtherance of the general definition of a sound recording provided earlier,
10
 generally, a 
sound recording is “any fixation or storage of sounds, or data signals representing sounds, 
capable of being reproduced, but does not include a sound-track associated with a 
cinematograph film”.
11
 Sound recordings can be fixed in several media: vinyl discs, 
magnetic tapes, perforated rolls, compact discs (CDs), or electronic formats such as MP3s, 
MPAs and WAVs.
12
  
                                                          
 
6
 It is noted that the role played by Grokster was that of a software distributor, which is different from the 
role of an ISP. 
  
7
  See chapter 1 of this study on the definition of sound recordings in this study. 
 
8
 See Poddar “Digital performances rights in sound recordings”. 
 
9
 For example, a recording of the Flying Scotsman building up steam is a sound recording, but it is not a 
recording of an original work from a musical or literal work. See Bainbridge Intellectual Property at 53. 
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 See s 1 of the South African Copyright Act of 1978; Sound recordings and musical and literary works are 
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TV show, see Wikipedia titled “Soundtrack”.  
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 Idris Intellectual Property: A Power Tool for Economic Growth at 194. 
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A soundtrack of a cinematograph film is protected as part of the film with which it is 
associated. However, a voice recorded message, other than the soundtrack to the film, is 
capable of being protected as a sound recording in its own right. When a sound is embodied 
in both a voice recorded message and a soundtrack, two distinct copyright rights arise, one 
relating to the sound recording and the other to a cinematographic film.
13
  
A sound recording is a derivative work,
14
 which is separate from and independent of 
the underlying works and it is protected by copyright. In essence, copyright infringement of 
a sound recording does not only imply infringement of copyright in the recording itself as 
the underlying work may also be infringed. 
It should be emphasized that the sounds recorded in a sound recording are not limited 
to musical works.
15
 Recordings of non-musical sounds are protected as sound recordings. 
For instance, a recording of a recitation of a passage from a book or poem falls within the 
meaning of a sound recording.
16
  
According to the common-law tradition any work that requires copyright protection 
must be in material form.
17
  
3.4   Holders of copyright rights in sound recordings  
Four major categories of rights-holders can be identified: firstly, composers,
18
 song 
writers,
19
 lyricists
20
 and authors,
21
 all of whom are creators of the primary copyright works; 
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 Bainbridge Intellectual Property at 53. 
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 See Ricketson and Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and 
Beyond at 473. 
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 Musical works are not defined in any of the international treaties or agreements. The term refers to works 
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the music, see section 1(xxxi) of South Africa Copyright Act. This definition is similarly and generally 
provided or described in the various domestic copyright law.
 
A musical work may consist of a relatively 
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a tangible form evidencing creativity in melody and harmony (see Idris Intellectual Property: A Power 
Tool for Economic Growth at 194). 
 
16
 Bainbridge Intellectual Property at 54. 
 
17
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 Wallis “Copyright and the composer” at 104; Theberge “Technology, creative practice and copyright” at 
141. 
 
19
 Muller The Music Business: A Legal Perspective: Music and Live Performances at 27. 
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secondly, the singers, dancers, performers
22
 and other persons who deliver, declaim, 
interpret or otherwise perform the literary
23
 or musical work; thirdly, publishers of formerly 
unpublished works,
24
 producers of phonograms,
25
 personal managers,
26
 broadcasters and 
cable casters; and, fourthly, “new” rights-holders including electronic agents such as ISPs 
and mobile-telephone service providers who own the transmission (entrepreneurial) right in 
their networks which is equivalent to the broadcaster‟s right. It is arguable that this last 
category also includes Internet users and mobile-telephone users who are amateur producers 
of sound recordings through user-generated content (UGC) devices and who are ordinarily 
grouped under the first, second or third category.
27
  
In summary, rights-holders are those who have contributed to the creation of the 
copyright work,
28
 ranging from the person who makes the musical composition to the 
performers, record companies, ISPs and broadcasters.
29
  
3.5   International protection of sound recordings prior to the digital era  
3.5.1   The Berne Convention  
The International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (the Berne Union), 
which is administered by WIPO, was first established pursuant to the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
30
 agreed to in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland. The 
Convention came into effect on 5 December 1887 and has been revised five times and 
supplemented with two additions. The last amendment was in 1979.
31
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 Ibid. at 102. See also Wallis “Copyright and the composer” at 106. 
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 Muller The Music Business at xi. 
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 Sterling Intellectual Property Rights in Sound Recordings, Films and Video at 6. 
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 Ibid. at 266. 
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amended Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886, as 
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 See Stewart International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights at 101, para. 4;Leaffer International Treaties 
on Intellectual Property at 357. 
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3.5.1.1   The right to reproduce musical and literary works  
The right of reproduction forms the basis of other economic rights and it is the most 
comprehensive economic right in all copyright works. The reproduction right is the general 
right of first distribution impliedly covered by the Berne Convention. Article 9(1) of the 
Convention stipulates that authors shall have the exclusive right to authorize the 
reproduction of their works in any manner or form subject to the exception permitted by fair 
use.
32
 It is arguable that the Berne Convention requires member states to interpret “any 
manner or form” as including transient digital fixation.
33
 
Although article 9 of the Berne Convention does not define reproduction, it is 
submitted that its expression of the right of reproduction is comprehensive, dynamic, 
innovative and futuristic and caters for digital reproduction.
34
 Reproduction is premised on a 
recording which is the fixation onto a material form. It is the performance of the work which 
is being fixed and not the work itself.
35
  
3.5.1.2 The right to distribute musical and literary works 
The right of distribution is one of the rights authors enjoy as soon as their work is created. 
The term “distribution right” is used differently in the digital era in that it conveys a more 
specific meaning relating to the protection copyright owners‟ interests in the online 
transmission of copyright works, particularly in P2P file-sharing.  
The right to distribute is “a copyrights-holder‟s exclusive right to sell, lease or 
otherwise transfer copies of the protected work to the public”.
36
 Generally, the forms of 
distribution are sale, transfer of ownership, lease, lending, rental or hire, importation, 
offering for sale, exhibition,
37
 barter and donation.
38
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The distribution right has long been a subject of debate as to whether a rights-holder 
has a right to control the production of his or her work, especially from the perspective of 
author‟s rights.
39
 For clarity, Sterling
40
 distinguishes between a restrictive and a general 
distribution right as follows: a restrictive distribution right is a right to control distribution of 
copies or duplicates that have been made without the necessary consent, while a general 
distribution right is a right to control distribution of copies or duplicates regardless of 
whether they have been made with the consent of the rights-holder. It seems that this right 
seeks to protect copyright in any circumstances, including DP2P file-sharing. For this 
reason, it supplements legislation that has not been amended to deal with modern 
technology. This position is supported by Sterling. In his commentary he notes that a 
distribution right refers to a general distribution right.
41
 
Although article 2 of the Berne Convention protects literary works, the Convention 
does provide for a general exclusive distribution right.
42
 Article 2 states that the expression 
“literary and artistic works” includes:  
“every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever 
may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets, and 
other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same 
nature; dramatic or dramatic-musical works, choreographic works and 
entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; 
cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a 
process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, painting, 
architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to 
which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to 
photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and 
three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or 
science”.  
However, article 14 of the Berne Convention provides for a distribution right in respect of 
cinematographic adaptations only.
43
 Article 14(1) (i) of the Convention states that authors of 
literary or artistic works shall have the exclusive right of authorising “the cinematographic 
adaptation and reproduction of these works, and the distribution of the works thus adapted or 
reproduced”. 
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3.5.1.3   The right to communicate musical and literary works  
Articles 11ter and 11(1) (ii) of the Convention provide for the right of communication to the 
public of literary and musical works. Article 11ter(1) (ii) states that authors of literary works 
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing “any communication to the public of the recitation 
of their works”, while article 11(1) (ii) grants authors of “dramatic, dramatico-musical and 
musical works” the exclusive right of authorizing “any communication to the public of the 
performance of their works”. However, this right is narrow in scope in contrast with the 
provisions in the Internet treaties. The right in the Berne Convention covers only analogue 
forms of communication.  
3.5.2   The Rome Convention  
The International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organizations (the Rome Convention)
44
 came into effect on 18 May 1964. 
The rights protected in the Convention are droits voisins or related rights.
45
 
3.5.2.1   The right to reproduce sound recordings  
The right of reproduction of sound recordings is protected by article 10 of the Rome 
Convention:  
“Producers of phonograms shall enjoy the right to authorize or prohibit 
the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms”.  
This provision is identical to article 14(2) of the later TRIPs Agreement.
46
 Although article 
10 of the Rome Convention does not mention an exclusive right to reproduce sound 
recordings, such a right is implied by the use of the phrase “to authorize or prohibit”.
47
  
3.5.2.2   The right to communicate sound recordings  
Article 12 of the Rome Convention provides that:  
“If a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of 
such phonogram, is used directly for broadcasting or for any communication 
to the public, a single equitable remuneration shall be paid by the user to the 
                                                          
 44  International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organization of 1961 (Rome Convention) 
 
45
 Leaffer International Treaties on Intellectual Property at 426. 
 46 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994. See Gervais The TRIPS 
Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis at 98. 
 
47
 Reinbothe and Von Lewinski The WIPO Treaties 1996 at 346–347. 
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performers, or to the producers of the phonograms, or to both. Domestic law 
may, in the absence of agreement between these parties, lay down the 
conditions as to the sharing of this remuneration”.  
Although producers of sound recordings are thus granted an indirect right of 
communication, they are not granted a right to distribute sound recordings.  
Article 22 of the Rome Convention provides that member states have:  
“the right to enter into special agreements among themselves in so far as 
such agreements grant to performers, producers of phonograms or 
broadcasting organizations more extensive rights than those granted by [the] 
Convention or contain other provisions not contrary to [the] Convention”.  
3.5.3   The Geneva Phonograms Convention  
Because of the inadequacies of the Rome Convention, WIPO adopted another treaty solely 
to cater for those lacunae. The Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms (the Geneva Phonograms 
Convention)
48
 was thus adopted and declared open for members‟ signature on 29 October 
1971. 
The Geneva Phonograms Convention was implemented to address the increasing 
record and tape piracy permitted by the new technologies for reproduction. Although the 
Rome Convention already covered the same subject, many member states did not extend 
copyright protection to the related rights.
49
 
Article 2 of the Geneva Phonograms Convention prohibits unauthorized reproduction 
and distribution of sound recordings by providing that:  
“Each Contracting State shall protect producers of phonograms who are 
nationals of other Contracting States against the making of duplicates 
without the consent of the producer and against the importation of such 
duplicates, provided that any such making or importation is for the purpose 
of distribution to the public, and against the distribution of such duplicates to 
the public”.  
                                                          
48 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Agonist Unauthorized Copyright of their 
Phonograms 1971 
49
  For instance, the US refused to adopt the Rome Convention. See Leaffer International Treaties on 
Intellectual Property at 451. 
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Protection of the distribution right appears to cover only tangible objects in view of the 
reference to “importation”. In the digital era, however, tangible objects have been extended 
to cover digital copies of sound recordings made available online.
50
  
The rights of reproduction and distribution set out in article 2 of the Geneva 
Phonograms Convention are not exclusive rights.  
3.5.4   The Universal Copyright Convention 
Even though the Berne Convention was operational as the basis of international copyright 
law, some major countries had not assent to it, most notably the United States, the former 
Soviet Union and China. The Universal Copyright Convention
51
 (the UCC) came into effect 
on 6 September 1952 as an alternative to the Berne Convention to enable parties to 
participate in an international agreement. The UCC was revised in Paris in 1971 as a result 
of the demands made by developing countries. Such countries are allowed to obtain 
compulsory licences, on certain conditions, to translate copyright works for teaching, 
scholarship and research purposes.
52
  
Article XVII of the UCC and its Appendix Declaration contain a “Berne Safeguard 
Clause” which prevents signatories to the Berne Convention from renouncing that 
Convention and relying on the provisions of the UCC in their copyright relations with other 
members of the Berne Convention. However, the Berne Safeguard Clause was suspended 
for developing countries, which allowed them to withdraw from the Berne Convention and 
to adopt the UCC.
53
 
 In terms of article 1 of the UCC, it provides that:   
“Each Contracting State undertakes to provide for the adequate and 
effective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright 
proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works, including writings, 
musical, dramatic and cinematographic works, and paintings, engravings 
and sculpture”.
54
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3.5.4.1   The right to reproduce sound recordings 
The right of reproduction is stated thus in article IVbis(1):  
“The rights referred to in Article I shall include the basic rights ensuring 
the author‟s economic interests, including the exclusive right to authorize 
reproduction by any means, public performance and broadcasting. The 
provisions of this Article shall extend to works protected under this 
Convention either in their original form or in any form recognizably 
derived from the original”.  
The phrase “by any means” is similar to the phrase “in any manner or form” in article 9(1) 
the Berne Convention. Both phrases are wide enough to cover online reproduction and 
distribution of copyright works.  
3.5.4.2   The right to distribute sound recordings 
The UCC does not provide explicitly for a distribution right. Article V(1) of the UCC, which 
provides for “the exclusive right of the author to make, publish and authorize the making 
and publication of translations of works protected under [the] Convention”,
55
 would 
ordinarily apply to sound recordings but does not because of the definition of “publication” 
in article VI. Article VI defines “publication” as:  
“the reproduction in tangible form and the general distribution to the public 
of copies of a work from which it can be read or otherwise visually 
perceived”.  
The focus on reading and visual “perception” makes it crystal clear that sound recordings 
are excluded. Although musical notes can be read they do not constitute a sound recording.  
3.5.4.3   The right to communicate sound recordings  
Article IVbis of the UCC sets out authors‟ right to authorize public performance of a work. 
It thus provides indirectly for their right to communicate the works to the public. Public 
                                                          
 
55
 A sound recording can arguably be translated, which could bring the recording of such a translation within 
the ambit of article V of the UCC. In Nigeria, among other West African countries, traditional drummers 
create sounds with locally made drums called “talking drums”. A listener versed in these instruments 
understands the sounds created by the drummer and can easily translate the messages the performers are 
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who has not received donations or rewards from the gathering “talks with the drum” to express his or her 
dissatisfaction or even to abuse the people in question. In such circumstances, no performer translates the 
uncomplimentary remarks to the ordinary listener or audience! 
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performance has been interpreted in a member country as transmission to the public by 
means of any device or process, regardless of whether the members of the public are capable 
of receiving the performance or display in the same place or in separate places and at the 
same time or at different times.
56
  
3.6   International protection of sound recordings in the digital era  
Today, virtually all sound recordings are created and stored digitally rather than in analogue 
form. This fact obviously facilitates the digital distribution of sound recordings, particularly 
on the Internet. Container files are distributed through the Internet and can be stored on 
computers.
57
  
The online liability of ISPs will be examined in relation to the rights of reproduction, 
distribution and communication of sound recordings in terms of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs Agreement), the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 
3.6.1   Digitization  
Digitization is the conversion of analogue works to a binary format represented by zeros and 
ones which are recorded, stored, transmitted and read by a machine. Different methods may 
be used to digitize works, but they all have the same result: the creation of a binary code that 
enables the work to be played back thus reproducing the original analogue data. Digitization 
enables all tangible works to be recorded in digital format, no matter how complicated they 
may be.
58
 
The features of digital works are (a) ease of copying or capturing of data; (b) ease of 
distribution or transmission; (c) ease of manipulating or editing; (d) ease of storage; (e) ease 
of searching or linking data; (f) difficulty in determining exclusive rights of authors in view 
of the new types of work which cannot be easily categorized in terms of the categories 
traditional works are categorised in.
59
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3.6.2   Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property  
The TRIPs Agreement
60
 makes provision for the protection of both original and derivative 
works, unlike the WCT and WPPT which protect original and derivative works respectively. 
The TRIPs Agreement does not address the challenges created by the new technologies.
61
 
3.6.2.1   The right to reproduce sound recordings  
Article 14(2) of the TRIPs Agreement sets out the right of producers of sound recordings to 
“authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction” of their recordings. To the extent 
that the article specifies only producers of sound recordings, this right can be said to be 
exclusively theirs.
62
  
3.6.2.2   The right to distribute sound recordings 
The TRIPs Agreement does not define distribution; consequently it cannot be said to 
provide for a general, explicit right of distribution.
63
  
3.6.3   The WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
The scope of copyright protection has been broadened in response to new means of 
reproducing sound recordings.
64
 Although celebrated rights-holders of sound recordings 
believe that the risk of easy and widespread piracy explains the growing rights of 
copyrights-holders in the digital era, Internet broadcasting and podcasting pose new 
questions about the effectiveness of copyright law.
65
  
Both Internet treaties will be examined together because of the similarity of their 
description of the rights of reproduction, distribution and communication. 
3.6.3.1   The right of reproduction 
The agreed statement concerning article 1(4) of the WCT states that:  
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“The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, 
and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital 
environment, in particular to the use of works in digital form. It is 
understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an 
electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of Article 
9 of the Berne Convention”.
66
  
Similarly, article 11 of the WPPT protects the exclusive right of producers of sound 
recordings to authorize “the direct or indirect reproduction” of their recordings “in any 
manner or form”.
67
 In terms of the agreed statement concerning article 11 this right applies 
fully “in the digital environment, in particular to the use of performances and phonograms in 
digital form”. The statement goes on to say that “the storage of a protected performance or 
phonogram in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction” within the 
meaning of article 11. The right of reproduction is an exclusive one in both the WCT and 
WPPT.  
Although the WPPT is not founded on the Rome Convention in the same way as that 
in which the WCT is based on the Berne Convention,
68
 it corresponds to article 10 of Rome 
Convention and article 14(2) of the TRIPs Agreement.
69
  
The Rome Convention, UCC and the TRIPs Agreement give the right of reproduction 
comprehensive protection to the extent that it is made exclusive.
70
 However, article 10 of the 
Rome Convention and article 14(2) of the TRIPs Agreement do not extend protection of the 
right to cover sound recordings “in any manner or form”. Article 11 of the WPPT does. 
Therefore the making of temporary copies, invisible copies and storing of the work are acts 
of reproduction.
71
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3.6.3.2   The right of distribution 
i. Introduction  
The WCT and the WPPT make provision for the explicit general right of distribution.
72
 
Article 12(1) of the WPPT states that “Producers of phonograms shall enjoy the exclusive 
right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their 
phonograms through sale or other transfer of ownership”. In terms of the agreed statement 
concerning article 12 of the WPPT “the expressions „copies‟ and „original and copies,‟ being 
subject to the right of distribution …, refer exclusively to fixed copies that can be put into 
circulation as tangible objects”.  
The distribution right is described in similar language in article 6 of the WCT.
73
 
Article 6(1) states that: 
“Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right 
of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and 
copies of their works through sale or other transfer of ownership”.  
This article updates the right of distribution in the Berne Convention. The agreed statement 
concerning article 6 of the WCT states that the expression “copies” refers; 
“exclusively to fixed copies that can be put into circulation as 
tangible objects”.  
     A question arises regarding the scope of the distribution right. Article 9 of the Berne 
Convention protects the right of reproduction in “any manner or form”. Although this right 
covers first publication or distribution, individual member states have discretion to 
implement a distribution right that extends beyond the initial act of publication of a 
copyrighted work, thus covering subsequent publications and distributions. In certain 
countries which practise some form of exhaustion right, this right does not cover the resale 
or distribution of a particular copy that has already been put into circulation.
74
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ii. Definition of terms in distribution right 
a. Original and copies  
Generally, the distribution right is attached inextricably to the belief that a tangible copy is 
the object of distribution that is issued or published. The right applies to the acts of 
distributing, issuing and publishing that take place in terms of a sale or other transaction that 
results in the transfer of ownership of the copy. The connection between the act of 
distributing and the existence of a tangible copy of a work to be distributed is established by 
the agreed statement concerning article 12 of the WPPT and that concerning article 6 of the 
WCT, both of which expressly state that in relation to the right of distribution the terms 
“copies” and “original and copies” refer “exclusively to fixed copies that can be put into 
„circulation‟ as tangible objects”. The intention of these statements is to limit copies to 
physical objects only.
75
  
In law fixation occurs when the embodiment of the work in a copy allows a sound 
recording to be perceived either directly or through the aid of a device or to be further 
communicated for a period which is longer than transitory.
76
  
b. Making available  
The phrase “making available to the public”, which describes the act of distribution,
77
 
originated in the discussions of the Committee of Experts and in the Basic Proposal for the 
WCT. It describes in more precise terms the rather general term “distribution”.
78
 Making 
available to the public covers only the putting into circulation of tangible objects either as 
originals or copies, as set out in the agreed statements in the WCT and WPPT – although 
parties are allowed to some extent to use the term in a flexible manner with regard to the 
implementation of the right of distribution.
79
  
In the US, however, the term “making available” has been interpreted not to mean 
distribution because it is a “mere offer to distribute” or “[mere invitation to] potential 
recipients to create those copies  in their computers” which does not create any intent to 
transfer ownership, unlike distribution and publication both of which have the intent to 
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distribute. This approach followed the earlier interpretation of distribution in a non-digital 
context as requiring actual dissemination.
80
 In some jurisdictions distribution is equated with 
publication.
81
  
On the other hand it has been argued that there is no reason to limit distribution to 
transactions in which a material object exists throughout, but rather that the definition of 
distribution should be extended to include transactions in which a material object is created 
elsewhere than at its finishing point and which does not require divestiture of physical 
ownership by the transferor. In other words, the newly created right held by the transferee is 
important and fundamental. The multiplication of ownership should be emphasised and not 
whether the material object changes hands.
82
  
If this interpretation is followed, the distinction between article 12 of the WPPT and 
article 6 of the WCT on the one hand and article 14 of the WPPT
83
 and article 8 of the 
WCT
84
 on the other would be blurred, and confusing, and would prohibit a user from 
obtaining a digital copy of a sound recording on the Internet notwithstanding the fact that 
certain features in the articles differ.
85
  
Article 14 of the WPPT states that “Producers of phonograms shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of their phonograms, by 
wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of the public may access them from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them” while article 8 of the WCT states that:  
“Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and 
(ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of 
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literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, 
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way 
that members of the public may access these works from a place and at 
time individually chosen by them.”  
 It is submitted that this blurring of the rights of distribution and communication was not 
intended by the drafters of the treaties. Fortunately, reading the articles with the relevant 
agreed statements, in which the drafters express their clear and unambiguous intent, should 
help avoid any confusion in this regard. 
c. Public  
Since the WPPT does not define “public”, each member country is expected to interpret it 
according to its own legal traditions and concepts.
86
 It is expected that their use of the term 
will reflect the intent of the WPPT‟s drafters, bearing in mind the terms used in the article to 
indicate that “public” refers to direct physical contact between users and not to the online-
world meaning of the concept “public”.  
d. Sale or other transfer of ownership  
Finally, “through sale or other transfer of ownership” excludes the term “lease” which is 
included in Garner‟s
87
 definition of “distribution”. The phrase further confirms that only 
permanent and absolute acts are covered by the right of distribution in the digital world, 
including donation and barter
88
 as opposed to lending, leasing, rental and hiring.  
3.6.3.3   The right of communication  
There are two main distinctions between article 14 of the WPPT and article 8 of the WCT. 
First, the title of article 14 of the WPPT refers to the “Right of making available of 
phonograms” in contrast with that of article 8 of the WCT, “Right of communication to the 
public”. Secondly, article 8 of the WCT contains the clause “including making available”, 
whereas article 14 of the WPPT does not contain a similar provision. Article 14 of the 
WPPT provides for the right of “making available” of phonograms “by wire or wireless 
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means”, while in article 8 of the WCT “making available” is only one of the means of 
communicating to the public.
89
  
“Making available” to the public includes offering users access to sound recordings 
and it extends to the whole transmission process if one actually takes place. Thus, in 
accordance with article 14 of the WPPT, “making available” applies to situations in which a 
server on which electronic files are stored, or offered for access, or made available for 
distribution is established that may be accessed individually by members of the public and at 
their convenience with regard to time and place.
90
 Further, uploading file names to the 
search index or for other copying purposes or uploading copyright works infringes 
copyright.
91
 However, “making available” does not cover the actions of a user who after 
accessing a sound recording transmits it by loudspeaker to an audience; such broadcasting 
constitutes public performance.
92
  
Notwithstanding the fact that the right of making available is limited to remote 
transmission, it does not mean that the right is limited to a local area.
93
 The mere provision 
of cables or other transmission facilities for the purpose of “making available” does not 
amount to actual making available. In other words, the facilities for transmission must be in 
working order.
94
 
Article 14 of the WPPT contemplates non-simultaneous transmission and receipt or an 
on-demand situation
95
 in which, for example, a sound recording is made available in such a 
way that members of the public may access it by “wire or wireless means” from a place and 
at a time individually chosen by them. However, this excludes the making available by way 
of offering, at specified times, and predetermined programmes for reception by the general 
public whether through the broadcasting of radio programmes by traditional means or 
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through digital networks (that is, webcasting – original cable programme distribution over 
the Web). Also excluded are simulcasting (simultaneous and unchanged retransmission  of 
traditional broadcast programmes  over digital networks), “real audio” or Internet radio, pay 
radio, pay-per-listen services, multi-channel services and near-on-demand services, all of 
which broadcast sound recordings.
96
 Reinbothe and Von Lewinski argue that these means of 
distribution or making available are excluded from the right set out in article 14 because, in 
each of them, a user relies on programming and cannot choose the time at which he or she 
accesses a particular sound recording.
97
  
Article 14 of the WPPT is concerned with the transactions between a copyrights-
holder and the public online which constitute the transmission of the work.
98
 This includes 
interactive and online communications rather than a transaction involving transfer of a 
physical object.
99
 Thus, the WPPT seems to make a clear distinction between, on the one 
hand, the public distribution of tangible copies of a copyright work in terms of article 12 and 
its agreed statement and, on the other, public access to the copyright work itself through 
some form of transmission, whether wired or wireless, digital or analogue, interactive or 
otherwise, in terms of article 14.
100
 
Essentially, the distinction between articles 12 and 14 of the WPPT is that article 12 
concerns copy-related rights – such as those of reproduction and distribution – which cover 
acts by which copies of works are made publicly available for what has been termed 
“deferred”
101
 uses whereas article 14 concerns non-copy-related rights – such as those of 
public performance, broadcasting and other transmissions – in situations in which the public 
uses or accesses copyright works.
102
 This distinction should put to rest the misinterpretation 
of the terms “copy” and “making available” examined in paragraph 3.6.3.2 above. Further, 
the fact that the phrase “sale or other transfer of ownership” has not been included in article 
14 of the WPPT and article 8 of the WCT (but has been included in article 12 of the WPPT 
and article 6 of the WCT) clearly indicates that sound recordings are “copied” and “made 
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available” online when they are uploaded which does not need any change of hands before a 
third party becomes the owner of a copy of the work.
103
  
The term “public” also appears in article 14 of the WPPT and article 8 of the WCT 
but the term is not defined in these treaties. The conventional meaning of “public” is that it 
comprises of third parties that are not part of a close family circle or caucus, and closest 
social acquaintances and affiliations.
104
 However, because of the nature of P2P file-sharing, 
once a work is placed or made available online in a P2P file-sharing environment it is made 
available and circulated to the public, notwithstanding the fact that it is a closed network. It 
is submitted that the term “public” in relation to DP2P networks means any person other 
than the owner or licensee of a sound recording although Kemper argues that the concepts of 
“public” and “private” can be maintained in the digital world.
105
  
3.6.3.4   The right to remuneration for communication to the public 
The right to remuneration under article 15 of the WPPT is among the economically most 
important rights of performance and phonograms producers.
106
 Article 15(1) of the WPPT 
protects “the right to a single equitable remuneration for the direct or indirect use of 
phonograms published for commercial purposes for broadcasting or for any communication 
to the public”. This right draws on the provisions of article 12 of the Rome Convention 
which states that:  
“If a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of such 
phonogram, is used directly for broadcasting or for any communication to the 
public, a single equitable remuneration shall be paid by the user to the 
performers, or to the producers of the phonograms, or to both”. 
 
However, article 15 of the WPPT has been constructed more strongly than article 12 of the 
Rome Convention.
107
 The first agreed statement concerning article 15 states that the article 
is not “a complete resolution of the level of rights of broadcasting and communication to the 
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public that should be enjoyed by performers and phonogram producers in the digital age”. 
The agreed statement relates to the nature of the remuneration right as a minimum standard 
and to the qualification of the relevant sound recordings as “published for commercial 
purposes”.
108
  
However, domestic law may make provision for the for the exclusive right for rights-
holders in respect of any kind of use for broadcasting and communication to the public or 
only for specified kinds thereof  provided the exclusive right gives more or greater 
protection to the author.
109
  
In terms of article 15(2), contracting parties to the WPPT are at liberty to “establish” 
in their national law that “the single equitable remuneration shall be claimed from the user 
by the performer or by producer” of a sound recording” and, in the absence of an agreement 
between the producer and performer, may enact national legislation to set the terms 
according to which producers and performers share the single equitable remuneration. In 
most countries providing for this right, performers and producers share the remuneration 
equally. This right is usually exercised through collecting societies.
110
   
A single equitable remuneration does not mean a once-off payment. Remuneration 
must be paid continuously (and perhaps periodically) for further uses specified under article 
15 of WPPT. Further, users jointly pay only one “remuneration” per use to producers and 
performers together rather than paying each producer and each performer individually or 
separately. The word “equitable” must be defined by domestic law or by judges in the 
application or implementation of this right except parties agree on the amount to be regarded 
as equitable because it is not defined in the WPPT. This expression implies that the 
frequency and value of use must be taken into consideration as the main criteria.
111
  
It is also within the discretion of each contracting party to declare that it will apply the 
provisions of article 15(1) of the WPPT “only in respect of certain uses, or that it will limit 
their application in some other ways, or that it will not apply these provisions at all”.
112
 This 
implies that ISPs may be excluded from paying remuneration to producers for indirect use of 
sound recordings for the purpose of granting users access to sound recordings, even though 
                                                          
 
108
 Ibid. at 386. 
 
109
 Ibid. at 380. 
110
 See Reinbothe and Von Lewinski The WIPO Treaties 1996 at 380 para 12. 
111
 Ibid. at 381 para 15. 
112
 Article 15(3) of the WPPT. 
42 
they derive direct financial benefit from granting such access through subscriptions paid by 
users. 
In terms of article 15(4) of the WPPT, sound recordings “made available to the public 
by wire or wireless means in such a way that members of the public may access them from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them shall be considered as if they had been 
published for commercial purposes”.
113
  
3.7   The role of ISPs in the limitation of liability  
A major issue concerning intellectual property and Internet transactions is that of liability 
for copyright infringement especially online infringement of sound recordings. The role of 
ISPs in copyright infringement is perhaps traceable to or perceived from article 11bis of the 
Berne Convention, which was the main international provision likely to affect the liability of 
ISPs prior to the introduction of the 1996 WIPO treaties.
114
 This article requires contracting 
states to grant authors of literary and artistic works the exclusive right to authorize the  
broadcasting of the work.
115
  
In view of the fact that the Internet is a means to broadcast any kind of information 
(including sound recordings), this provision is relevant to the Internet. This is because the 
Internet has the ability to achieve rapid, widespread delivery and mass distribution which 
has made distribution move away from the traditional concept of broadcasting. With the 
growth of the Internet, ISPs may encounter potential liability for the acts of users making 
use of their services to access, post and download information.
116
       
In 1996, WIPO adopted two Internet treaties which are WCT and WPPT. These 
treaties give guidelines to ISPs relating to their liability recommending that copyright 
liability should not apply to the person who acts as a conduit.
117
  
Liability issues are very complex
118
 and the extent of liability is determined under 
national law and on a case-by-case basis.
119
 Over the years member countries to WIPO 
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Internet treaties have adopted domestic copyright law in compliance with the basic standards 
established by WIPO treaties.
120
  
Since the adoption of the Internet treaties (WCT and WPPT), member countries i.e. 
signatories to the Internet treaties have begun to apply this basic standard. Some countries
121
 
have adopted rules governing ISP liability regardless of the grounds for illegality of the 
transmitted material that cover not only copyright infringement but also other legal aspects 
such as libel or obscenity. Other countries
122
 have adopted copyright-specific laws.  
3.8   Conclusion     
 
Having examined the rights in sound recordings under the various international treaties and 
agreements, it is evident that several issues arise. First, is adoption of these treaties and 
agreements adequate to protect rights owners in the digital era particularly in DP2P 
technology? Secondly, are these rights uniformly interpreted by member countries, given 
that the agreed statements allow flexibility in the domestic implementation of the treaties 
and agreements? Thirdly, do these rights adequately protect rights-holders against DP2P 
technology? Fourthly, does dissemination or transmission of a work in digital form amount 
to public performance, an act of reproduction or distribution – or to all three? Fifthly, how 
do rules concerning the right to importation apply in a digital environment?
123
 All of these 
matters will be considered in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
4.1   Introduction  
The antecedent of the American copyright law is found in English law, particularly the 
Statute of Anne of 1710.
1
 Copyright law in the United States is a compromise which 
balances the interests of authors and the public. Copyright protection is rooted in the 
American Constitution.
2
 Section 8 of article I states that:  
“The Congress shall have power … To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Investors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”. 
The US Copyright Act is entrenched in Title 17 of the United States Code. The kernel of 
the Act is contained in its first five chapters. The others serve a wide range of special 
purposes, particularly Chapter 12, “Copyright protection and management system”, 
containing the controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 which was added 
to the Copyright Act by section 103 of the controversial DMCA.
3
  
The United States is a signatory to international instruments such as the Universal 
Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention,
4
 the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs Agreement)
5
 and the Rome Convention.
6
 The 
United States delayed in acceding to the Berne Convention for a long time because of the 
Convention‟s inconsistency with its Copyright Act.
7
 Most of the 1976 changes to the 
Copyright Act were made in anticipation of the ratification of various treaties including the 
Berne Convention. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and 
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Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) have been implemented, but only in part, by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.
8
 
4.2   Rights in sound recordings 
4.2.1   Right of reproduction 
In terms of section 106(1) of the Copyright Act copyright owners have the exclusive right 
“to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”. Section 101 defines 
“copies” as “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any 
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
device”.  
Regarding the reproduction of copies the US government in its 1995 White Paper on 
the National Information Infrastructure
9
 said that: “when a work is placed into a computer, 
whether on a disk, diskette, ROM, or other storage device or in the RAM for more than a 
very brief period, a copy is made. Copying is automatically proved when there is an upload 
to, transmission on or download from the Internet.
10
  
“Whenever a printed work is “scanned” into a digital file, a copy 
– the digital file itself – is made; when other works – including 
photographs, motion pictures, or sound recordings – are digitized, 
copies are made; whenever a digitized file is “uploaded” from a 
user‟s computer to a bulletin board system (BBS) or other server, 
a copy is made; whenever a digitized file is “downloaded” from a 
BBS or other server, a copy is made; when a file is transferred 
from one computer network user to another, multiple copies are 
generally made; under current technology, when an end-user‟s 
computer is employed as a “dumb” terminal to access a file 
resident on another computer such as a BBS or Internet host, a 
copy of at least the portion viewed is made in the user‟s 
computer” Without such copying into the RAM or buffer of the 
user‟s computer, no screen display would be possible.”
11
  
Two recent court cases in the United States explored whether a digital file embodying a 
work is a copy or a phonorecord of the work and whether the embodiment must be more 
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than merely transitory. In London-Sire Records v Does
12
 the plaintiff sued the defendant 
students for allegedly copying and distributing copyrighted sound recordings over a P2P 
file-sharing network. The students‟ defence was that the exclusive right “to distribute the 
work in copies or phonorecords” was limited to tangible, physical objects and therefore did 
not apply to the transmission of digital files. Had this argument been favourably received, 
“a great deal of internet commerce involving computer-to-computer electronic transfers of 
information” would fall outside the scope of rights-holders‟ distribution rights.
13
 The court 
considered the implications of the defendants‟ submission alongside the intent of Congress 
to enable copyrights-holders to control the distribution of artists‟ sound recordings.
14
  
The court examined the definition of “copy”, “phonorecord” and “fixation”, saying 
that the “Copyright Act thus does not use materiality in its most obvious sense to mean a 
tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc. Rather, it refers to 
materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work can be fixed”.
15
 The court declared 
that: 
[A]ny object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a “material 
object”. That includes the electronic files at issue here. When a user 
on a peer to peer network downloads a song from another user, he 
receives into his computer a digital sequence representing the sound 
recordings. That sequence is magnetically encoded on a segment of 
his hard disk (or likewise written on other media). With the right 
hardware and software, the downloader can use the magnetic 
sequence to reproduce the sound recordings. The electronic file – or 
perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk – is 
therefore a “phonorecord” with the meaning of the statute.
16
 
According to Ginsburg,
17
 the court did not take into consideration the other part of the 
definition of fixation which might have supported the defendants‟ claim. That part of the 
definition is to the effect that a copy that is distributed must be tangible, thus excluding 
digital files communicated between computers.
18
  
In the second case, the Second Circuit held in Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings
19
 
that reproductions made in a computer‟s buffer and lasting 1,2 seconds were insufficiently 
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“fixed” to be copies; although the buffer embodied the works, the embodiments were too 
transitory.
20
 Unfortunately the court did not specify the duration of embodiment that would 
suffice.  
  4.2.2 Right of distribution 
  The US Copyright Act expressly includes a distribution right.
21
 The right of distribution of 
works is set out in section 106(3) which stipulates that, subject to certain limitations, the 
owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to “distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, leasing, 
or lending”. 
In the defendants‟ argument in the London-Sire Records v Does
22
 it was contended 
that a narrow interpretation of the distribution right should be applied to the term “copy” to 
cover only the “sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease or lending which are 
presumed to be in physical copies”. The defendants argued that transferors must give up, 
relinquish or transfer ownership or possession of the copy distributed but in the case of 
digital copies the copy is retained by the transferor, which means that there is no 
distribution. The court refused to read the “transfer of ownership as requiring dispossession 
of the distributor‟s copy”,
23
 adducing two reasons for its refusal. First, distribution should 
now be extended to a transaction where a material object is created elsewhere at its 
finishing point. Secondly, the newly created ownership right held by the transferee is more 
important than whether the transferor gives up his or her own copy.
24
 The intent of the 
legislature is to allow rights-holders to control the rate at and terms on which copies of 
phonorecords are made.
25
 In conclusion, the court said that electronic file transfer fits 
within the definition of the distribution of phonorecords.
26
 
Subsequent legislation follows the right as set out in section 106(3). In 1995, section 
115 of the Copyright Act, which deals with compulsory licences for making and 
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distributing phonograms, was amended to include “those who make phonorecords or 
digital phonorecord deliveries”. The amendment further declares that: 
     “A person may obtain a compulsory license only if his or her primary 
purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute them to the public 
for private use, including by means of a digital phonorecord 
delivery”.  
The significance of the amendment is that digital deliveries create new copies 
without divesting the sender‟s copy.
27
     
The definition of digital phonorecord delivery confirms that what is most important 
is the constitution of the copy in the recipient‟s computer:  
“A „digital phonorecord delivery‟ is each individual delivery of 
phonorecord by digital transmission of a sound recording which 
results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by or for any 
transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound recording”.
28
 
Since Congress has equated digital phonorecord delivery with distribution, transfer of 
ownership cannot be understood to require dispossession of the transferor‟s copy.
29
  
The controversy concerning the phrase “making available” still rages on.
30
 
Proceeding from the definition of “digital phonorecord”, the statutory distribution right 
applies when a specifically identifiable reproduction “results” in a user‟s destination 
computer, i.e. the delivery has actually been received by a user, not merely offered by the 
offeror.
31
  
 Two appellate courts namely:  BMG Music v Gonzales
32
 and A & M Records v 
Napster I case,
33
 have held in passing that persons who “post” files to a sharing directory 
or upload file names to a directory of files available for download violate copyright 
owners‟ exclusive right of distribution. The courts‟ statements do not mean that 
distribution encompasses making available without actual transfer of digital files. In other 
words, digital files must actually be transferred for there to be distribution which arguably 
is not the case when potential recipients are only invited to create copies on their 
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computers or when works are made available for copying.
34
 In BMG Music v Gonzales,
35
 
the distributor‟s liability was limited to only those works users had downloaded from him 
and the reference to posting was a dictum in the decision. In A & M Records v Napster Inc 
II case,
36
 Napster asserted an affirmative defence to the charge that its users directly 
infringed plaintiff‟s copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings in two ways: 
rights of reproduction and distribution. On reproduction right, Napster users downloaded 
files containing copyrighted sound recordings while on the distribution right, Napster users 
uploaded file names to the search index for others to copy.    
Case law which categorically limits distribution rights to acts only of “making 
available” online currently stems from judgments of first-level courts which are very 
inconsistent in claims by record or film producers against individuals allegedly engaged in 
high-volume file-sharing. The more extensively reasoned decisions do not find statutory 
authority for a making available right.
37
  
There have been many default decisions  accepting, without discussion, the inclusion 
of “making available”  within the distribution right especially equating the defendant‟s 
conduct  with publication or better still declaring a presumption  that works made available 
were in fact downloaded.
38
 While other decisions
39
 reject the existence or approximation of 
a right to make available, and pointed out that the person offering digital files from his or 
her directory may still be pursued for contravening reproduction rights if the files were 
themselves illegal or unlawful downloads. 
 Nonetheless, the Copyright Act does not define the terms “distribute” and 
“distribution”; it defines a closely related term, “publication”, in terms virtually identical to 
section 106(3)‟s provision for a distribution right, but with an additional specification, 
namely that: 
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50 
“the offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group or   
persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance or 
public display constitutes publication”.
40
  
This phrase from 1976 might have anticipated P2P networks since a person who places a 
copy of a work in his or her sharing directory is offering it to a group of persons (i.e. 
Internet users) for further distribution (i.e. follow-on) “sharing” by other participants in the 
P2P network
41
 The court in Atlantic Recording Corp v Anderson
42
 therefore held that it 
would entertain a claim that the defendant had offered to distribute digital files for the 
purpose of further distribution. It also observed that other courts had characterized making 
available as unauthorized publication. Nevertheless, the court‟s equation of distribution 
with publication is unconvincing. Publication is a form of distribution but not synonymous 
with it. Publication is understood in two contexts. While all publications are distributions, 
not all distributions are publications.
43
  
The London-Sire Records v Does
44
 court did not distinguish a “making available” 
right in section 106(3), nor did it subscribe to the publication theory. Rather, the court 
followed the analysis of a decision construing the distribution right in the analogue world. 
In Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
45
 the rights-holders claimed that 
the branch libraries of the Mormon Church had made available to the public unauthorized 
copies of their work on microfiche. The libraries did not keep records to show whether 
patrons had in fact consulted the microfiches. In the church‟s reply, it was submitted that 
the rights-holders did not prove more than an offer to distribute the work; without proof 
that a member of the public had accepted the offer, the authors could not make out a claim 
of unauthorized distribution.
46
  
The court realized that the impossible situation in which the Church‟s argument put 
the rights-holders effectively shifted the onus of proof. It said that a defendant who is 
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expected to keep records of public use but does not would unjustly profit by this 
omission.
47
 The court further held that:  
“[i]f, as the church says, actual use by the public must be shown to 
establish distribution, no one can expect a copyrights-holder to 
prove particular instances of use by the public when the proof is 
impossible to produce because the infringing library has not kept 
records of the public use”.
48
  
Thus, copyrights-holders should not be prejudiced by the infringer‟s failure to keep records 
nor should the infringer be permitted to benefit from that failure.
49
 If the argument of the 
church is followed, defendants can always prove that they did not intend distribution 
because no member of the public accepted the offer to make available.
50
  
The London-Sire Records v Does court followed the Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints case to hold that: 
 “where the defendant has completed all the necessary steps for a 
public distribution, a reasonable fact-finder may infer that the 
distribution actually took place … The evidence and allegations 
taken together are sufficient to allow a statistically reasonable 
inference that at least one copyrighted work was downloadable 
once”.
51
  
In contrast, the court in Capitol Records v Thomas
52
 rejected both the “making available” 
right and functional equivalents thereof. The court found no support in the protection of 
copyright thereof in sound recording for basing liability on a mere offer to distribute. It 
determined that the court in National Car Rental System, Inc v Computer Associates 
International Inc
53
 had already ruled (in a non-digital context) that distribution requires 
actual dissemination. The court interpreted this as prohibiting the “deemed distribution” 
approach of the Hotaling case. It held that:  
The specter of impossible-to-meet evidentiary standards … is overstated. 
A person who makes an unauthorized copy of a phonorecord of a 
copyrighted work for purposes of uploading it unto a P2P network, absent 
a defence such as fair-use, violates the reproduction right [(17 USC 
                                                          
 
47
  Supra 
 
48
  Supra.   
 
49
 Supra. 
 
50
 Ginsburg “Recent developments in US copyright law” at 23. 
 
51
 London-Sire Records v Does supra at 169 and 176. 
 
52
 Capitol Records v Thomas at 40. See also Ginsburg “Recent developments in US copyright law” at 24 
and Wong “The exclusive rights of „distribution‟, „communication to the public‟ and „making available‟ 
under the WIPO Copyright Treaty” at 18. 
 
53
  See National Car Rental System, Inc v Computer Associates International Inc.at 434. 
52 
section 106(1)].That person might also be held for indirect infringement 
to the extent that their conduct caused others to engage in unauthorized 
reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, public performance or 
public display of an author‟s copyrighted work.
54
  
In Re Napster Inc Copyright Litigation (which is herein referred to as Napster IV case),
55
 
the court dismissed the copyright owners‟ argument that the Artists‟ Rights and Theft 
Prevention Act (the ART Act) was intended to amend section 106(3) of the Copyright Act 
and that the term “making available” in the ART Act pertained merely to one element of a 
criminal offence which still had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
56
 Further, Judge 
Patel made a distinction between the Napster IV case and Hotaling v Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints case. She ruled that Napster‟s listing of copyright works in its 
file index was distinguishable from what happened in Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints by citing case law from other courts that required dissemination of a 
copy of a copyrighted work for distribution to have occurred. She concluded that to apply 
the precedent in Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints that merely 
offering to distribute copies of a copyright work constitutes a violation of the distribution 
right would be contrary to case-law precedent, statutory interpretation and legislative 
history.
57
  
  In Interscope v Duty,
58
 the court denied the defendant‟s motion to dismiss the suit, in 
which the defendant argued that no section 106(3) distribution could occur without actual 
public dissemination of actual copies of copyright works. Similar arguments were 
canvassed in Atlantic Recording Corporation et al. v Howell 
59
 in August 2008.  
Most of the courts
60
 have said that the distribution right does not include the right of 
making available because making available is not actual distribution.
61
 While the language 
of article 6 of the WCT may seem strange to US copyright law, examining the provision in 
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conjunction with the agreed statement relating to it and identifying the differences between 
the concept of copyright in the United States and the same concept in other systems will 
cause one to argue that article 6 of the WCT is intended to deal with the exclusive right of 
selling, lending, disposing of or otherwise transferring ownership of tangible copies of a 
work. Thus, section 106(3) of the US Copyright Act is more limited in scope than article 6 
of the WCT.
62
 Also, dealing in tangible objects inevitably brings to the fore the issue of the 
“first sale” right in US copyright law.
63
 
According to Lee and Davidson
64
 it is not clear whether electronic transmission 
constitutes or amounts to distribution, even though distribution is not defined in the 
Copyright Act.
65
 However, section 101 provides for the definition of the term “transmit” 
thus:  
“To „transmit‟ a performance or display is to communicate it 
by any device or process whereby images or sounds are 
received beyond the place from which they are sent”.  
The term “transmit” does not appear in the section dealing with the right of distribution 
although the court in Playboy Enterprises Inc v Frena,
66
  has interpreted it in relation to a 
bulletin board. In this case, the court held that the unauthorized uploading and subsequent 
downloading of digitized photographs by BBS subscribers impacted on the right of 
distribution in an action against the BBS operator. Essentially, this judgment confirms that 
uploading constitutes distribution. 
According to Halpern
67
 digital technology presents a real problem for the definition 
of distribution. For example, normally a distributor does not have a copy of what is 
distributed as soon as it is distributed, but this is not true of online distribution. He further 
opines that in the digital world when a copy is distributed, the receiver simultaneously 
acquires both possession and ownership, whereas in the analogue world possessing, 
lending, leasing or hiring, and owning are discrete acts.
68
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Following Halpern,
69
 distribution on the Internet is unique in nature, different from 
other modes of distribution. Once a work is uploaded, the sender – whether or not he or she 
owns the copy legitimately – disposes of the possessory and ownership rights regarding the 
copy.
70
 Halpern‟s position complies with the requirements of online transmission with 
regard to sale or transfer of ownership as expressed in section 106(3) of the US Copyright 
Act. However, lending, leasing and hiring do not apply to online transmission.
71
 Broadcast 
transmission of a sound recording does not amount to distribution for the purposes of 
section 106(3) of the US Copyright Act. In Agee v Paramount Communications Inc
72
 the 
court held that merely transmitting a sound recording to the public on the airwaves does 
not constitute a distribution. However, while a broadcast is not in the strict sense 
distribution as regards broadcast programmes, the same cannot be said of convergence or 
broadcast transmissions on the Internet, in what is referred to as webcasting. 
4.2.3   Right of communication 
The right to communicate sound recordings to the public is provided for in section 106(6) 
of the Copyright Act, although it is not expressly stated.
73
 Section 106(6) provides that in 
the case of sound recordings the copyright owner has the exclusive right “to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission”.
74
 The italicized 
words herein call for examination in view of the fusion of the right of communication with 
the right of public performance. The right owners do not enjoy a full public-performance 
right. This is because the right of communication is generally believed not to extend to 
public performance since, strictly speaking, there is no performance when a sound 
recording is transmitted, despite the fact that performance and display rights seem fairly 
broad in scope.
75
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Public performance or display can occur in public places or by transmission, the 
latter being relevant to digital communication.
76
 According to section 101 of the Copyright 
Act to perform or display a work publicly by transmission is to: 
 “to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of 
the work … to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times”.  
This broad definition anticipates new forms of transmission such as video on demand.
77
  
In Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings & Cable Vision,
78
 the plaintiff claimed that the 
statutory language of section 106(4) and (5) of the US Copyright Act covered a remote 
video delivery service. The court, however, having curtailed the scope of the right of 
reproduction in the digital environment,
79
 proceeded to give a narrow construction of the 
public-performance right. The Cablevision remote playback system stored copies of 
television programmes in virtual storage boxes dedicated to individual subscribers. The 
cablevision system would transmit the programme when the individual subscriber chose to 
view it, using the copy in the subscriber‟s storage box as the source of the transmission. 
Cablevision claimed that the transmission was not to the public in that each copy was 
transmitted to the particular subscriber only.
80
  
The court found merit in this argument. The definition of the term “public” was 
limited to people capable of receiving a particular transmission or performance; thus, the 
potential audience of a particular work was excluded.
81
 Ginsburg submits that the court 
ruled that because Cablevision had set up the playback system so that only one person (or 
his or her family or circle of social acquaintances – in other words, not the public) would 
be “capable” of receiving the transmission originating from his or her storage box the 
performance was not public.
82
  
The key phrase in the definition of what it means to perform or display a work is “to 
the public”. The public, with respect to television transmissions, is the intended audience 
or in the case of a cable service the subscribers. The phrase “members of the public 
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capable of receiving the performance” is not intended to restrict the meaning of “public”; 
its role is to make it clear that a transmission is still “to the public” even if it is received by 
individuals.  The public in the case of a television transmission is the intended audience, 
or, in the case of a cable service, the subscribers.
83
  
The court demonstrated its confusion between performance and transmission by 
declaring that “when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to the public, it refers 
to the performance created by the act of transmission”.
84
 Section 101 of the Copyright Act, 
which defines the term “perform”, does not refer to a performance created by the act of 
transmission. A transmission on its own does not perform, play or render a work; rather, it 
communicates a sound recording, for example, so that its performance can be perceived by 
the members of the public who receive the communication. It is not possible to transmit a 
performance “created by the act of transmission” to the public at different times, although 
it is possible to transmit simultaneously to recipients in different locations. If the 
performance does not occur publicly because of transmission is “individualized”, we are 
dealing with conventional on-demand streaming.
85
  
4.3 Infringement 
In addition to section 106 of the US Copyright Act, which spells out the general protection 
of copyright works, section 501 specifically provides for an infringement clause by 
protecting the exclusive rights of copyright owners, as set out in sections 106 to 121 
inclusive. A violation these rights is an infringement in terms of section 501. 
4.3.1 Direct infringement 
In the Internet world direct infringement of copyright in sound recordings takes place 
through uploading, transmission, and downloading the sound recording. These acts 
generally occur during online transmission.
86
 Direct infringers on the Internet are the 
swappers who are ignorant or more generally scornful of copyright.
87
 Liability for direct 
infringement is strict, implying that the intent or state of mind of the infringer is generally 
irrelevant.
88
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According to Mahony
89
 to prove direct infringement of the right to distribute a sound 
recording the copyright owner must prove the following elements: a) he owns a valid 
copyright in the disputed work; b) the defendant copied the protected work. Copying on 
the Internet is qualitatively and quantitatively substantial.
90
  
4.3.2   Indirect infringement 
Another name for indirect infringement is secondary infringement. The US Copyright Act   
does not expressly regulate indirect infringement, although it makes provision for it in 
section 501, nor does it expressly render anyone liable for such infringements.
91
  
The doctrines of secondary infringement emerged from common-law principles
92
 
and are well established in case law.
93
 The case law is described in Playboy Enterprises, 
Inc. v Frena.
94
  
According to Mee and Watters
95
 indirect infringement takes place when one party 
helps another to engage in infringement which includes the carriage of an unauthorized 
reproduction over a computer network. Akester
96
 regards it as secondary infringement 
when someone intentionally or negligently contributes to or participates in the infringing 
act by sanctioning, helping or encouraging a direct infringer to carry out the infringing act.  
 ISPs reproduce, distribute and communicate copyright works to the public in that every 
download by an Internet user causes the ISPs‟ computers to copy the works in order to 
forward them to the subscriber.
97
 In Playboy Enterprises, Inc v Frena,
98
 the court held that 
the ISP was liable because it had provided the means by which copies could be distributed 
to the public. The court referred to the US Copyright Act‟s strict-liability standard in 
finding the defendant operator liable for direct infringement because it had supplied a 
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product – a Bulletin Board System – containing unauthorized copies of the copyright 
work.
99
  
The approach of the court in Playboy Enterprises, Inc v Frena
100
 was rejected in 
subsequent cases, however, one of which was Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-
line Communication Services Inc.
101
 In that case the court held that when the infringing 
subscriber is clearly directly liable for the same act of infringement, it does not make any 
sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in the 
infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is necessary for 
the functioning of the Internet.  
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III case,
102
 the US Supreme 
Court held that: 
“Indirect infringement occurs when a device is distributed with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression of the intent or by other affirmative steps taken to 
encourage infringement, going beyond mere distribution with 
knowledge of third-party action of infringement regardless of the 
device‟s lawful uses”.  
The court limited the meaning of indirect infringement to the distributor, on the basis of 
the role played by distributors. However, the phrase “...showing clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement”  demonstrates the level of action or 
omission required from a third party before he or she can be held liable for the act. Thus, 
the decision of the court in this case identifies the activities of other role-players in 
copyright infringement.
103
  
Hence, the categories of persons involved in infringing activities in relation to 
transmission by intermediaries will be useful in defining modern-day indirect 
infringement. According to Sterling
104
 these categories include: 
“The person who transmits representative signals to the server site, 
or makes such signals available for transmission to an accessor, the 
person or persons providing transmission facilities between the 
person transmitting to the server site and the hosting provider, the 
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site operator, and the person or persons providing transmission 
facilities between the server site and the access. Persons who 
provide links or other access facilities may also be involved in 
infringing activities”. 
It is evident that indirect infringement occurs when an ISP engages in or facilitates 
copyright infringement by granting access to or providing network or other facilities to 
users who unlawfully upload, copy, transmit, distribute, download or otherwise infringe 
copyright.
105
 
4.4   Contributory infringement by ISPs  
Contributory infringement occurs when one party intentionally induces or encourages 
another to commit an act of direct infringement.
106
 In some respects it is not unlike “aiding 
and abetting” in that “One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, 
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
contributory infringer”.
107
  
It is argued that an ISP is liable for indirect infringement because it was aware or 
should have been aware of copyright infringement by a third party and the ISP was 
instrumental in contributing to the violation of the law.
108
 
The undisputed element of direct infringement is not difficult to prove in the digital 
world.
109
 Also, direct financial gain is not required as proof of contributory 
infringement.
110
 For contributory infringement to occur two other requirements must be 
met: knowledge of the infringement and material contribution to it.
111
 
 
 
                                                          
 
105
 See A & M Records Inc v Napster I case at 927. See also Akester “A practical guide to digital copyright 
law” at 42. 
 
106
 Von Lohmann “IAAL: What peer-to-peer developers need to know about copyright law” at 114. See also 
Gershwin Pub. Corp. v Columbia Artists Management, Inc at 1162. 
 
107
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd III case supra at 2767. See also Dixon “Liability of 
users and third parties for copyright infringement on the Internet: Overview of international 
developments” at 15. 
 
108
 Baumer et al. “Napster, Gnutella, Kazaa and beyond: Can the music industry win the battle against file-
sharing networks? A comparative legal approach to decentralized file-sharing networks (peer-to-peer) in 
the USA, England and Germany” at 135. 
 
109
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster II case supra at 1160. 
 
110
 Supra at 1164. 
 
111
 Ginsburg “Copyright control v compensation: The prospects for exclusive rights after Grokster and 
Kazaa” at 112. 
60 
4.4.1   The ISP’s knowledge of the infringement 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal ruled in Fonovisa Inc v Cherry Auction Inc
112
 that 
providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish 
contributory infringement.
113
  
In Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
114
 the court shifted the 
onus of proving whether there was an actual infringement and held that the defendant 
should have kept a record that would have allowed it to defeat the rights-holders‟ claim. 
This is because the court expected the defendant to have kept record of the public use of 
the plaintiff‟ work. A copyrights-holder should not be prejudiced by the defendant failure 
to keep records. The court must have shifted the onus of proof in this regard because the 
Internet is not controlled by rights-holders. Shifting the onus may be permissible in cases 
of civil infringement of copyright but not in cases of criminal infringement of copyright.  
In determining knowledge, it is presumed that statistics about activities on the 
Internet are available in ISPs‟ systems which “time stamp”
115
 every transaction; thus the 
time of each transaction is recorded. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd 
III case,
116
 a statistician was commissioned to conduct a systematic search of the Grokster 
and Streamcast networks since they themselves did not know when particular files were 
copied. The study showed that ninety per cent of the files available for downloading on the 
system were copyright works.
117
 
It is important that the right-owner prove sufficient knowledge on the part of the ISP 
to establish liability.
118
 Sometimes the rights-holder faces the burden of proving that copies 
were made or proving which specific copies were made or proving how many copies were 
made when a sound recording is obtained from an illegal website or from an unauthorized 
seeder or user. The difficulty is that rights-holders cannot go to the illegal website 
themselves to verify how many sound recordings have been downloaded from it. 
Fortunately, rights-holders can easily prove knowledge of infringement on the part of ISPs 
when a sound recording has been illegally obtained from an authorized website in which a 
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counter is installed which counts the number of transactions made. Operators of such 
websites can easily provide records of the transactions made.  
The level or extent and the time when ISPs become aware of distribution in DP2P 
file-sharing will be examined As regards the level of knowledge, it must be proved that the 
defendant either knew
119
 or had reason to believe that the activities at issue were wrongful. 
Essentially, liability lies in the ISP‟s having actual or constructive knowledge.
120
 
According to Daly there is no clear-cut distinction between constructive and actual 
knowledge;
121
 what distinction there is, is based on the use of the phrase “reasonable 
knowledge of specific infringing files” and actual-knowledge which can also be applied to 
constructive knowledge. Actual knowledge requires that an infringer must have actual 
knowledge of specific instances of infringement.
122
  
4.4.1.1 Distinction in the features of technology in the Sony and Grokster cases in 
determining knowledge 
Knowledge of contributory copyright infringement is guided by the principles established 
in case law. In the Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studios
123
 it was 
held that the sale or distribution of video tape recorders (VTR) was not enough to render 
the indirect infringer, i.e. the manufacturers of home video tape recorders liable for 
contributory copyright infringement even if the manufacturers knew that the machines 
were being used to commit infringement.  
 The court drew on the “staple article of commerce” doctrine from patent law. This 
doctrine stipulates that a defendant in a contributory-infringement claim succeeds in his 
or her defence if he or she proves that the product in question is “capable of substantial 
or commercially significant non-infringing uses”.
124
 The court found that because Sony 
Betamax videotape recorders were capable of commercially significant non-infringing 
uses constructive knowledge of infringing activity could not be imputed from the fact 
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that Sony knew that the recorders could be put to infringing use.
125
 A similar test was 
applied in the Napster cases
126
 and in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd 
II case.
127
  
In determining the level of knowledge most suitable to DP2P file-sharing, the court 
in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II
128
 case posed the following 
question:  
“if the product at issue is “not capable of substantial or commercially 
significant non-infringing uses”, then the copyright owner need only 
show that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the 
infringement. On the other hand, if the product at issue is “capable of 
substantial or commercially significant non-infringing uses”, then, the 
copyright owner must demonstrate that they had reasonable knowledge 
of specific infringing files and failed to act on that knowledge to 
prevent infringement.
129
 
The test is to determine in the first place whether the product in this case – i.e. the P2P 
computer networking software product– possesses the same features as the videotape 
recorder in the Sony case. The answer to this test would in turn determine whether the 
software product is “not capable of substantial or commercially significant non-
infringing uses”, which is the only test of constructive knowledge proffered by the court; 
actual knowledge on the other hand also requires other elements to prove infringement. 
The distinction in the test will prove either a specific infringing activity (i.e. know)
130
 or 
the mere fact that the system is capable of being used for infringing activity (i.e. have 
reason to know),
131
 which will be tested in proving knowledge of infringement of 
copyright of sound recordings in a DP2P network.
132
 Regarding level of knowledge, two 
conditions apply. 
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(a) Capability of substantial infringing or non-infringing use  
The product in question in the Sony case
133
 was a videotape recorder and an analogue 
device used in time shifting to record broadcast programmes. The decision of the court
134
 
may not be questioned in holding that VTR‟s uses are capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses. This is because users of the videotape recorder would otherwise have lost out on a 
private copy of a particular programme to which copy they might have been entitled under 
copyright law had they not been permitted to use their recorders to record the programme 
when it was broadcast.
135
  
However, to apply the finding in the Sony case to the digital, non-broadcasting, on-
demand nature of the Internet, and particularly to the unique nature of DP2P file-sharing, 
would be a misapplication of the doctrine of a “staple article of commerce” to the Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case.
136
 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc v Grokster Ltd III case,
137
 the court stated that Groskter case differs markedly from 
Sony case in terms of the interpretation of the substantial non-infringing use.
138
 Also, it 
was held in AM Records Inc et al. v Napster Inc II case
139
 that the activities of  Internet 
services that facilitate transmission and retention of digital audio audio files which 
consisted of downloading such files in order to listen to sound recordings does not amount 
to mere “space-shifting” for purposes of the fair use  analysis.      
In the words of Ginsburg, one who distributes an infringement-enabling device will 
not be liable for the ensuing infringements if the device is „widely used for non-infringing 
purposes‟.
140
 If a user wants to enjoy a personal copy in any part of the world, all he or she 
need do is to put the file in his or her in-box on the Internet. This will ensure access to it at 
any time the user needs or wants it. Similarly, videotape recorders enable users to record 
programmes that can be accessed at any time after they have been recorded. However, 
using DP2P software to share sound recordings with people implies intent to use the 
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software (and the recording) for a substantially infringing purpose, which was the primary 
object of the product as revealed by the developer.
141
     
Accordingly, articles 11, 12 and 14 of the WPPT prohibit the sharing of sound 
recordings online. Digital reproduction enables multiple and exact copies to be made 
instantly, unlike the loss of quality that result from analogue reproduction. In addition, the 
reproduction, distribution and communication of works in DP2P file-sharing networks are 
uncontrollable. In fact, the WCT and WPPT were concluded to solve the problems of 
online reproduction, distribution and communication.  
         The streaming or real-time transmission of the files from one unknown user to others 
would probably be an infringement. Also, swapping facilitates the exchange of files and 
takes the use of a file out of the personal view of the user to a public view.
142
  
In the Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studios case,
143
 the 
product at issue was a videotape recorder, which is not easily reproduced as a product. By 
contrast, the P2P computer networking software products
144
 are easily and cheaply 
reproduced online in DP2P file-sharing without restrictions, as soon as a new peer joins the 
chain. Furthermore, the cost of the sale and distribution of videotape machines attracted a 
market price which implies that not every Tom, Dick and Harry could afford the price or 
would have free access to the machine, whereas software products in DP2P file-sharing are 
distributed freely by and to users.  
The VTR product in the Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studios 
case was not inbuilt with the television; it required the use of additional equipment for the 
work to be reproduced, distributed and communicated to the public: the tape and the 
recorder itself. On the Internet, software, although it is also not inbuilt, is not external: it is 
integrated online as soon as it is installed or activated by its distribution. Online 
reproduction, distribution and communication can take place without external equipment 
such as CD or MP3 players. This makes reproduction easy, certainly much easier than 
reproduction of material on video cassettes which at a minimum requires either erasure of 
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an existing tape or the purchase of another tape for recording, in addition to a videotape 
recorder.  
A computer uses both hardware and software, which makes it easy for reproduction, 
distribution and communication of data to occur. Moreover, the Internet connects these 
computers. By contrast, tape recorders or tape are not connected in this way. Accordingly, 
copyright infringement will be encountered in DP2P file-sharing to a larger extent than in 
tape recordings. In this way the P2P computer networking software product is capable of 
substantial or commercially significant infringing uses. With regard to DP2P file-sharing, 
it is submitted that rights-holders can ab initio impute to ISPs constructive knowledge of 
infringement on the basis of this capability. 
Whereas the source of material captured by means of videotape recorders is the 
broadcaster that transmits the signals decoded and recorded, the content in on-demand 
transmission on the Internet is contributed by users on the network.
145
 The P2P computer 
networking software product in DP2P network enables every user in the network to serve 
interchangeably as a mini-server and client. In effect, users engage in archiving of files.
146
 
This makes copyright more vulnerable to infringement by users who do not care about the 
protection of copyright since they have a contrary interest against the rights-holders.  
In on-demand transmissions (as the name suggests) it is not necessary to make a 
simultaneous recording of the content,
147
 thus the doctrine of “staple article of commerce” 
does not justify the defence that the P2P computer networking software product is “capable 
of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing uses”.
148
 The fact that the product 
is capable of being used for infringing activities is sufficient proof of constructive 
knowledge of such activity on the part of those who distribute or make available the 
product
149
 and grant access to users the product to share sound recordings illegally. It 
should be noted that Groksters cases concern distributors and not ISPs.  
In the Sony case, actual knowledge of infringement was deemed necessary. The 
court said that since videotape recorders were capable of commercially significant non-
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infringing uses constructive knowledge of the infringing activity could not be imputed 
notwithstanding the fact that Sony knew that the recorders could generally be used for 
infringement.
150
 In the Grokster cases, although the court did not make any categorical 
finding
151
 in respect of the kind of knowledge required of an ISP in DP2P file-sharing, it is 
submitted that constructive knowledge of infringing acts would apply.
152
 This is based on 
the premise that such an ISP does not store infringing files or indexes on its server but only 
provides the facilities for an access network; thus the ISP does not control the infringing 
files at server level but at transmission or access-network level. ISPs in DP2P file-sharing 
have the duty and ability to control access to their networks. 
The court in In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation cautioned that a product that is capable 
of being used for non-infringing purposes is also capable of being put to infringing use. In 
In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation case
153
 the court in re-evaluating the Sony case said 
that the provider of a service, unlike the seller of a product, has a continuing relation with 
its customers and therefore should be able to prevent or at least limit their infringing 
copyright by monitoring their use of the service. In the view of Ginsburg,
154
 one might 
predict that “when a device facilitates infringements on a massive scale its distributor will 
likely be found to have intended that result”
155
  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is submitted that the P2P computer networking 
software product is also capable of non-infringing use but this is on a small or minimal 
scale in contrast with the infringing capability.  
(b) Capability of commercially significant infringing use  
Concerning the second leg of the phrase, the court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v 
Grokster Ltd II
156
 case posed the question: “if the product in question is „not capable of … 
commercially significant non-infringing uses‟ the rights-holder only has to prove that the 
indirect infringer had constructive knowledge of the infringement”.
157
 Given the reasons 
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for the submissions earlier
158
 that a P2P computer networking software product is more 
capable of infringing use than non-infringing use, same is equally submitted herein. Thus, 
the product is more capable of commercially significant infringing use than non-infringing 
use.    
In Sony Corporation of America et al v Universal City Studio,
159
 the court held that 
every commercial use of a copyrighted work is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the 
monopoly of privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright while non-commercial 
uses are a different issue.
160
 The court further said that if the intended use is for 
commercial gain, the likelihood may be presumed but if it is for non-commercial purpose, 
the likelihood must be demonstrated. It is not clear whether the court intentionally 
described the product as a copyrighted work instead of VTR. Nevertheless, it is presumed 
that the court, instead of referring to VTR as a product, referred to the copyrighted work in 
its decision
161
 which seems to be erroneously used or better still, interchangeably used. 
However, notwithstanding the presumption that the court erroneously or interchangeably 
described the product, both subject matters shall be examined to be on the safe side.  
Commercial use is described by the court in AM Records Inc et al. v Napster Inc 
II case,
162
 by holding that direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a 
commercial use, rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if 
copies are not offered for sale may constitute commercial use.
163
 Further, it was held that 
the uploading and downloading of digital audio files containing sound recordings -under 
the fair use concept- was commercial use. This is because it could save users the expense 
of purchasing authorized copies which could impair the market for the works by reducing 
sales and raising barrier to copyright owners‟ entry into the market for the digital 
downloading of sound recordings.
164
  
According to the rule of commercial use laid down in Sony Corporation of 
America et al. v Universal City Studio,
165
 and AM Records Inc et al. v Napster Inc II 
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case,
166
 I submit that the use of DP2P software applications (or sound recordings) on a 
DP2P network by users is likely to be for commercial use. This is because the DP2P 
software application is freely and widely distributed by, and to users on the Internet with 
the ultimate aim of using the software to share sound recordings on DP2P networks. In the 
case of sound recording, it is freely and widely distributed on DP2P network amongst users 
with the aid of a DP2P software application. In interpreting the principle laid down in Sony 
Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studio case with respect to the commercial 
use of copyrighted work,
167
 it is noted that in DP2P networks, sound recordings cannot be 
shared without the use of DP2P software application (i.e. the product in issue), thus 
making DP2P software application likely to be for commercial use or gain.   
        Though the court in Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studio case 
held that every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptive,
168
 this study has, in 
the foregoing submissions, gone beyond presuming that the DP2P software application has 
a commercial use. It has examined the commercial use or gain in DP2P software 
applications (and sound recordings).
169
 Essentially, the foregoing examination of DP2P 
software applications (which tilts in favour of rights-holders) in terms of commercial gain 
by users makes it difficult for users to demonstrate the non-commercial use of the 
distribution of DP2P software applications on a DP2P network. Equally, it is also difficult 
for ISPs to demonstrate the non-commercial use of sound recordings on ISPs networks 
with the aid of the DP2P software application (if the court actually meant to refer to 
copyrighted works).  
In Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studio,
170
 the court 
pronounced that where there is a challenge by a right holder on non-commercial use of a 
copyright work, it is required that a rights-holder proves either that the particular use is 
harmful or that if it should become widespread it would adversely affect the potential 
market for the copyrighted work. It is not necessary to prove actual harm nor is it 
necessary to establish with certainty that future harm will result.
171
 In this case, most of the 
rights-holders claim of harm were speculative
172
 or at best, minimal.
173
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In addition to the other
174
 and foregoing submissions herein, free (i.e. without paying 
royalty to rights-holders) uploading and downloading of DP2P software applications (or 
sound recordings) through DP2P networks is sufficient to prove that these two subject 
matters save users the expense of purchasing DP2P software applications and sound 
recordings. Consequently, free uploading and downloading of the subject matters have 
impaired the market for the work by reducing sales and ultimately raising barrier to rights-
holders to copyright in sound recordings. Accordingly, the free distribution of DP2P 
software applications and sound recordings on DP2P networks is not only widespread on 
the Internet (thereby affecting the potential market for sound recordings) but constitutes 
actual present harm and based on the preponderance of evidence of current distribution of 
the software application and sound recordings, future harm is likely.
175
  
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case,
176
 the court reiterated 
the District court‟s observation in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd I 
case,
177
 by saying that even if the software distributors closed their doors and deactivated 
all computers within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with 
little or no interruption.
178
 Further, the P2P computer networking software products in 
DP2P networks is capable of infringing uses whether or not the ISP takes reasonable care 
or steps to prevent harm.
179
 
It is submitted that because the DP2P software applications in DP2P file-sharing 
entail meaningful likelihood of future harm and is capable of commercially significant 
infringing use, constructive knowledge is required. Further to this, it is safe to assume that, 
given their knowledge of the Internet, without which they could not operate an Internet 
business or function as ISPs, they know that the P2P computer networking software 
products are capable infringing use.
180
  
 The court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III case
181
 held that 
even if the absolute number of non-infringing files copied using the Grokster and 
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Streamcast software was large it did not follow that the P2P computer networking software 
products were put to substantial non-infringing use and therefore renders the distributor 
immune from liability. The number of non-infringing copies may be reflective of and 
dwarfed by the total number of files shared.
182
 
Although the court pointed out that an exact calculation of infringing use as a basis for 
a claim of damages is a subject of dispute it admitted that the Grokster case
183
 was 
significantly different from the Sony case and that reliance on the latter case to rule in 
favour of the defendants – Streamcast and Grokster – was an error. 
4.4.1.2   Constructive knowledge of infringing activity  
It is important to note the concept of “rule of last opportunity” or “the last clear chance 
rule” which limits the availability of the defence to a claim against contributory 
negligence. This rule refers to the fact that an infringer had an opportunity to avoid causing 
harm but refused to use it.
184
  
 The level of knowledge is the standard of knowledge that an infringer is presumed 
to possess because of his or her circumstances and business activities in relation to the 
infringement.
185
 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III case,
186
 the court 
held that “the record is replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster and 
Streamcast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective 
that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and that each took active steps to 
encourage infringement”. Similarly, in DP2P file-sharing, ISPs are presumed to have 
knowledge of infringement when they grant access to users.
187
  
According to the court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case
188
 
there is only one criterion according to which constructive knowledge is determined: the 
plaintiff need show only the “capability of substantial or commercially significant 
infringing use”. The test does not concern specific infringing files as would the test for 
actual knowledge, although knowledge of a specific infringing file is ultimately required in 
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the proof of knowledge. In any case, courts generally expect claimants to prove the details 
of the infringement before any successful claim can be made. In the Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III case,
189
 the court held that a rights-holder must prove 
the exact calculation of the number or quantum of infringing use as a basis for damages.  
In the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case, it was held that the 
District Court had quite properly concluded that the software was capable of substantial 
and commercially significant non-infringing uses. Consequently, the court held that the 
Sony doctrine of “staple article of commerce” applied
190
 in relation to the software 
distributor. However, it is submitted that the position of the District Court (in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd I case) and Court of Appeal (in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case) is not applicable to DP2P file-sharing. 
On appeal, in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III case,
191
 the court 
held that it was an error on the part of the lower courts to read broadly the Sony limitation 
and to give too much weight to the value of innovative technology and too little to 
copyrights infringed by users of their software. This is because the fact that a product is 
capable of substantial lawful use does not mean that the producer can never be held 
contributorily liable for third parties‟ infringing use of the product.
192
  
The court‟s reasoning in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd I case 
and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case was a one-sided evaluation 
of the software product, finalised in favour of the software developer or distributor. The 
courts held that the software product is capable of substantial or commercially significant 
non-infringing uses in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case.
193
  
The following aspects of the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II 
case
194
 are noteworthy. The rights owners did not contradict the evidence of the software 
distributor that Wilco, one of the copyright owners, and thousands of other musical groups 
authorized pro bono distribution and downloading from the ISPs websites and through the 
networks of the ISPs.
195
 The fact that this evidence was not contradicted was not enough to 
enable the court to imply that the other rights owners had consented to the free use of their 
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works; indeed, had they all consented there would have been no plaintiff to launch the 
case! The P2P computer networking software product was used to share thousands of 
public-domain literary works made available through Project Gutenberg and the historic 
public-domain films released by the Prelinger Archive. Again, as large as these numbers 
were they were miniscule compared to the millions of literary texts and cinematograph 
films available in the world which are not in the public domain. The court found that some 
of the files shared were copyright works shared without authorization and that the 
copyright owners‟ assertion that the vast majority of files were exchanged illegally in 
violation of their copyright was not seriously contested by the software distributors.
196
  
It is submitted that the courts‟ reasoning in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v 
Grokster Ltd  I case
197
 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case
198
 
that the Sony case was applicable was premised on a hasty generalization, insufficient 
analysis, and misrepresentation of the statistics the plaintiff relied on. It is argued that the 
Grokster court foreclosed other possibilities which could promote or hinder the use of 
DP2P file-sharing in future. The court did not allow parties to carry out a detailed survey 
of the use of the P2P computer networking software product whereas the parties in Sony 
conducted surveys on the way the Sony Betamax machine was used by several hundred 
owners during a sample period in 1978. Although there were differences in the surveys, 
however, they both showed that the primary use of the machine for most owners was time-
shifting.
199
  
Before concluding the remarks on constructive knowledge, I shall consider an older 
American case relating to the kind of knowledge or liability expected in cases of indirect 
copyright infringement. In 1963 – long before even the Sony case – the court in Shapiro 
Bernstein & Co et al v HL Green Company Inc & Jalen Amusement Company Inc
200
 made 
several pronouncements which are relevant to this study as follows:.  
 i. Indirect infringers are liable for infringement of phonograph record because of 
the close relationship between themselves and the direct infringers and the 
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strong desire of the indirect infringers for the financial success of the infringing 
act.
201
 
 ii. It is not unusual to hold an indirect infringer liable even in the absence of an 
intention to infringe or of knowledge of the infringement.
202
 
 iii. Despite complaints about the harshness of the principle of strict liability in 
copyright law, the courts “have consistently refused to honor the defence of 
absence of knowledge or intention” because intellectual property would be 
valueless if infringers were insulated from damages.
203
 
 iv. Often a party “found strictly liable is in a position to police the conduct of the 
„primary‟ infringer”. Were courts to hold otherwise, indirect infringers could 
establish concessions and shield their own eyes “from the possibility of 
copyright infringement, thus creating a buffer against liability while reaping the 
proceeds of infringement”.
204
 
 v. Indirect infringers are expected to make enquiries about the infringement of 
copyright before they can be exonerated of liability, otherwise the infringer, who 
has “an opportunity to guard against the infringement (by diligent inquiry), or at 
least the ability to guard against the infringement (by an indemnity agreement … 
and/or by insurance)”, must suffer.
205
 
 vi. Indirect infringers should police carefully the conduct of their concessionaires, 
“thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively exercised”.
206
 
 vii. “Even if a fairly constant system of surveillance is thought too burdensome, the 
indirect infringer is in the position to safeguard itself in a less arduous manner 
against liability resulting from the conduct of its concessionaires.”
207
  
In summary, it is submitted that the distinctions between the three Grokster cases and the 
Sony cases show that as regards DP2P file-sharing, copyright owners must prove 
constructive knowledge on the part of the ISP after having demonstrated the dual 
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(infringing and non-infringing) uses of the software in question. In the most recent case, 
the court seems to suggest that constructive knowledge would be sufficient. In London-Sire 
Records v Does,
208
 the court followed the Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints decision
209
 and held that “evidence and allegations taken altogether are sufficient to 
allow a statistically reasonable inference that at least one copyrighted work was 
downloaded at least once”.
210
 
4.4.1.3   Actual knowledge of infringing activity  
Actual knowledge is direct and clear knowledge.
211
 It is the opposite of constructive 
knowledge and does not presume any foreknowledge of infringement. Williams and Das
212
 
argue that to prove that a software program is used mainly for infringing purposes is 
difficult, thus the knowledge of infringement by ISPs must be actual. In pursuance of this, 
in AM Records Inc et al. v Napster Inc II case
213
 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v 
Grokster Ltd I case,
214
 the courts held that in the absence of any specific information which 
identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory 
infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of 
copyrighted material.
215
 
216
 The court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd  
II case
217
 said that: 
“if the product at issue is capable of substantial or commercially 
significant non-infringing uses, then the copyright owner must 
demonstrate that the defendant had „reasonable‟ knowledge of 
„specific‟ infringing files and failed to act on that knowledge to prevent 
infringement”. 
However in AM Records Inc et al v Napster Inc II case,
218
 the court held that: 
“specifically, we reiterate that contributory liability may potentially be 
imposed only to the extent that Napster: 1) receives „reasonable‟ 
knowledge of „specific‟ infringing files with copyrighted musical 
compositions; 2) knows or should know that such files are available on 
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the Napster system; and 3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of 
the works.” 
The test for actual knowledge thus employs, in addition to the basic criterion regarding 
capability for non-infringing uses which also applies to constructive knowledge, two 
dependent criteria which are: “reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files” and 
“failure to act on that knowledge to prevent infringement”. Actual knowledge on the part 
of ISPs is required by the phrase “specific infringing files”. However, even if a rights-
holder is unable to prove constructive knowledge against an ISP, the former must prove 
that the latter has actual knowledge of specific infringing files,
219
otherwise, no claim under 
contributory infringement will succeed.    
 The last requirement for actual knowledge is failure to act to prevent infringement. 
In Shapiro Bernstein & Co et al v HL Green Company & Jalen Amusement Company 
Inc,
220
 the court held that the defendant was liable because it had not only refused to 
monitor the direct infringer but also failed to protect itself in a less-onerous manner from 
liability for the direct infringer‟s the conduct. In In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation,
221
 the 
court declared that an ISP will be liable if it fails to act against copyright infringement 
unless it can demonstrate that reducing infringement would be disproportionately costly.
222
 
I submit that ISPs have not presented any cost analysis to the public or implemented 
control mechanisms; nor have they advanced a valid reason for their inability to prevent 
copyright infringement on their networks.  
In relying on actual knowledge, ISPs can lay claim to the provisions of section 
512(m) of the Copyright Act which excludes ISPs from monitoring their networks or 
“affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity”. However, in proving 
knowledge, if ISPs rely on actual knowledge or its limitation clause (by virtue of the 
protection under the limitation law) they should bear in mind that they are capable of 
“detecting” sound recordings in their networks without monitoring them.
223
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4.4.1.4 The time at which knowledge of infringing activity is obtained 
Having examined the level of knowledge required of ISPs under the rubrics of constructive 
knowledge and actual knowledge, I turn now to the criterion under which knowledge of 
infringing activity can be obtained by an ISP: the time knowledge of infringement of 
copyright by users. As it was held by the courts in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v 
Grokster Ltd I case
224
 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case,
225
 
the time at which such knowledge is obtained is significant.
226
 Notice is relevant to 
establishing either type of knowledge and must therefore be served on an ISP by a rights-
holder. It is also relevant because ISPs have the right and ability to stop the infringement 
complained of in the notice.  
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case,
227
 the court held that 
copyright owners are required to establish that software distributors had “specific 
knowledge of infringement” when they contributed to the infringement and failed to act on 
that information. The process of acquiring specific knowledge and not acting brings to the 
fore the significance of time as a determining factor. In AM Records Inc v Napster Inc II 
case,
228
 the court also said that actual knowledge is obtained when a rights-holder gives the 
software distributor notice of infringement and information about files containing such 
infringed work available on the latter‟s system and that this notice must be given before the 
software distributor has “the duty to disable access to the offending content”. All of this 
demonstrates that time of knowledge is significant in proving the type of knowledge of 
infringement required in proving liability.  
Nevertheless, the courts in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd I case,
229
 
and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case,
230
 held that in the case 
before it, notice of infringing conduct was irrelevant because Grokster did nothing to 
facilitate infringement (because he was a distributor) and could not have done anything to 
stop the alleged infringement of specific copyright content.
231
 I submit that software 
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distributors, though arguably, do not need a notice because they do not have the same 
ability to control ISPs networks as ISPs do.
232
  
Finally, whatever legal position an ISP may canvass or adopt, I submit that ISPs 
possess knowledge of infringement of copyright in sound recordings on DP2P networks, 
be it actual or constructive.
233
  
4.4.2   Material contribution to the infringing activity by ISPs  
Material contribution to the infringing activity is the third and last requirement for 
contributory infringement.
234
 The ISP must have materially contributed to or induced the 
infringing conduct of the direct infringer.
235
 An indirect infringer “contributes by 
personally furthering the infringement or engaging in some part of the infringing activity 
or by contributing facilities or a site for known infringing activity”.
236
 This seems to 
indicate strict liability. In the opinion of Von Lohmann,
237
 the mere provision of the “site 
and facilities” to make infringement possible is not enough to make an infringer liable. It is 
submitted that simply providing the software or device is sufficient for contributory 
infringement in DP2P network.  
 Strict liability can also be inferred from the principle laid down in the In re: Aimster 
Copyright Litigation case.
238
 In this case, it was held that the contributory infringer will be 
liable if “its ostrich-like refusal to discover the extent to which its system was being used 
to infringe copyright is merely another piece of evidence that it was a contributory 
infringer”.
239
 
When an ISP provides facilities for the transmission of sound recordings to users but 
is not vigilant about what happens in its network, it becomes a contributor to the 
infringement when uploading, transmitting or downloading occurs in its network. The 
cause of the infringement must be proximate in relation to the ISP,
240
 however, not remote. 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case,
241
 for example, the court‟s 
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arguable finding was that because the software distributor did not provide the site and 
facilities for infringement its actions were too remote to constitute material contribution to 
the direct infringement. The court also said that the software distributor was not a true 
access provider because it did not have the ability to suspend user accounts.  
Furthermore, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case,
242
 there 
was also the failure on the part of the software distributor to alter the software located on 
the user‟s computer. It was concluded that the users of the software were the ones 
connecting to one another over the Internet, creating a network and providing the access.
243
 
It is submitted that a software distributor has the right and ability to upgrade his software 
on the network having realized that users were using it for infringing purposes. The 
upgrade can be done by developing a new version that will discourage infringement of 
copyright in sound recording that will prevent users from engaging in illegal sharing of 
sound recordings.     
Although the court found that the cause of infringement was remote in the software 
distributor‟s case, the same cannot be said of the integrated or tripartite services (of 
centralized peer index, file index and content) rendered in the three Napster cases, a 
service that was the proximate cause of copyright infringement in that case. Therefore, it is 
submitted that an ISP which is a true access provider plays a fundamental role in DP2P 
file-sharing and if an infringement occurs on its network, he would be held liable. This is 
based on the substantial behaviour
244
 of ISPs in terms of the neighbourhood principle
245
 
which is a sufficiently close relationship between ISPs and rights-holders in the online 
world. Finally, on the issue of proximate cause, which may consist in the provision of 
software or a device that makes infringement possible, I submit that an ISP that provides a 
site and the facilities for network access and infringement but does not prevent the 
infringement acts recklessly. In this way the ISP materially contributes to copyright 
infringement on its networks. 
 However, case law has generally intervened in favour of the technologists by widely 
protecting their devices.
246
 In 1984, the court in the Sony Corp of America v Universal City 
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Studios Inc case
247
 held that the manufacturer of a device could not be held liable simply 
because the device was “capable of substantial non-infringing use”.
248
 The technology 
industry supports the upholding of the defence proffered in Sony, while copyright holders 
are of the view that liability should be predicated on the primary use of the device or 
technology. The technology industry believes that once a product is “merely capable” of 
substantial non-infringing use, the degree or extent of infringing or non-infringing uses it 
may turn out to have does not matter. Copyright holders, on the other hand, say that 
anyone who continues to distribute a product which is primarily used for infringement has 
contributorily infringed copyright.
249
  
Finally, as regards contributory infringement, notwithstanding the foreclosure by the 
court in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case
250
 of other possible 
uses of works in DP2P file-sharing, the court in “In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation” 
case
251
 struck a balance between rights-holders and ISPs by recognizing infringing and 
non-infringing uses. It held that when a supplier makes available a product or service with 
both infringing and non-infringing uses some estimate of the respective magnitudes of 
these uses is important to making a finding of contributory infringement, and that the 
magnitude of the loss will be irrelevant in liability against an ISP.
252
 The ISP will not be 
immune from liability for contributory infringement even if the product or service is used 
for both infringing and non-infringing purposes, since the ISP will be presumed to have 
had knowledge of both infringing and non-infringing use on its networks from the very 
beginning of its Internet operation.
253
 
4.5   Vicarious infringement 
Two other elements must be satisfied before an indirect infringer can be found vicariously 
liable. According to Mahony,
254
 the allegation that ISPs exert control and enjoy financial 
benefit from the infringing activity are sufficient for a vicarious-infringement claim to be 
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accepted by a court.
255
 In Fonovisa Inc v Cherry Auction Inc.,
256
 the court mentioned these 
two elements in making a distinction between vicarious and contributory infringements. 
Liability for vicarious infringement is a strong incentive for ISPs to supervise the 
behaviour of users.  According to Mahony,
257
 liability would follow notwithstanding the 
fact that there is no employer–employee relationship between the indirect and direct 
defendants and that the indirect defendant does not actually know that the infringement is 
taking place.  
4.5.1   The right and ability of ISPs to control infringing activities  
The duty of ISPs to control infringing activities in their networks and systems are based on 
the “dance hall operator” principle
258
 in terms of which the operator is entitled and deemed 
be able to supervise the conduct of the dancers or service users and held liable for their 
infringements.  
Whether ISPs possess the right and ability to supervise their networks as regards 
DP2P file-sharing will be considered in the light of case law. US case law recognizes the 
relationship between an ISP and the direct infringer in terms of the formal licensing 
agreement between ISP and the regulatory authorities which gives the ISP the right to 
block infringers‟ access for infringement of copyright and contravention of the agreement. 
In Shapiro,
259
 the court held that indirect infringers should carefully police the conduct of 
their concessionaires, “thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively 
exercised”. This position is based on the principle of an underlying neighbourhood or 
sufficiently close relationship
260
 on the Internet between the ISP and the user, on the one 
hand, and the relationship between the ISP and the rights owner, on the other. Essentially, 
an ISP is expected to provide a caveat for users‟ attention before granting access on the 
Internet on the need to refrain from infringing activities. Furthermore, the court in the 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case
261
 held that indirect infringers 
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have an obligation to exercise their policing powers to the fullest extent which in the 
second Napster case
262
 included the implementation of new filtering mechanisms.  
The agreement between an ISP and its user is an important determinant of their 
relationship. Although AM Records Inc et al v Napster Inc
263
 concerned a CP2P system, it 
is important to compare it with the Grokster (which concerned a DP2P system). Napster – 
as both ISP and software distributor – controlled the central indices of files and users were 
required to register before being bound contractually. Perhaps because of the centralization 
of the file indices, Napster had an express policy reserving its right to block infringers‟ 
access for any reason.
264
 The reservation of the right was premised on the neighbourhood 
principle. Thus Napster had the right to control and supervise its network.  
On the other hand, in the -Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case,
265
 the 
court held that, although Grokster had freely distributed software that allowed users to 
share files, there was no evidence to show that software distributors were able to block 
individual users‟ access to the Internet. Grokster‟s agreement with Kazaa/Sharman did not 
confer on Grokster the right or ability to shut down the root nodes because of the 
relationship, which is different from the relationship that existed in Napster. Grokster was 
described as only having “nominal reservation of right to terminate access”
266
 as a software 
distributor since it did not register users nor were users required to follow any login 
process. Therefore, the court said that there was no right or ability on the part of the 
software distributor to terminate users‟ access because the relationship was not like that 
between an ISP and a user.  The court also held that Grokster would not have been able to 
undertake a mandatory upgrade of the software or make any IP-address-blocking 
attempts
267
 because Grokster did not have access to the hardware involved in the 
transmissions. These ratios are contested below.  
I submit that the findings of the court on these ratios above in the Grokster case are 
fallacious. Firstly, the fact that Grokster distributed the software meant that the software 
could have been upgraded by developing an advanced version of the software that will not 
match the old version in terms of operation or by creating technical protection or security 
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measures on the existing one that could prevent users from having access if users infringe 
copyright. This explanation impliedly means that Grokster had the right or ability to 
terminate users‟ access. Secondly, Grokster could have issued a caveat to the effect that 
future transactions using the old software would not be supported. Lastly, ISPs could have 
collaborated in granting further access only to users through the upgraded software.  
ISPs own and control the facilities – the hardware
268
 – even though they do not 
supply or distribute the software. Both hardware and software are necessary for any 
activity in the electronic or digital world. The close relationship between an ISP and 
copyright holders cannot be denied. Consequently, any adverse activity carried out by the 
ISP would affect the rights-holders.  
Given the influential position ISPs occupy by providing access to DP2P file-sharing 
networks, it is submitted that a reasonably standard of care is expected of ISPs when they 
deal with the works of copyrights owners ,more particularly sound recordings by virtue of 
the fact that they have the right and ability to control and supervise what passes through 
their networks. Copyright rights-holders have argued that technical protection measures
269
 
to protect sound recordings should be installed by the ISPs.
 270 
By implication, according to 
Mee and Watters,
271
 the standard of care expected of an ISP should not be less than that of 
strict liability.  
In this regard, a prima facie case can be made against an ISP if it has the ability to 
control infringing acts and the ISP fails to implement filtering technology that can identify 
unauthorized files for sharing.
272
 For instance, in the first Napster case
273
 the court pointed 
out that the ability to terminate the subscription of a user or block access to the system 
constituted “control”, an assessment in keeping with the “dance hall operator” principle. 
Thus, if it is irrebuttable that ISPs possess the expertise to provide the technical facilities 
in the first place, it is inconceivable that they do not also have the ability to control traffic 
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on their networks. By extension, it is submitted that ISPs have the right and ability to 
control infringing acts in DP2P networks.
274
 
4.5.2   Direct financial benefit to the ISP of the infringing activity  
In the opinion of Mahony,
275
 a copyright owner must show that the indirect infringer 
exercises sufficient control over the direct infringer‟s activities and receives financial 
benefit from the infringement. This imposes liability on ISPs that are in a sufficiently 
supervisory position in relation to the direct infringer.
276
 Vicarious infringement occurs 
when one party profits from direct infringement by others and refuses to stop or limit the 
infringement
277
 or when an ISP had control over and derived direct pecuniary benefit from 
the direct infringement of a work by a third party.
278
 It is premised on the same legal 
principle in the law of tort that holds an employer liable for the actions of its employees.
279
  
In the historic case establishing the principles of DP2P file-sharing – Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd I case
280
 – a defendant must have a direct 
financial interest in the infringing activity. Financial benefit may be shown “where 
infringing performances enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers”.
281
 
Further, financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material „acts‟ as a 
„draw‟ for customers. The court concluded 
282
 that trading in copyrighted songs and other 
copyrighted works certainly draw many users to defendant‟s software and that individuals 
are attracted to defendant‟s software because of the ability to acquire copyrighted material 
free of charge. 
In the AM Records Inc et al. v Napster Inc II case,
283
 the court found that customers 
were drawn to the available infringing materials and to the growing user base which made 
both the software distributor and the ISP attractive to investors and users.
284
 The ISP then 
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benefits directly from advertising revenue
285
 and gains from the subscriptions of users who 
are registered with it. In view of this decisions in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v 
Grokster Ltd  I case
286
 and AM Records Inc et al. v Napster Inc II case,
287
 ISPs can be 
liable for vicarious infringement even if they lack knowledge of the infringing activity.
288
 
Section 101 of US Copyright Act, as amended by the No Electronic Theft Act, 
defines “financial gain” as including “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of 
value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works”. 
Economists believe that individuals only engage in activities that provide a positive 
expected return.
289
 ISPs thus grant users access to  systems that share sound recordings in 
exchange for some benefits. One such benefit is the increased bandwidth that is required 
by a user to share sound recordings, thus, increasing the users bandwidth use.    
4.6   Inducing infringement  
Inducing infringement is a new test, and head of claim used in US courts in cases of 
alleged copyright infringement, particularly those in which parties intentionally induced 
violation of copyright.
290
 In the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III r 
case,
291
 the court held that the inducement rule is a sensible one as regards copyright, 
saying that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or „other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement‟, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the 
device regardless of the device‟s lawful uses”.
292
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 The inducement rule “premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and 
conduct and does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation 
with a lawful premise”.
293
  
4.6.1   Affirmative act by the ISP to facilitate infringing activity  
“Mere knowledge” of infringing potential or of actual infringing use is not enough to make 
a  defendant liable nor are “ordinary acts” incidental to product distribution, such as 
offering customers technical support or product updates.
294
 Affirmative steps may consist 
of advertisements to encourage infringing uses, instructing users on how to use the 
infringing product,
295
 offering customer support or any other step that “entices or 
persuades” a user to commit infringement and so on. Such steps could also include 
promotional strategies aimed at attracting users to one‟s product.
296
  
From the operation of the software application in DP2P networks, it is clear that ISPs 
do not engage or get involved in all the specific instances or activities mentioned above, 
except where they expressly mention the activities as a promotional approach in terms of 
the ISPs‟ provision of access to users for file-sharing purposes because ordinarily they only 
provide access to the network. However, according to Von Lohmann,
297
 the infringer must 
have made statements or “taken other active steps” to encourage infringing uses. The 
expression “taken other active steps” is useful in examining the liability of an ISP for the 
infringement of copyright. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd III case,
298
 
the court held that proving that a message had been sent out is the pre-eminent but not 
exclusive way of showing that active steps were taken with the purpose of bringing about 
the infringing acts and of showing that infringing acts took place. 
 
 As regards the liability of ISPs in DP2P networks, the active step is unlike the step 
taken by software distributors. The court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster 
Ltd III case held that the defendants took steps by aiming to satisfy a known source of 
demand for copyright infringement, i.e. the market comprising former Napster users; that 
neither defendants attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the 
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infringing activity for which their software was used and that Grokster and Streamcast 
made money from selling advertising space essentially on the screens of computers using 
their software.
299
  
Networks can be designed in such a way that  users‟ access to the network for the 
purpose of accessing sound recordings that do not originate from a legal website can be 
blocked in furtherance of ISPs‟ duty to “detect” infringing sound recordings
300
 without 
infringing users‟ right to privacy.  
In Shapiro,
301
 the court held that an indirect infringer should police carefully the 
conduct of its concessionaires, “thus placing responsibility where it can and should be 
effectively exercised”. Failure to police in this way would amount to sanctioning, 
approving or affirming the act or conduct of the direct infringer. The court said that an 
indirect infringer should endeavour to protect itself in a less difficult situation than it has 
found itself against liability resulting from the conduct of the direct infringer when a 
moderately regular system of monitoring is seen by an indirect defendant to be too difficult 
to achieve.
302
  
The court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III case
303
 held that 
in terms of the inducement theory there must be evidence of actual infringement by 
recipients of the device or, as in this case, the DP2P software application, and found 
evidence of infringement on a gigantic scale.
304
 
Finally, an ISP‟s turning a blind eye to the infringing acts committed on its system or 
networks is sufficient to prove that the ISP endorses those acts, particularly when one 
considers the ISP‟s role as gatekeeper or “dance hall operator”. Unless the ISP can show 
that it has made reasonable efforts not to engage in any affirmative act to facilitate 
infringing activity on the Internet, it will be assumed to have actively and knowingly aided 
and abetted online direct infringement by its users.  
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4.6.2   Intent to facilitate infringing activity  
Courts normally allow rights owners to show infringement by means of circumstantial 
evidence. A rights-holder could use one or more of the following to furnish circumstantial 
evidence: facts pointing to how a company or specifically the infringing ISP generates 
income; whether the infringer could have modified the software to reduce infringing acts; 
whether the infringing ISP was making an effort to invite or attract users.
305
 In the course 
of the proceedings, a claimant could take advantage of a “discovery” method
306
 to search  a 
company  or individual e-mails or other documents or interview potential witnesses under 
oath so as to prove intent.
307
  
In the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd III case,
308
 the court held 
that the defendants had taken steps by aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for 
copyright infringement, namely the market comprising former Napster users; that they had 
made no attempt to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing 
activity using their software; and that Grokster and Streamcast (amongst others) made 
money by selling advertising space for advertisements directed to the screens of computers 
employing their software. Further, part of the court‟s finding was that Streamcast had not 
only rejected a company‟s offer to help monitor infringement but also blocked third-party 
filters or the Internet protocol addresses of such infringing companies.
 309
 These acts prove 
intent.  
Some ISPs have devised a means whereby downloading of a sound recording takes a 
longer time than and the packet downloaded is disjointedly assembled, reducing the quality 
of the sound recording downloaded.
310
 The Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) has announced a new strategy to curtail online copyright infringement by passing a 
“notice of detection” to users;
311
 ISPs and the Federal Communications Commission have 
embraced filtering. Human-rights groups hope that arrangements between the RIAA and 
ISPs will not involve invasion of users‟ privacy through the filtering of Internet content.
312
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ISPs should become suspicious of users in DP2P networks when users only upload 
and download without requesting sound recordings from ISPs and as such the ISPs open 
the gate for all users which render the network an “all-comers” affair. Therefore, intent to 
invite and attract users would be formed if an ISP does not act prudent and reasonably in 
taking precautions to filter the infringing works from such a growing user base.
313
  
Finally, as regards intent, although the court in the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v 
Grokster Ltd II case subsumed inducement theory in vicarious infringement it commented 
that:  
“the role of the software distributor is important: if the software 
distributor had a right and ability to control and supervise, that 
they proactively refused to exercise such refusal would not 
absolve them of liability”.
314
  
The court in Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v HL Green Company Inc & Jalen Amusement 
Company
315
 has been able to explain the reason behind the requirement of intent. This 
requirement seems loose, broad, harsh and unfavourable to ISPs. In this case,
316
 the court 
held that it is not unlawful to impose liability on an indirect infringer even in the absence 
of an intention to infringe or of knowledge of the infringement. The court also said that 
courts had consistently refused to honour the defence of lack of knowledge or intention 
because intellectual property would be rendered valueless were infringers indemnified 
against damages.
317
  
Since ISPs have a right and the ability to control and supervise their networks but 
refuse to exercise the right their refusal does not absolve them of liability. Thus, turning a 
blind eye to infringement amounts to consent.
318
 According to the court in In Re: Aimster 
Copyright Litigation,
319
 “wilful blindness is knowledge” that is sufficient for the ISP to 
have known of the direct infringement. Therefore, following the ratio of the court in the 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd II case
320
 and given the nature of DP2P 
technology, I submit that ISPs have the intent to facilitate infringing activity in DP2P 
network. 
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4.7 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and limitation of ISP liability in DP2P 
file-sharing  
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted in 1998 two years after the 
WIPO Internet treaties WIPO Copyright Treaty “WCT” and WIPO Producers and 
Performers Treaty “WPPT”) were adopted in the wake of uncontrollable copyright 
infringements on the Internet so as to limit the liability of ISPs under the title “Limitations 
on liability relating to material online”. Section 202 of the DMCA inserts section 512 into 
the Copyright Act. Before the enactment of the DMCA there was no legislation in the 
United States designed to limit the liability of indirect infringers. 
The DMCA amended US copyright law to enable the USA to ratify the WCT and 
WPPT.
321
 The Act‟s limitation clauses are premised on the belief that ISPs do not have this 
right/ability, or even more simply that effect of the limitation clauses is to remove this 
right/ability. The limitation clauses seek to protect ISPs from copyright owners who 
produce the works for transmission by ISPs.  
4.7.1   The duty of ISPs to detect unlawful activity on the Internet 
Further to the arguments on the right and ability of ISPs to “detect” illegal sound 
recordings on their networks,
322
 it is submitted that no US law exempts ISPs from the duty 
to filter, identify or detect sound recordings on their networks. However, the Copyright Act 
provides for the exemption of ISPs from the duty to monitor their networks.  
In terms of section 512(m)(1), read with in section 512(a) to (d),  of the Copyright Act 
– ISPs are excluded from monitoring their services or affirmatively seeking facts indicating 
infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure
323
 
complying with the provisions of section 512(i). Section 512(i) concerns the conditions for 
eligibility for the accommodation of technology. 
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Further, section 512(m)(2) states that: 
“nothing in section 512 “shall be construed to condition the applicability 
of [section 512(a) to (d)] on … a service provider gaining access to, 
removing, or disabling access to material in cases in which such conduct 
is prohibited by law”.  
It reiterates the earlier submission that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor unlawful 
activity on the Internet.    
4.7.2   Basic requirements for the limitation of liability of ISPs 
For an ISP to take advantage of the limitation clause it must comply with section 512(i)(1) 
and 512(i)(2) of the US Copyright Act. Section 512(i)(1) sets out two conditions on which 
the limitation on liability applies to an ISP. First, the ISP must have “adopted and 
reasonably implemented”, and must inform subscribers and account holders of its system 
or network, of “a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of 
subscribers and account holders of the service provider‟s system or network who are repeat 
infringers”.
324
  
Secondly, the ISP must accommodate and not interfere with standard technical 
measures.
325
 However, section 512(a) does not make it mandatory for ISPs to install a 
technical protection measure
326
 instead; it makes it an offence for anyone who distributes a 
circumventive measure to neutralize a TPM. It would have been more logical to assign a 
duty to install a TPM by ISPs initiated by rights holders.  
4.7.3   Primary conditions for limiting the liability of ISPs as mere conduits 
Section 512(a) of the Copyright Act stipulates that:  
“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as 
provided in [section 512(j)], for injunctive or other equitable relief, for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the [ISP‟s] transmitting, routing, 
or providing connections for, material through a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the 
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such 
transmitting, routing, or providing connections, if – 
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(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of 
a person other than the service provider; 
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is 
carried out through an automatic technical process without selection 
of the material by the service provider; 
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material 
except as an automatic response to the request of another person; 
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of 
such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or 
network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than 
anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system 
or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated 
recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the 
transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and 
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without 
modification of its content”. 
In addition, although section 512(a) does not stipulate this, it is implied that in terms of 
section 512(l) ISPs are at liberty to consider other defences not covered in section 512. In 
essence, an ISP can raise as many defences as possible in order to enjoy the immunity 
provided under this section.  
4.7.4   Specific provision relating to the liability of non-profit educational institutions 
In addition to the four limitations created in section 512(a) to (d), section 512(e) limits the 
liability of non-profit educational institutions for the infringing acts of their faculty 
members and graduate students, which acts might otherwise have been imputed to the 
institutions as employers and prevented them from benefiting from the mere-conduit, 
system-caching or host limitations.
327
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4.7.5   Take-down notice by the rights-holder  
The take-down notice is one of the most controversial innovations introduced by the 
DMCA. However, it is a quick and inexpensive procedure that allows rights-holders to 
have infringing material removed from the network.
328
 
4.7.5.1   Designation of an agent 
Although section 512(c)(2) provides for the role of a designated agent with regard to the 
hosting function of ISPs, there is no such provision relating to the mere-conduit function of 
ISPs in section 512(a). This was pointed out by Oktay and Wrenn
329
 in their examination 
of the role of designated agents, although they seem to include caching and linking 
limitations as being covered under section 512(c)(2). In this regard, it is submitted that 
section 512(c)(2) is not applicable to other limitations, except that of hosting, expressly 
stated therein.  
4.7.5.2   Notification 
Copyright holders must give full details of the infringement when they make claims of 
copyright infringement, especially one for damages. The notification which must contain: 
the following gives further details on an ISP‟s claim: 
(a) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on 
behalf of the copyright owner or exclusive licensee. 
(b) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to be infringed. If a 
notice refers to multiple works posted at a single location, it is 
sufficient to include a representative list of works infringed at the site. 
(c) Identification of the material claimed to be infringing together with 
“information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
locate the material.” For purposes of the information location tools 
limitation, the notification must also identify the reference or link to 
the material or activity claimed to be infringing and information 
“reasonably sufficient” to permit the service provider to locate the 
reference or link. 
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(d) Information “reasonably sufficient” to permit the service provider to 
contact the complaining party. Such information may include the 
complaining party‟s address, telephone, or email address. 
(e) A statement that the complaining party believes, in good faith, that 
the copyrighted material identified is being used in a manner that is 
not authorized by “the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” and  
(f) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and 
under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to 
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly 
infringed.
330
 
Although Oktay and Wrenn
331
 argue that the Copyright Act merely requires substantial 
compliance, which implies that not all of these six requirements need be met, I submit that 
in the interests of justice a rights-holder is not permitted to gamble with other people‟s 
rights by alleging a claim that cannot be substantiated. If Oktay and Wrenn‟s argument is 
“correct”, the essence of the statements regarding good faith and perjury would seem 
ineffective in the provision. Essentially, the word “substantial” must be read in conjunction 
with the main particulars necessary for a claim to succeed and with the overall intent of the 
DMCA.  
4.7.5.3   “Counter notification” 
Like take-down notices, a counter-notice must meet certain requirements. It must include  
(a) A physical or electronic signature of the alleged infringer; 
(b) Identification of the material that was removed or disabled by the 
service provider and the location where the material appeared before 
it was removed or access to it was disabled; 
(c) A statement under penalty of perjury that the alleged infringer has a 
good faith belief that the material at issue was mistakenly removed or 
misidentified; and 
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(d) The alleged infringer‟s name, address, and telephone number and a 
statement that the alleged infringer consents to the jurisdiction of the 
federal district court for the judicial district in which the address it 
provides is located and that it will accept service of process from the 
person who provided the original notification. If the alleged infringer 
is located outside the United States, the alleged infringer must include 
a statement that it consents to the jurisdiction of any U.S. federal 
district court in which the service provider may be found.
332
 
Oktay and Wrenn
333
 posit that these requirements need only be substantially met.
334
  
4.7.5.4 Protection of ISPs from misrepresentation in notifications and counter-
notifications  
To reduce the likelihood of fraudulent notifications or counter-notifications, both 
complainants and alleged infringers may be subject to liability for copyright infringement 
if they materially misrepresent facts in their notices.
335
  
4.7.5.5 Protection of ISPs when removing or disabling access to materials believed to 
be infringing 
Pursuant to the creation in section 512(f) of the Copyright Act of liability arising from the 
material misrepresentation of facts, section 512(g)(1) generally exonerates ISPs from 
liability “to any person for any claim based on the [ISP‟s] good faith disabling of access to, 
or removal of, material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, regardless of whether the 
material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing”.
336
 
Generally, an ISP who has met the threshold requirements may be protected from 
being held liable for a legal claim (for instance a claim of infringement of rights to privacy) 
made by a user or person whose material has been removed or access disabled when the 
ISP acts in good faith on its own initiative (even when notification has not been submitted) 
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or in response to a user‟s or third party‟s complaints to remove or disable access to content 
believed to be infringing. This exemption is applicable to any claim made against an ISP 
for removing or blocking access to content, including tort or breach-of-contract claims.
337
  
4.7.5.6   Subpoena to identify infringers  
Section 512(h)(1) of the Copyright Act provides for the identification of an alleged 
infringer by permitting “A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner‟s 
behalf [to] request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a 
service provider for identification of an alleged infringer”. Each request must include a 
copy of the notification of infringement of copyright a proposed subpoena and a sworn 
affidavit stating that the rights-holder would use the information obtained by means of the 
subpoena only for protecting his or her rights under the Act.
338
  
The procedure to be followed for the issuing of these subpoenas are set out in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Subpoenas appear easy to obtain in view of the fact that 
there is no provision for judicial assessment of the merits of the claim in respect of which 
the subpoenas are sought. Once a take-down notice is issued, obtaining a subpoena is a 
formality.
339
 When an ISP receives the subpoena, the information required must be 
expeditiously disclosed regardless of any other law.
340
  
Some courts have expressed doubts in granting these subpoenas. The courts in RIAA 
v Verizon Internet Services Inc.
341
 and In re Charter Communications
342
 held that the 
DMCA‟s safe-harbour regime was meant to address a technological infrastructure and did 
not apply to P2P technology. Further, both courts concluded that P2P architecture might 
require a new balance of interest among right holders and a change in the law to 
accommodate the relevant conflicting interests among right holders, ISPs and users. The 
rationale of the courts suggests that the DMCA – and its safe harbour – is no longer 
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applicable to ISPs; therefore, ISPs may encounter unlimited liability for infringing copies 
on P2P networks.
343
  
4.7.5.7   Limited injunctive relief available against ISPs  
The DMCA provides limited injunctive relief against ISPs who comply with the 
requirements of that Act to deny access to infringers and block infringing content in the US 
and abroad. Basically, a court may grant only three forms of equitable relief:
344
  
1. an order restraining the ISP from “providing access to infringing material or activity 
residing at a particular online site on the provider‟s system or network” 
2. an order requiring that a particular user‟s account be terminated so that access to the 
system or network is denied  
3. other injunctive relief the court may deem necessary to prevent or restrain 
infringement of specific copyright material at a particular online location. 
In contrast, a court may order an ISP whose liability is otherwise limited under the 
mere-conduit limitation not to provide access to the subscriber or account holder using the 
ISP‟s services to engage in infringing activity. This provision (i.e. section 512(j))(1)(A) of 
the Copyright Act) is important for copyright owners because it categorically authorizes 
court to compel service providers who are subject to the jurisdiction of the USA to block 
access to content which would be infringing under US law, even if that the content is 
located in a country in which it may not be regarded as infringing.
345
 
In considering injunctive relief, the court must weigh the factors set out in section 
512(j)(2):  
(A) whether such an injunction, either alone or in combination with other 
such injunctions issued against the same service provider under this 
subsection, would significantly burden either the provider or the 
operation of the provider‟s system or network; 
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(B) the magnitude of the harm likely to be suffered by the copyright 
owner in the digital network environment if steps are not taken to 
prevent or restrain the infringement; 
(C) whether implementation of such an injunction would be technically 
feasible and effective, and would not interfere with access to non-
infringing material at other online locations; and  
(D) whether other less burdensome and comparably effective means of 
preventing or restraining access to the infringing material are 
available. 
4.7.5.8   Advantages of the take-down notice 
There are many advantages to the Copyright Act notice and take-down procedure. Firstly, 
rights-holders are provided with a clear procedure, while ISPs benefit from the safe habour 
clause. Both parties quickly and efficiently address allegations of copyright infringement. 
Secondly, the procedure makes rights-holders who apply for a take-down notice or lodge a 
claim for copyright infringement on the basis of false information or of misrepresentation 
liable for such claims herein. Thirdly, the Copyright Act streamlines the procedure for 
obtaining a subpoena. Fourthly, service providers are encouraged to comply with take-
down requests from copyright owners. This is because the procedure is codified and 
available for use by service providers. Fifthly, the Act clarifies the circumstances in which 
ISPs who merely route, cache, host or link to allegedly infringing material are not liable for 
copyright infringement.
346
  
4.7.5.9   Disadvantages of the take-down notice 
The first problem with the take-down notice relates to the authentication of the electronic 
signature of a rights-holder. As a result, most of the notices sent by e-mail may not actually 
reveal the identity of the sender, and multiple notices may be sent from the same source 
since e-mail accounts or e-mails may be spoofed.
347
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Secondly, content owners may lodge sham infringing claims which, because of the 
presumption that claims are made in good faith, could be used to victimize users who are 
critical of the owners‟ services or products.
348
 
Thirdly, the Copyright Act procedure creates some additional tasks and burdens for 
ISPs. Some ISPs are relatively small and cannot afford the cost of processing. Big ISPs 
who cannot cope with the volume of notices engage the services of full-time copyright 
agents, which mean additional cost. It is easier for a rights-holder to send large volumes 
of notices than it is for ISPs to process them.
349
  
Fourthly, because counter-notices do not actually require ISPs to restore the disputed 
material ISPs refuse to do so. This creates an unbalanced system in which a take-down 
notice is given more weight than a counter-notice.
350
  
4.8   Conclusion  
In conclusion, three issues are addressed. Firstly, the right of reproduction was correctly 
interpreted as meaning that copies of phonorecords include intangible copies.
351
 The courts 
have interpreted the rights of distribution and communication to the public differently, 
which is seen as a departure from the intent of the drafters of the WPPT and WCT. The 
courts have excluded the “making available” right from the distribution right, and use the 
right of distribution and the right of publication interchangeably.
352
 The right of 
communication has been interpreted as public performance through digital audio 
transmission.
353
 What is important is whether users and ISPs pay rights-holders a royalty 
for the benefits derived from transmissions on DP2P networks.  
Secondly, it is now clear that because the US Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd III case 
354
 overturned the decisions of the lower courts, 
decisions based on the principles laid out in Sony,
355
 particularly with respect to actual 
knowledge, ISPs in DP2P technology are strictly liable on the basis of their constructive 
knowledge of infringement. Thus, ISPs become liable under the law of copyright 
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notwithstanding the provisions of section 512 of the Copyright Act, since the duty to detect 
infringing sound recordings is not provided for in the Copyright Act other than in the form 
of a duty not to monitor. In this regard, as the courts held in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd II case
356
 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v Grokster Ltd 
III case,
357
 it behoves Congress to find a legislative solution in a more holistic manner to 
balance the conflicting interests of rights-holders, ISPs and users in this technologically 
driven era.  
Thirdly, notwithstanding the shortcomings and controversies surrounding the 
Copyright Act‟s implementation, the benefits of the Copyright Act outweigh the 
challenges. In this regard, it may seem impracticable to have a watertight legal provision in 
the Copyright Act in an era of instant technology as inventors wake up almost daily with 
new ideas; on the other hand, the new provisions have protected ISPs, allowing them to 
continue playing their indispensable role on the Internet. 
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      CHAPTER 5 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 5.1   Introduction 
In understanding the consistencies and differences of UK law compared with other 
jurisdictions, one must remember that historically the source of UK law is different from other 
parts of the world. In part, the law in England was formulated and developed over a long time 
by “common law” courts.
1
 Copyright protection in the United Kingdom (UK) is provided for in 
the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act (CDPA) of 1988, the UK‟s modernized copyright 
legislation.
2
 The CDPA protects literary and musical works and sound recordings among other 
works.
3
 It is a precedent-based system in which previous judgments are incorporated into the 
consideration of rights.
4
 No formalities are required to protect copyright in the UK.
5
  
A new piece of legislation was recently enacted to protect copyright against online 
infringements: the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DECA)
6
 2010 which amends the 
Communications Act of 2003. The various provisions of the DECA have different 
commencement dates. Some regulatory authorities  may make prospective regulations and 
provide guidelines and codes. Recently, based on the provisions of DECA, the court endorsed 
the tracking of illegal users, blocking of illegal file-sharing sites and sending warning letters to 
offenders on the Internet who share sound recordings, films, books and other copyrighted 
materials.
7
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101 
The UK is party to the Berne (Paris) and Rome Conventions, the Universal Copyright 
Convention (UCC), the TRIPs Agreement,
8
 the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The application of copyright law in Europe 
became controversial in 2006 with the national courts struggling with the challenges of the 
Internet, ranging from downloading, the use of search engines, technological measures used by 
rights rights-holders to address digital copying. Various European courts have handed down 
decisions on ISP‟s liability and obligations, particularly with regard to P2P file-sharing.
9
 Most 
of these decisions, which have been decided at first instance, have taken into consideration their 
diversity and differing legal frameworks for the limitation of ISP liability. Essentially, they 
have not followed the recent, most far-reaching measure of copyright harmonization achieved 
by community legislation, namely the EUCD.
10
  
In this chapter, I will go through the provisions implementing the European Union 
directives on copyright law in the UK, particularly those relating to the rights of reproduction, 
distribution and communication to the public and to the limitation of liability of ISPs. Three 
major EU directives affect copyright in relation to this study: the ECD,
11
 the EUCD
12
  and the 
EIPRD
13
  This chapter examines the liability of ISPs for infringement of copyright in sound 
recordings in DP2P file-sharing under the indirect-infringement theory and concludes with an 
examination of the limitation of ISPs‟ liability in DP2P file-sharing. 
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5.2   Rights in the object of protection 
In the 1988 CDPA, the “author” of a sound recording is  the person who undertakes the 
recording of the audio file. This definition has been criticized in the UK.
14
  
Sound recordings have been protected as such since the passing of the 1956 Copyright 
Act. Under the 1911 Act, they were in effect protected as musical works, although with the 
passing of the 1956 Act, these works became protectable as sound recordings separate and apart 
from musical works.
15
  
There are two types of rights, namely, moral and economic. Moral rights are available in 
the UK by virtue of a “paternity right” granted in sections 77(1), 80 and 84 of the CDPA with 
respect to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, film and derivative work. The nature of 
economic rights varies from one category of works to another.
16
 However, the restricted acts as 
regards a sound recording are making copies of it, issuing copies of it to the public, renting or 
lending the sound recording or copies of it, playing it in public and communicating it to the 
public.
17
  
In pursuance of this economic right, a rights-holder has the obligation to protect her 
work. Section 124A (2) of the Communication Act obliges a rights-holder to notify users via a 
report through an ISP (who provided the Internet access service) of the infringement of 
copyright. Section 124A(2) of the Communication Act is in furtherance of the provisions of 
section 124A(1)(a) and (b) of the Communication Act. Section 124A(1)(a) and (b) provides for 
the duty of an owner to protect his work online against users and agents of users against 
infringement of copyright.  According to section 124A(2) of the Communication Act, the 
obligation is not automatic. The obligation can be performed only “if” an initial obligation code 
in force under section 124C or 124D of the Communication Act 2003 “allows” the owner to do 
                                                          
 
14
  See Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James on Copyright at 205, para. 4-47. 
 
15
 Id at  205, para. 4-48. See section 3(i) of the CDPA for the definition of musical works. For the description of 
literary works which may also be included in a sound recording, see section 1(1)(a) of the CDPA and article 2 
of the Berne Convention. See Garner (ed.) Black‟s Law Dictionary at 944; Collins English Dictionary and 
Thesaurus at 684; Bently and Sherman Intellectual Property Law at 59. 
 
16
 See Bently and Sherman Intellectual Property Law at 131. 
 
17
 See sections 5A(1)(a), 17 and 18 of the CDPA; Flint et al. A User‟s Guide to Copyright at 368. The economic 
right of reproduction in literary and musical works is stated in section 17(2) of the CDPA, while the 
distribution right of these works is stated in section 18. 
103 
so. However, the latter provision seems equivocal and decorative in view of the non-existent 
code
18
 and jurisprudentially this creates a vacuum.
19
  
 Section 124A(3)(b) and (c) of the Communication Act defines what a copyright-
infringement report is. Such a report includes a description and evidence of the apparent 
infringement that shows the user‟s IP address and time at which the evidence was gathered. 
Since rights-holders do not always have access to ISPs‟ networks,
20
 it is fallacious to require 
them to supply such information.  
Finally, section 124A(4) of the Communication Act requires an ISP to make a 
copyright-infringement list “if” the initial obligation code requires the provider to do so. The 
word “if” further limits the enforcement of the rights of a rights-holder in the protection of his 
rights. Notwithstanding the limits in the Communication Act, at the moment, there is no such 
code saying so.   
5.2.1   The right of reproduction 
The right of reproduction is the most important and the oldest right in copyright. It is broadly 
defined in section 17 of the CDPA.
21
 This right covers the reproduction of sound recordings in 
any material form including electronic means.
22
 The definition of reproduction in respect of 
sound recordings is narrower than literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. This is because 
it is an entrepreneurial work.
23
 Article 2 of the EUCD provides for the right of reproduction.
24
  
The growth in volume and importance of the digital storage and transfer of works via 
the Internet and other information carriers has had a significant impact on copyright. Works 
recorded in digital form cannot usually be used without being copied again for the particular 
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purpose. Thus, the traditional utilization of works does not require any form of licence, but 
digital works do.
25
 Essentially, when a licence has not been obtained infringement occurs 
whether a copy is permanent, transient, temporary or incidental to some other use of the work.
26
 
Unless there is a defence, infringement certainly occurs when a reproduction of a copyright 
work is made on a computer screen, stored in a computer‟s memory or copied from disk to 
disk.
27
 An article is an infringing copy if its making constituted an infringement of the 
copyright work in question.
28
  
However, activities on the Internet such as framing, caching, hosting and transmission 
will be outright copying, including uploading and downloading onto sites.
29
 The making of 
transient copies can constitute infringement just as the making of copies of a more permanent 
form.
30
 Nevertheless, an innocent intermediary or end user – depending on the circumstances – 
may seek to invoke the protection of fair use or other defences.
31
 
Notwithstanding the general provision, article 5(1) of the EUCD, which is implemented 
in regulation 8 of the Copyright and Related Rights Management Regulations 2003 and section 
28A of the CDPA, is to the effect that copyright shall not be infringed by the making of a 
temporary copy which is an essential part of a process whose sole purpose is to enable lawful 
transmission of a work between third parties
32
 and which has no “independent economic 
significance”.
33
 
Although there is no definition of “independent economic significance”, its likely 
meaning is “the independent economic significance to the copyright holder”. The exemption 
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will apply in the case of a temporary copy made by an ISP.
34
 A rights-holder who wishes to 
rely on copying may sometimes argue that a remote copy was made in some way.
35
  
Article 5(2)(b) of the EUCD provides for another exception allowing private copying of 
a work (by means of downloading) without the authorization of the rights-holder, as long as 
four conditions are met: the reproduction must be in analogue or digital media, done by a 
natural person, for private purposes and subject to the payment of a levy.
36
 However, the UK 
government did not set out a private-copying exemption but amended the existing time-shifting 
provision that exempts the copying of a recording of a broadcast made on domestic premises 
for private and domestic use and solely to enable it to be viewed or listened to at a more 
convenient time.
37
  
Despite the fact that ECJ aims at an autonomous community law interpretation of the 
terms of the Infosoc Directive, the court has not been privileged to pronounce on the concept of 
reproduction. Further, there are no criteria in community law in determining when infringement 
occurs at the right of reproduction.
38
  
5.2.2   The right of distribution 
In copyright, a rights-holder – of all types of works – has a right to issue copies of the work to 
the public, according to section 18 of the CDPA. This is generally referred to as a distribution 
right.
39
 In the UK, a distribution right is referred to as a “right to issue copies to the public” or 
the act of first release into the market of any particular work, including the original.
40
 The right 
to issue copies to the public is equivalent to the EUCD‟s distribution right in article 4 and to 
article 6 of the WCT
41
 and article 12 of the WPPT. The distribution right is the right to control 
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the marketing and circulation of tangible embodiments of the work. It supplements the 
reproduction right when the act of reproduction has occurred abroad or when the origin of the 
copies is known. It can be limited to certain channels of distribution. It is the only economic 
right in copyright that is subject to exhaustion.
42
  
Article 4 of the EUCD provides for the distribution right,
43
 although the right is not 
directly defined in the Directive.
44
 It however clarifies that it applies to any form of distribution 
to the public by sale or otherwise.
45
 Articles 3 and 4 of the EUCD draw a distinction between 
the sale of tangible copies and online transmission of computer programs or other files.
46
  
There is a distinction between a “general” distribution right and “restricted” distribution 
right.
47
 The former right arises from the act of controlling the distribution of copies or 
duplicates irrespective of whether the act was performed with the consent of the rights-holder. 
The latter right arises from the act of controlling the distribution of copies or duplicates only 
when the act was performed without the necessary authority.
48
 
The use of the phrase “making available” instead of the term “distribution” shows the 
different approach to exclusive rights in the US and some European civil law countries.
49
 
Infringement by issuing of copies to the public is a new concept introduced in section 18 of the 
CDPA, which is a substantial departure from previous law under the publication of literary 
works.
50
 In sound recording, the operation of distribution involves the circulation of copies or 
duplicates of a recording. Several debates have been canvassed on the issue of whether a rights-
holder has or should have a right to control the distribution of his or her production or work.
51
 
According to Conradi,
52
 section 18 of the CDPA is infringed if copies of a work are “issued to 
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the public”.
53
 He further says that section 18 of the CDPA is strict, that is, knowledge of 
infringement is not required to find an infringer liable.
54
 
The issuance of copies of a work to the public brings us to the scope and entitlement to 
the right of distribution. The question then is, in terms of the sale of a copy, should the right of 
distribution be limited to the first sale?
55
 In terms of the distribution right, the rights-holder has 
the right to control the act of putting into circulation copies of a work not previously put into 
circulation in the European Economic Area (EEA), but not to control subsequent distribution, 
sale, hiring, loan or importation of those copies into the EEA.
56
 Circulation involves 
publication and covers both tangible and intangible media and even transient forms.
57
 
According to Bently and Sherman,
58
 in terms of section 18 of the CDPA “the issuing of 
copies of a work to the public” means:  
(a) the act of putting into circulation in the EEA copies not previously put into circulation in 
the EEA by or with the consent of the rights rights-holder; or 
(b) the act of putting into circulation outside the EEA copies not previously put into circulation 
in the EEA or elsewhere. 
In their opinion, a distribution right is accorded in respect of the issuance of each copy, 
including the original. In this regard, it is different from a right to make works available to the 
public for the first time – that is, a “publication” or “divulgation” right of the type hitherto 
applicable in UK law. In essence, a distribution right enables a rights-holder to put into 
commercial circulation tangible copies of a work not previously circulated.
59
 It is less clear 
what constitutes the restricted act of putting copies into circulation when there is a chain of 
distribution. Distribution commonly starts with the producer, moves through the importer or 
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wholesaler and ends with retailers who make the copies available to the public.
60
 However, 
Internet distribution involves content providers and ISPs.  
They further submit
61
 that as soon as copies are put into circulation (particularly when 
the first circulation is done with consent) the right would thereafter not operate. They note that 
since the right of distribution does not include “any subsequent distribution” of the work, 
copyright holders cannot control resale.
62
 Article 4(2) of the EUCD codifies the principle of 
exhaustion. Garnett et al.
63
 suggest that the effects of section 18 of the CDPA are as follows:  
(a) If a copy of the work has never before been put into circulation anywhere in the world, the 
act of putting it into circulation in the UK for the first time is a restricted act. 
(b) If the copy has previously been put into circulation within the EEA by or with the consent 
of the copyright holder, the act of putting it into circulation in the UK is not a restricted act. 
In the EEA the distribution right is exhausted by the consensual first act of distribution. 
(c) If the copy has previously been put into circulation in a country outside the EEA but not 
within the EEA, the act of putting it into circulation in the UK is a restricted act. 
(d) Whether the act of putting the copy into circulation in a country other than the UK is an 
infringement of copyright is a matter for the law of that state, not that of the UK.
64
 
 
Furthermore, although the word “public” does appear in section 18 of the CDPA, in Reinbothe 
and Von Lewinski‟s view,
65
 the term “circulation” suggests synonymy? Going back to my 
earlier submission, public in the online world now means any person, other than the rights-
holder or her licensee.
66
 Garnett et al.
67
 interpret public to mean where a sound recording is 
only available to subscribers to an Internet service.  
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As regards the use of the term “sale or other transfer of ownership” in the WCT and 
WPPT, Bently and Sherman
68
 submit that the wording of section 18 of the CDPA is 
ambiguous, although the EC legislation which the section is meant to implement suggests that 
distribution takes place on the first sale or other transfer of rights-ownership. However, Ohly
69
 
submits that to distribute means to transfer rights-ownership. This submission conflates digital 
and non-digital works. Further, he says that an interpretation which considers mere display or 
permission to others to use a copy without taking it away as distribution would seriously 
restrict the right to use a legitimately purchased copy of a work.
70
   
5.2.3   The right of communication to the public  
A good component of copyright is the public performance right, more particularly the right to 
perform play or show the work in public.
71
 In furtherance of the implementation of article 3 of 
the EUCD, section 20 of the CDPA (or Regulation 6 of Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulation 2003) now includes the new exclusive right of communication to the public. This 
replaces the two separate exclusive rights: broadcasting and cable-programme rights. This new 
right has broadly incorporated these two similar rights, which substantially reflect articles 14 
and 8 of the WPPT and WCT, and includes what may loosely be called the on-demand-
availability right in relation to communication on the Internet, the right of making available.
72
 
Subsuming the right of broadcasting, cable programming and on-demand transmission together 
causes the right of communication in the UK to be wider than articles 14 and 8 of the WPPT 
and WCT respectively.
73
 
Communication to the public encompasses both the “direct” commission to persons 
who are present at the time and place where the recording is played (such as the playing of 
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records in a club) and indirect communication to persons who listen to the recording 
elsewhere.
74
 
Article 3(1) of the EUCD gives effect to article 14 of the WPPT by providing for an 
exclusive right to authorize or prohibit any communication of a work to the public, by wired or 
wireless means (i.e. broadcasting generally). It also provides for an “on-demand right”, the 
right to make a work available to the public by wired or wireless means in such a way that 
members of the public may access it from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
75
 
Article 3(2)(b) of the EUCD is wider than article 14 of the WPPT in that it employs the word 
“including” in article 3, which word does not appear in article 14 of the WPPT. This 
distinguishes article 14 of the WPPT from article 8 of the WCT because the latter contains the 
term “including” which makes it wider than article 14 of the WPPT.  
Acts under the right of communication to the public under section 20 of the CDPA are 
different in nature from the restricted acts of performing, or showing or playing, a work in 
public under section 19 of the CDPA. Section 20 covers situations in which a work is 
communicated to the public and the members of the public are not present at the place at which 
communication originates; section 19 deals with performances which take place in the presence 
of the audience. When a work is performed in public through broadcasting, the communication 
is to be regarded as originating in the loudspeaker of the television or radio set where the public 
is present and not in the place from which transmission of the broadcast takes place.
76
  
Copyright is also infringed by a person who, without the permission of the copyright 
holder, transmits the copyright work by means of a telecommunications system (otherwise than 
communication to the public), knowing or having reason to believe that infringing copies of the 
work will be made by means of the reception of the transmission in the UK or elsewhere.
77
 A 
telecommunication system is defined as meaning a system for conveying visual images, sounds 
or other information by electronic means. This provision will make it an infringement, for 
example, to fax a work knowing that infringing copies will then be made at the receiving end. 
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In such a case, the person transmitting the work will often also have infringed copyright by 
copying the work before, or in the course of, transmission.
78
  
Where transmission is by way of communication to the public, an act of primary 
infringement will of course also occur. The provision that an infringement will occur under the 
present section if the sender knows or has reason to believe that infringing copies will then be 
made “elsewhere” than in the UK appears to be designed to prevent works being electronically 
exported for copying overseas. The provision appears to be of limited application, however, 
since the definition of “infringing copy” is generally limited to copies made in the UK or 
imported or to be imported into the UK.
79
  
The second category of communication to the public (on-demand) is the act of making 
available a work to the public by electronic transmission in such a way that members of the 
public may access it from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. The wording of 
this provision replicates that of articles 3.2 and 3.3 of the EUCD which are based on article 8 of 
the WCT and article 14 of the WPPT respectively.
80
 The Infosoc expressly provides that 
transmission may be by wired or wireless means, encompassing both wireless transmissions 
and transmissions by cable, but it must be electronic,
81
 although the UK law does not define 
electronic transmission.
82
 The fundamental distinction between on-demand transmission and 
broadcasting is that in broadcasting the work is transmitted at a time determined by the 
broadcaster with a view to its simultaneous reception by the public at large, while in on-
demand transmission the transmission is meant for a single recipient who initiates the 
transmission and chooses when and where to receive it.
83
  
The question that follows is, what constitutes the act of making a work available and 
who is liable for the infringement of communication to the public? Both the Act and the EUCD 
do not contain further provisions in this regard. However, what is important here is the act of 
making available a work to the public by electronic means and in such a way that the public can 
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access it.
84
 Garnett et al.
85
 suggest that as soon as a work becomes available on an ISP‟s server, 
the restricted act is committed and will continue to be committed until the work is no longer 
available.
86
 In a DP2P network, a sound recording becomes available when a peer uploads the 
work into her computer since the sound recordings are not stored in the ISP‟s server in a DP2P 
network.
87
  
In Poludor Ltd v Brown,
88
 the court held that the act of connecting a computer containing 
copies of the plaintiff‟s copyright works to the Internet so that the public could access the fields 
without the copyright holder‟s permission was in fact an act of copyright infringement. It did 
not matter whether a person knew nor had reason to believe that what he or she was doing was 
an infringement, because innocence or ignorance was no defence. The mere fact that the file 
had been made available meant that the right to communicate the work to the public had been 
infringed.
89
 The act of making available takes place where the apparatus of making available is 
situated.
90
 The meaning of “public” has been described under the right of distribution herein.
91
 
In addition, the court said that: 
“Mr Bowles had the Internet account; he admitted using the P2P software 
and had control over the computer, and he has never denied that he installed 
the software onto the computer”.
92
  
The exclusive and inherent control over the Internet by ISP is a confirmation of their 
responsibilities in accordance with the findings in this study.
93
  
The EUCD and its implementation by the UK appear to reflect substantially the 
provisions of articles 6 and 8 of the WCT, including the distinction between the two rights 
stated therein.
94
 Article 2, in contrast with the continental droid d‟auteur tradition, does not 
distinguish between copyright and related rights.
95
 
                                                          
 
84
 Ibid. at 444, para. 7-115. 
 
85
 Ibid. at 444, para. 7-116. 
 
86
 Ibid. 
 
87
 See para. 2.6.2 of this study. 
 
88
 Poludor Ltd v Brown at 1. 
 
89
 Supra at 9. 
 
90
 Garnett et al. Copinger and Skone James on Copyright at 445, para. 7-117. 
 
91
 Ibid. at 445, para. 7-118. See also para. 5.2.2 of this study. 
 
92
 Ibid. 
 
93
 See para. 2.7 of this study. 
 
94
 Wong “The Exclusive  Rights of „Distribution‟, „Communication to the Public‟ & „Making Available‟ Under 
Wipo: Lessons for other Jurisdictions from the Hong kong Bittorent Case”  at 23  
 
95
 See Ohly “Economic rights” at 214. 
113 
 5.3   Infringement 
The English copyright law protects rights-holder from both direct and indirect infringements.
96
 
Unauthorized file-sharing of copyright works, encompassing both uploading and downloading, 
may entail infringement of copyright in that the copyright work is copied and communicated to 
the public.
97
 Not all aspects of the CDPA provide for the challenges in the digital world and the 
case law is still developing.
98
 Although the Communication Act was amended in 2010 to cure 
some of the defects in the CDPA and other provisions of the law, it makes the execution of 
some of the provisions futuristic because the specific provisions for execution are not detailed 
in the Act.
99
 The provisions are left for the administrators to determine. This means that it may 
not noticeably reduce the infringement of sound recordings.  
5.3.1   Direct infringement 
The primary rights granted copyright holders are set out in sections 16 to 21 of the 1988 Act. 
Direct infringement arises if anyone carries out any of the activities reserved for the copyright 
owner or authorizes someone to carry out these activities.
100
 These two categories of direct 
infringer are identified in section 124A(1)(a) and (b) of the Communication Act of 2003.  
Direct infringement is primary infringement, which is generally the first act of copying 
according to section 17 of the CDPA.
101
 Direct infringement is committed when any of the 
restricted acts is infringed, because a rights-holder possesses the exclusive right to carry out any 
of the restricted acts in section 16(1) of the CDPA. Direct infringement occurs when any 
person, without the authority of the copyright holder, does or authorizes another to do any of 
the acts restricted by the CDPA according to section 16(2),
102
 whereas in other countries 
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authorizing an infringing act may be classified as an act of secondary infringement.
103
 The 
infringement may occur as a whole or in part, either directly or indirectly.
104
 Direct 
infringement is a tort of strict liability since there is no knowledge requirement.
105
  
According to Williams and Das,
106
 the relevant primary acts capable of being carried out on 
the Internet are reproduction and inclusion in a cable-programme service. Emphatically, the 
other acts listed in section 16 of the CDPA do not appropriately apply in the online world.
107
 
There is no primary liability for infringement under sections 17 and 18 of the CDPA as regards 
ISPs‟ inability to control the infringing activity. The trend in UK copyright case law confirms 
this. In Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd and others v Easyinternetcafé Ltd,
108
 it was 
reinstated that in so far as an ISP sets out a notice forbidding copyright infringement it would 
have a defence to the claim of authorizing another to commit a restricted act. This decision is 
also in consonance with the decision in CBS Songs v Amstrad case.
109
 Thus, an ISP does not 
have a direct liability.  
5.3.2   Indirect infringement  
Sections 22 to 26 of the CDPA make provision for the protection of copyright holders against 
secondary infringement.
110
 Indirect infringement involves those who generally deal in 
infringing goods or arising from the commercial exploitation of copies or of articles specifically 
adopted to make copies, provided the indirect infringer knew or had reason to believe that the 
copies were or would be infringements.
111
 Essentially, the CDPA requires the element of 
knowledge in indirect infringement, which is not the case in direct infringement.
112
 Regulation 
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27 of the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003
113
 reiterates the need for copyright 
holders to prove this requirement against ISPs, although such knowledge must be actual.
114
  
In Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd (Joinder),
115
 a patent case, the Court of Appeal 
explained that the:  
“concept of “common design” does not “call for any finding that the 
secondary party has explicitly mapped out a plan with the primary 
offender. Their tacit agreement will be sufficient. Nor is there any need for 
a common design to infringe. It is enough that the parties combine to 
secure the doing of acts which in the event prove to be infringements”.  
In relation to DP2P file-sharing, a common design (tacit agreement) exists between ISPs and 
users in so far as both parties combine to transmit sound recordings on the Internet illegally. 
According to Bently and Sherman,
116
 indirect infringement occurs in two ways. The first 
involves distributing or dealing with infringing copies immediately after they are made, 
according to sections 22, 23 and 27(2) of the CDPA. Section 27(2) renders an article an 
“infringing copy” if the making of that copy is an infringement of the copyright in the work in 
question.
117
 The second way involves those who facilitate copying by providing the equipment 
or means that enable copying to occur or provide the means for making infringing copies or 
performances.
118
 This study concerns this second way, which is provided for in section 24 of 
the CDPA. It states that liability occurs where a person supplies “an article that is specifically 
designed or adapted for making copies of the work”.
119
 Further, the Communication Act makes 
provision for online infringement of copyright and penalties for the infringement of copyright 
and performers‟ rights and secondly it makes provision for public lending right in relation to 
electronic publications.
120
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According to Bently and Sherman,
121
 the phrase “an article specifically designed or 
adapted for purposes of copying” is not sufficient for potential copying, but the article must 
also be specifically designed for the copying of a particular work.
122
 Regarding the view of 
Bently and Sherman,
123
 an article specifically designed or adapted for the purposes of copying 
is enough for potential copying of sound recordings in DP2P file-sharing and need not 
necessarily be specifically designed for the copying of a particular work. This is because of the 
unique features of sound recordings and the inherent and exclusive right and ability that ISPs 
have.
124
  
In the Shetland Times Ltd v Dr Jonathan Wills
125
 and Sony Music Entertainment (UK) 
Ltd and others v Easyinternetcafé Ltd
126
 cases, the plaintiff claimed that the headlines made 
available by it on its website were part of the cable programmes within the meaning of section 
7 of the CDPA. The defendant argued that the website operator did not send the information, 
but that it merely waited passively for the files to be accessed by users at the website. The 
defendant admitted that some of the files shared were copyrighted works shared without 
authorization.
127
 The court rejected the former argument and held that the transmission of 
material via the Internet could be considered “a cable programming service” based on the 
meaning of section 7 of the CDPA.
128
  
Further, section 24(2) of the CDPA, as the general requirement in indirect infringement, 
is expected to prove that the indirect infringer knows  or has reason to believe that infringing 
copies of the work will be made by means of the reception of the transmission in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere.
129
 Section 24(2) of the CDPA states that copyright in a work is 
infringed by a person who without the licence of the copyright holder transmits the work by 
means of a telecommunication system, including a fax transmission. However, Bently and 
Sherman submit that section 24(2) of the CDPA does not apply to communications to the 
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public.
130
 Generally, the software in DP2P network is capable of both infringing and non-
infringing uses. The DP2P software can be used to infringe any type of copyright work, 
although sound recordings are the most frequently infringed works.  
5.4   Contributory infringement by an ISP 
In the CBS Songs Ltd and others v Amstrad Consumer Electronic Plc and another,
131
 the 
House of Lords held that joint infringement occurs where two or more persons acted in concert 
with one another pursuant to the “common design” namely the infringement. No common 
design to infringe existed between Amstrad and the purchasers of the tape recording, since 
Amstrad sold the machines and the purchasers decided the purpose for which the machine 
would be used and whether or not to break the law.
132
  
According to Lord Atkin,
133
 a defendant owes a duty of care in order to avoid acts or 
omissions to her neighbour, aimed at a reasonable foreseeable risk of injury by the defendant‟s 
actions.
134
 In sections 124E(9)(b),
135
 124J(4)(b) and 124K(7)(a) and (b) of the Communication 
Act, reference is made to the words “act” and “omission” as criteria, yardsticks, standards, or 
principles for creating obligations and responsibilities among parties in copyright infringement 
and disputes particularly true rights-holders and ISPs who have reciprocal duties under the 
Communication Act.
136
 For this reason, it is expected that a defendant (an ISP) would take 
steps immediately after starting an Internet business to ensure that it meets its obligations and 
avoid liability for contributory infringement of sound recordings.  
5.4.1   Knowledge of contributory infringement by an ISP 
The 1988 Act provides for a class of secondary infringement, the principal characteristic of 
which is that the defendant must have a degree of “guilty knowledge” before he can be liable. 
The Act does not provide that a person who authorizes an act of infringement is liable, although 
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a person may nevertheless be liable for such an act under the common law, for example as a 
joint tortfeasor.
137
  
The onus of proving knowledge is on the plaintiff.
138
 According to section 124A(1)(a), 
(2), (3)(d) and (4) of the Communication Act 2003, the onus of proof lies with a rights-holder 
whom must prepare a copyright-infringement report and send to an ISP about the user‟s 
infringement. The ISP in turn sends a notification to the user
139
 detailing the contents of the 
notification comprising the particulars under section 124A(6), (7) and (8) of the 
Communication Act. Although the subtitle in section 124A of the Communication Act is 
“Obligation to notify subscribers of copyright infringement reports”, the obligations therein 
invariably lie with rights-holders, especially the duty of rights-holders to send a copyright-
infringement report to an ISP in section 124A(2), (3)(d),(4) and (5) of the Communication 
Act.
140
  
However, further to the earlier submissions,
141
 a rights-holder does not have adequate 
knowledge
142
 to justify her claim of “apparent” knowledge of infringement in her report to the 
ISP. In section 124A(1)(a) and (3)(a) of the Communication Act, the phrase “if it appears” to a 
copyright holder that a user of an Internet service has infringed the rights-holder‟s copyright by 
means of the service
143
 refers to the assessment by a rights-holder which is not sufficient 
enough to constitute knowledge on the part of a rights-holder. From the findings of this 
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study,
144
 the duty of a rights-holders to report “apparent” infringement in terms of section 
124A(3)(b) and (c) of the Communication Act is based on the “appearance” clause.  A mere 
suspicion or unfounded allegation against an ISP would not suffice in the circumstance.
145
  In 
any case, being an agent provocateur does not avail a rights-holder to have “apparent” 
knowledge of infringement or knowledge of all infringing transactions in the network in 
contrast with the knowledge of ISPs.
146
 The tasks expected of a rights-holder in section 124A 
of the Communication Act should have instead been added to the primary functions of an ISP 
in section 124B of the Communication Act.
147
  
Reasonable reference is required in proving knowledge against a defendant. In RCA 
Corporation v Custom Cleared Sales Pty Ltd,
148
 the court said that: 
“it [was] not concerned with the knowledge of a reasonable man, but. . . 
with reasonable inferences to be drawn from a concrete situation as 
disclosed in the evidence as it affects the particular person whose 
knowledge is in issue”. The court “is entitled to infer knowledge on the 
part of a particular person on the assumption that such a person 
possesses the ordinary understanding expected of persons in his line of 
business, unless by his or other evidence it is convinced otherwise”.
149
 
In inferring knowledge, a court “is entitled to approach the matter in 
two stages: (1) where opportunities for knowledge on the part of a 
particular person are proved; and (2) there is nothing to indicate that 
there are no obstacles to the particular person acquiring the relevant 
knowledge: there is some evidence from which the court can conclude 
that such a person has the knowledge”.
150
  
                                                          
 
144
 See paras 2.3 and 2.7 of this study. 
 
145
 Ibid.  
 
146
 Ibid. 
 
147
 Ibid. 
 
148
 RCA Corporation v Custom Cleared Sales Pty Ltd at 579. 
 
149
 Supra. See also Sterling and Carpenter Copyright Law in the United Kingdom at 255, para.546. 
 
150
 RCA Corporation v Custom Cleared Sales Pty Ltd at 579; See also Sterling and Carpenter Copyright Law in 
the United Kingdom at 255, para. 546. 
120 
However, Sterling and Carpenter further submit that knowledge may easily be overturned by 
either the defendant‟s denial of the knowledge which the court accepts or by demonstrating 
that he or she is properly excused from giving evidence of his or her actual knowledge.
151
  
In applying the foregoing to this study, the two requirements in RCA Corporation v 
Custom Cleared Sales Pty Ltd
152
 are present in that the opportunities for knowledge of 
infringement exist and there is nothing on the part of ISPs to indicate obstacles to the 
acquisition of relevant knowledge of infringement of sound recordings in DP2P network.
153
 In 
DP2P transactions it is extremely difficult for ISPs to deny knowledge of infringement of sound 
recordings and they cannot be excused from giving evidence of infringement on copyright in 
sound recordings.
154
 
In contributory infringement, it is necessary to prove that the defendant “knew” or “had 
reason” to believe he or she was dealing with an article which was an infringing copy of the 
copyright work. Two types of states of mind identify the two types of knowledge available: 
actual and constructive knowledge.
155
 In the Communication Act, the words “appears” and 
“apparent” are described therein and they generally seem to denote the words “had reason to 
know”
156
 and “know”
157
 respectively.  
5.4.1.1   Actual knowledge  
In the requirement for actual knowledge, an ISP must not play a passive role. In Bunt v 
Tilley,
158
 the court held that “an ISP which performs no more than a passive role in facilitating 
postings on the Internet cannot be deemed to be a publisher at common law”. It stated that “if a 
person „knowingly‟ permits another to communicate information which is defamatory, when 
there would be an opportunity to prevent the publication, there would seem to be no reason in 
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principle why liability should not accrue”.
159
 The subject matter in question was generally a 
defamatory statement and not a sound recording.
160
 However, in this study, an ISP does not 
play a passive role on the network.
161
  
Actual knowledge is a question of fact and will usually be based on the evidence of the 
infringer‟s actions, what he or she knew and did. The onus on the rights-holder has been 
described by the court as a heavy one as it was held in the case of Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book 
Co.
162
 Section 124A(2) of the Communication Act, for example, obliges rights-holders to make 
a copyright-infringement report to ISPs. This is a shift in onus with respect to providing first-
hand information on the Internet despite the fact that a rights-holder does not have control over 
the network.
163
  
Section 124A(2) of the Communication Act may place an onerous duty on a rights-
holder, however, according to section 124B of the Communication Act,
164
 it is presumed that 
an ISP must have had actual knowledge before she supplies the copyright infringement list
165
 
and yet, nothing is being done by ISPs to ameliorate the situation as at the time of gathering the 
information. This constitutes evidence of “action” by an ISP, evidence of what it knew and 
did.
166
 In the Communication Act, it seems that where a rights-holder delivers a copyright-
infringement report to an ISP, the latter initially plays a passive role (which is temporal) by 
virtue of the fact that she depends on the rights-holder‟s first or initial step to report the 
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infringement before an ISP in turn prepares a copyright infringement list.
167
 The passive role an 
ISP plays presupposes that there is a benefit of doubt given to an ISP at the initial stage. This 
procedure and presumption to a large extent protect ISPs from carrying out their primary 
obligations based on their exclusive and inherent control of their networks.
168
  
When knowledge of infringement is discovered, an ISP is obliged to disclose the 
copyright infringement, as impliedly stated in section 124A(8)(b) of the Communication Act, 
and to disclose the identity of the user, pursuant to section 124A(8)(c) of the Communication 
Act. In Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commissioners,
169
 the House of Lords ruled 
that a person who, even innocently, gets mixed up in wrongdoing is obliged to assist the injured 
party by providing information about the identity of other persons, or other vital information. In 
terms of section 124A(8)(c) of the Communication Act , however, an ISP need not disclose the 
identity of a subscriber to a rights-holder unless a court grants the rights-holder‟s application 
for that information.
170
  
Further, actual knowledge contemplates specific knowledge about the circumstances in 
which a specific article was made. The possibility that “an infringer‟s general knowledge of an 
article may be an infringing copy” will not be sufficient to associate him with knowledge. For 
instance, where he is in possession of a large number of articles, some of which he knows may 
infringe and some of which will not be deemed to be sufficient knowledge.
171
 The expression 
of specific knowledge requirement on the part of an ISP can be seen in the description or use of 
the term “apparent infringement” as stated in section 124A(6)(c) and (d) and (8)(a) of the 
Communication Act. These provisions emphasize the point that the notification that must be 
sent to the user must include the description and evidence of the “apparent infringement” and a 
statement to the effect that the information about the “apparent infringement” may be kept by 
ISPs. All of these require actual knowledge of an ISP. In any case, an ISP has specific 
knowledge that transactions conducted on DP2P software application constitute a breach of 
protocol and as such are infringements.
172
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Under the 1956 Act, infringers were taken to have possessed actual knowledge if they 
knew all the relevant facts but were under a mistake of law, i.e. labouring under a 
misunderstanding of or misconception about the law.
173
 According to Garnett et al.
174
 the 1956 
Act is still a good law, although the argument is now likely to be academic in view of the 
alternative constructive-knowledge position. The reason to suspect may turn into reason to 
believe if no explanation is offered. It is submitted that, although the defence of mistake or 
ignorance of the law
175
 does not apply to Internet operations, actual knowledge may apply 
because of the statutory lack of a duty to monitor the network in accordance with article 15 of 
the ECD.
176
  
5.4.1.2   Constructive knowledge 
In Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book Co,
177
 Judge Mervyn Davies QC held that knowledge 
mentioned in section 5(2) and (3) of the CDPA is knowledge of the facts. Of course, a rights 
rights-holder cannot make a claim with regard to the infringing activity without knowledge of 
the facts by the infringer being particularized by the claimant.
178
 The judge in his observation in 
Sillitoe reprimanded the defendant for taking a deliberate risk in her actions which were wrong 
in law. At this stage, she could not claim ignorance of the infringement.
179
  
Garnett et al.
180
 say the following about the phrase “has reason to believe”:  
(a) “Reason to believe”, which involves knowledge of facts from which a reasonable person
181
 
would arrive at the relevant belief, involves an objective test.
182
  
(b) Facts from which a reasonable person might suspect the relevant conclusions are 
enough.
183
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(c) A period of time must be allowed to enable the reasonable person to evaluate the facts and 
convert them into a reasonable belief.
184
  
Although this reasonable-person test contradicts the test in the RCA Corp case,
185
 the three 
criteria in this test have the same consequences as that in the RCA Corp case, which is based on 
“reasonable inference to be drawn from a concrete situation”.  
If a defendant has knowledge of relevant facts giving reasons for belief, this is all that is 
necessary. It is no defence that the defendant did not in fact believe the copies to be infringing 
or that he or she believed that as a matter of law no infringement would be committed – even if 
this belief was based on legal advice.
186
 In DP2P technology, ISPs know before transmission 
takes place if a sound recording is coming from a legal website or not and this establishes 
knowledge of the fact that the illegal transaction in sound recordings is an infringing copy and 
not a mere suspicion. This is in furtherance of the submissions on identification
187
 and the 
justification behind the duty of an ISP to furnish a copyright infringement list in section 124B 
of the Communication Act.  
It is important to identify the copyright work in question and if a copy is not supplied, it 
follows that at least the facilities should be offered for inspection. Nevertheless, it is not 
necessary for the defendant to have seen a copy of the relevant copyright work before she can 
be assumed to have reason to believe that an article is an infringing copy. Each case is decided 
on its merits.
188
 Further to the submissions regarding the detection of illegal transactions in 
sound recordings in a DP2P network,
189
 ISPs do not need any supply of the infringing copy 
because they already know
190
 and the track history shows the records from the inception of the 
transaction. In addition, the track history in a network system allows ISPs to trace the origin of 
a transaction and enables the inspection to be done by an independent person.  
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The courts have said that the infringer must be in the position to evaluate the information 
given to him or her.
191
 All that is required from a claimant is a notice of the facts to the 
defendant, which the latter cannot rebut by claiming that she was without knowledge within 
subsection 5(2) of the CDPA.
192
 In the UK, a warning letter giving details of the infringing 
activity is now served on the infringer.  Prior to this letter, in this study, an ISP is presumed to 
have reason to believe that it was dealing with or facilitating the creation of an infringing copy 
in sound recordings,
193
 on the basis of its knowledge of Internet operations, particularly DP2P 
file-sharing, in respect of which it is believed that ISPs have the ability to identify infringing 
files.
194
 Although a warning letter may not be a final notice, it furnishes the details of the 
infringing act. 
A reasonable period of time must be given to evaluate the information. A normal period 
is 14 days according to case law.
195
 It is submitted that, although a 14-day period is sufficient 
for the warning letter to be issued in the UK, adequate knowledge of the general infringement is 
obtained when transmission of a sound recording is about to take place on the ISP‟s network.
196
 
However, in terms of section 124A(3)(d) of the Communication Act, a rights-holder is expected 
to send a copyright-infringement report to the ISP within one month from the day on which the 
evidence was gathered. In terms of sections 124A(4)-(5) of the Communication Act, an ISP 
who receives such a report must notify the user of the report, if the initial obligation code 
requires the provider to do so, within one month from the day on which the provider receives 
the report.  
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An infringer is not bound to accept the rights-holder‟s allegation, although the former 
cannot simply ignore them.
197
 A defendant who refuses to accept the allegation is capable of 
becoming a person with reason to believe an infringement if she carries out no sensible 
inquiries and does absolutely nothing in the face of continued allegations of the copyright by 
the rights-holder.
198
 In DP2P file-sharing, the infringement of sound recordings is reasonably 
believed to be known to ISPs since they have not done enough for some time to prevent 
infringement in the face of continued allegations by rights-holders.  
Having generally submitted that an ISP had reason to believe that it was dealing with or 
facilitating the copyright infringement of sound recordings based on its general knowledge, a 
claim cannot be made by a rights-holder without the particulars of the claim. A rights-holder‟s 
case is strengthened by the fact that the defendant is supplied with a copy of or given 
reasonable access to the copyright work infringed.
199
 Such information must be detailed and 
must not be a general allegation.
200
 Facts that lead a reasonable person to suspect the relevant 
conclusion are not sufficient.
201
 The supply of information of infringement is entrenched in the 
evidence required in the copyright-infringement report in terms of section 124A(3)(c) of the 
Communication Act. In DP2P, even though there is a suspicion of infringement by the rights 
rights-holder, as mentioned earlier, a claim cannot be based on general facts, but only on 
specific ones. Section 124A(1)(a), 124A (3)(b)and(c), 124A (6)(c)and(d), 124A (8)(a) and 
124K(6)(a) of the Communication Act makes provision for apparent knowledge of 
infringement.  
5.4.2   Material contribution to infringement by ISPs 
There is no case law to demonstrate the material contribution made by an ISP in indirect 
infringement of sound recordings in a DP2P network. However, the relevant case law on this 
point was considered. In Moorhouse v University of New South Wales,
202
 the court held that the 
notice the university had placed on each photocopy machine was not clearly worded and 
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accurate in that it merely set out the provisions of section 29 of the 1988 Copyright Act which a 
lay person would not have understood. Accordingly, the court found that the notices were 
completely ineffective for the purpose for which they were apparently intended.
203
  
Thus, ISPs should place a specific and adequate notice and agreement on their networks 
informing users about the implications of the illegal sharing of sound recordings. Users must 
then acknowledge the notice and accept the terms in the agreement included the ISPs‟ reserved 
right to deny or block access to users who attempt to distribute illegal copyright works. The 
issue of denying access or blocking the actual transmission of sound recordings may not arise 
since the ISPs would have known in advance the intention of the users by sending a signal 
ahead to inform the ISPs of their intention. This is because the ISPs have the right and 
capability to detect illegal transaction in sound recordings in the ordinary course of their 
operation. This is a duty of care on the part of ISPs.
204
 
Material contribution to infringement can also be examined in the Communication Act. 
Sections 124G to 124J set out that the secretary of state may by order give directive on the 
“obligations of ISPs to limit Internet access:
205
 impose a technical obligation on ISPs
206
 and 
criteria for the contents of the code about obligations to limit Internet access. The technical 
obligation in relation to an ISP is an obligation for the provider to take a technical measure 
against some or all relevant users of  its service for the purposes of preventing or reducing 
infringement of copyright on the Internet. This is stated in section 124G(2) of the 
Communication Act. Further, a technical measure is a measure that limits the speed or other 
capacity of the service provided to a subscriber,
207
 prevents a subscriber from using the service 
to gain access to particular material or limits such uses,
208
 suspends the service provided to a 
subscriber
209
 or limits the service provided to a user in another way.
210
 The duty of care by ISPs 
in the Communication Act is also stated in section 124A(4) and (6) of Communication Act. 
Section 124A(6) provides that an ISP has a duty to advise or inform the user  regarding lawful 
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access to copyright works,
211
 about steps that a subscriber can take to avoid unauthorized use
212
 
and anything else that the initial obligations code requires notification to include.
213
 Thus, 
failure of an ISP to comply with these provisions would amount to material contribution toward 
the infringement of sound recordings in DP2P application.  
Further, in CBS Songs v Amstrad,
214
 it was held that Amstrad in their advertisement to 
sell “double speed twin-deck” tape recorders did not sanction, approve or countenance an 
infringing use of their model. Although Amstrad conferred on the purchaser the power to copy, 
there was a footnote warning (in the user‟s manual) that some copying required permission and 
that Amstrad had no authority to grant that permission. In conclusion, the court held that 
Amstrad did not authorize the infringement because there was no material contribution by the 
indirect infringer.
215
 Of course, acknowledging both the infringing and non-infringing uses of a 
product, the court held correctly in the Amstrad case;
216
 moreover, copying in the analogue 
world without permission, although illegal, is however permissible due to the countable number 
of copies that can be made. The product in question was not within the control and supervision 
of Amstrad at the time of infringement. The situation in Amstrad is different from the role of 
ISPs in a DP2P network and as such, notwithstanding the fact that ISPs do not make 
advertisements on their networks to persuade users, they do however materially contribute to 
the infringement by the breach of duty to prevent illegal sound recordings from passing through 
their network. The granting of access by ISPs is the causal connection for the infringement of 
sound recordings in a DP2P network.
217
 
In section 16(2) of the CDPA, a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of 
the copyright holder commits, or authorizes another to commit, any restricted act. According to 
Dixon,
218
 authorization has not just been interpreted literally, that is, purporting to grant a 
licence to use copyright material. It has been used to cover a broader range of activities that the 
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third party may “sanction, approve or countenance”,
219
 “permit or even treat with inactivity or 
indifference”.
220
 Also in section 124G(2) of the Communication Act, ISPs have a technical 
obligation to either prevent or reduce infringement of copyright by means of the Internet. The 
failure to do so would amount to authorization or contribution to infringement.  
In the Amstrad case,
221
 it was held that to “authorize” means “to grant or purport to 
grant, expressly or by implication, the right to do the act complained of”. Based on this 
definition Conradi
222
 says that ISPs should ensure that any material they transmit is not 
condoned and that they should not authorize illegal activity on their network. He concludes by 
saying that since file-sharing activity constitutes a large share of an ISP‟s business, it is quite 
possible that the courts would take a less tolerant view and that ISPs should therefore adopt a 
prominent anti-infringement message.
223
 
Regulation 17 of the Electronic Commerce Regulations (ECR) offers a defence only 
when a transmission or the act of giving access to a network would otherwise create a liability. 
Therefore, this defence does not apply to liability for authorization, which is reinforced by 
Recital 44 of the ECD.
224
 
5.5   Vicarious infringement by an ISP  
Section 124A(1)(b) provides for vicarious liability against a user or other persons (or both) that 
may be allowed to use the system.
225
  
5.5.1   The right and ability to control infringing activity  
There is no case law dealing with the issue at hand. However, reliance will be placed on the 
dictum in the relevant case below. In RCA Corp v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd,
226
 in the Supreme 
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Court of New South Wales, Kearney J adopted a part in Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria The 
Modern Law of Copyright 
227
 by saying that: 
“a person may be said to authorize another to commit an 
infringement if the one has some form of control over the other at 
the time of infringement or if he has no such control, is responsible 
for placing in the other‟s hands materials which by their nature are 
almost inevitably to be used for the purpose of an infringement.
228
 
The court found that the machine was capable of being used for lawful or unlawful purposes. 
Further, all recording machines and many other machines are capable of being used for 
unlawful purposes.
229
 From the above case law, it can be argued that an ISP has exclusive and 
inherent control over direct infringers at the time of the infringement since ISPs are neighbours 
to the rights-holders who owe the latter a duty of care as submitted earlier in this study
230
 and 
generally in section 124G to 124J of the Communication Act. Alternatively, without conceding 
that ISPs have no such control, they are still responsible for giving direct infringers network 
access which access will, given the very nature of DP2P file-sharing, almost inevitably be used 
for the purpose of copyright infringement. 
5.5.2   Direct financial benefit  an ISP gain from an infringing activity  
In like manner, no case law has been recorded relating to direct financial benefit gained by 
ISPs. Consequently, previous case law is relied on. In Ernest Turner Electrical Instruments Ltd 
v Performing Rights Society,
231
 two companies played – that is, performed – music to their 
employees during business hours. The Performing Rights Society challenged the companies for 
infringing performing rights in the works. In their defence, the companies relied on the fact that 
the performances were not to the public.
232
 The issue that was argued not to be legitimate for 
consideration became the gravamen of the discussion, that is, what would be the effect of a 
decision that allows thousands of factories in the country employing millions of workers if the 
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performance can be carried out without infringement of copyright? The result would be that the 
employers of these millions of workers would be performing to the workforce without payment 
to the brains, skills, imagination and taste of another, while the employers derive increased or 
improved output.
233
 
It is apparent that an entrepreneur cannot embark on a project without taking account of 
his or her economic benefit.
234
 Likewise, performances of sound recordings to employees are 
regarded as a direct financial benefit by the infringing acts. Were this principle applied in the 
UK, a decision in favour of a rights-holder would be made to say that the activities of ISPs are 
meant to derive economic benefit for their business, which is precisely the causal connection 
for infringement by the ISPs.  
On a general note, this study has revealed that the major stakeholders (i.e. rights-holders, 
ISPs and users) of sound recordings have pecuniary interests in the work from which conflicts 
arise. The Communication Act provides for the payment of contributions by one or more 
copyright holder, ISPs and users in the sharing of costs incurred under the copyright 
infringement provisions.
235
 ISPs have some form of interest, stake or benefits (which may not 
be in cash form)  for the infringement of sound recordings. These expected benefits from the 
motivating factor for ISPs‟ failing or refusing to identify illegal transactions in sound 
recordings.
236
 Economists posit that individuals do not engage in activities that do not provide 
a positive expected return.
237
 Thus, any form of benefit to the infringer is sufficient if it results 
in pure economic loss to the copyright owner. 
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5.6 Inducing infringement by an ISP  
To prove liability against ISPs under this theory, there must be an inducement. In the Amstrad 
case,
238
 it was noted that “generally speaking, inducement, incitement or persuasion to infringe 
must be by a defendant to an individual infringer and must identifiably procure a particular 
infringement in order to make a defendant as a joint infringer”.
239
 Amstrad had not procured 
infringement by advertising and offering a machine for sale that could be used for both lawful 
and unlawful purposes. Purchasers who copied unlawfully did so because they chose to do so, 
not because they had been induced, incited or persuaded to do by Amstrad.
240
  
In a DP2P network, because the unlawful copying of sound recordings from illegal 
websites and personal computers goes through the ISP‟s network, ISPs would be inducing, 
inciting, and persuading users to copy sound recordings on their network without much ado. 
This is because, apart from ISPs‟ having control over their networks, ISPs also know the actual 
risks inherent to the Internet.  
5.6.1   Affirmative acts in infringing activity by an ISP  
UK case law provides for liability stemming from the authorization of infringing copyright. 
Authorization includes turning a blind eye or being indifferent to copyright infringement or 
failing to inform persons of the implications of copyright. In Moorhouse and Angus v 
University of New South Wales,
241
 the court held that the deeds – be they the act or omission – 
of the alleged authorizing party must be considered in the circumstances in which the deed 
composed in the act was done. These include the possibility that such a deed will be carried out. 
The court may infer authorization or consent from deeds which fall short of being direct and 
positive. Furthermore, authorization or consent may be inferred from indifference demonstrated 
by acts of commission or omission.  
Although section 124E(9)(b) of the Communication Act provides for an act or omission 
by both ISPs and rights-holders in terms of the definition of owner-service provider dispute, 
section 124E(1) of the Communication Act places more obligations on ISPs than on  rights-
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holders. This is due to the technical role of an ISP in this regard.
242
 Thus, the performance of an 
act or the omission to perform where the contrary is expected from an ISP can be regarded as 
an affirmative act. For instance, an ISP who receives a copyright-infringement report from a 
rights-holder
243
 but who does not notify the user concerned about it disobeys the provisions of 
the initial obligation code as stated in sections 124A (4)-(5) and 124E(1)(a)-(b)of the 
Communication Act.  
Every case is treated on its own merit from the inference to be made from the conduct of 
the alleged infringer. In CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc,
244
 the court held 
that the mere fact that Amstrad produced the equipment that facilitated the infringing activity in 
copyright was not sufficient to conclude that Amstrad authorized users to infringe copyright.
245
 
Although an ISP is not a producer of the software in DP2P file-sharing, it provides the causal 
connection by facilitating transmission without exercising the due care and diligence to detect 
the infringement of copyright, thus facilitating infringement.
246
  
Lord Templeman, continuing with his pronouncement in the CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad 
Consumer Electronics Plc,
247
case referred to Monckton v Pathe Freres Pathephone Ltd 
248
 in 
which the court considered the difficulties in controlling home taping and admitted that nothing 
could be done against the infringers in the sense of prosecuting or stopping the infringers. As 
discussed earlier, the features in taping are very different from digital production or 
exploitation.
249
 Moreover, it has been revealed that an ISP has control over the infringing 
activity.
250
 Thus, it can be argued that were Lord Templeman to apply his reasoning today he 
would hold ISPs liable. However, , it seems unlikely that a duty by an ISP in controlling 
infringing activity would be implied by the courts regarding the ISP by virtue of regulation 17 
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which limits the ISP‟s liability. Nonetheless, section 97A of the CDPA and a part of the 
regulation might allow a rights-holder to seek for her rights against an ISP via an injunction 
based on the ISP‟s actual knowledge of another person using their services to infringe 
copyright.
251
 In pursuance of this relief, section 17 of the DECA gives the Secretary of State the 
power to make provision about injunctions preventing access to location on the Internet.  
The Communication Act lists the following as indicating affirmative acts of infringement 
of sound recordings by ISPs. 
(a) When an ISP does not:  
 (i) limit the speed or capacity of service provided to a user when required;
252
 
 (ii) prevent a user from using the service to gain access to a particular material or limit 
such use when there is an illegal transaction;
253
  
 (iii) suspend the service provided to a user when required;
254
  
 (iv) limit the service provided to a subscriber in another way.
255
 
(b) When an ISP fails or refuses to send to the user the notification to the electronic or postal 
address held by the ISP for that user.
256
  
(c) When an ISP fails or refuses to provide a copyright holder with a copyright-infringement 
list when requested by the holder to do so.
257
 
(d) When an ISP does not keep information about users in terms of the initial obligation 
code.
258
 
(e) When an ISP‟s initial obligations code discriminates unduly against rights-holders.
259
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(f) When an ISP does not comply with the technical obligations imposed on it.
260
 
(g) When an ISP fails or refuses to comply with one or more obligations to limit Internet 
access imposed by the secretary of state.
261
  
5.6.2   Intent on the part of the infringer in the activity  
The UK copyright law has not recorded a case touching on intent on the part of an infringer in 
online transmission. However, the general principle of intent in copyright is examined in the 
old law. In Scott v Stanford,
262
 Sir W Page Wood VC says that: 
“If, in effect, the great bulk of a plaintiff‟s publication – a large and vital 
portion of his work and labour – has been appropriated and published in a 
form which will materially injure his copyright, mere honest intention on 
the part of the appropriator will not suffice, as the court can only look at 
the result, and not at the intention in the minds at the time of doing the act 
complained of, he must be presumed to intend all that the publication of 
his work effects”.
263
 
Similarly in support of this principle, in Hanfstaengl v Empire Palace,
264
 Lindley LJ says that 
what is necessary to be considered is the protection of authors, be it musical or literary 
compositions, and therefore the intention of an infringer is immaterial.
265
 In UK copyright law, 
ISPs in DP2P file-sharing are presumed to be strictly liable since courts are not interested in 
their state of mind but in the result of the infringement. However, even if the court looks at an 
ISP‟s state of mind in DP2P file-sharing, it can make no finding other than that the ISP 
intended to induce direct infringement.
266
 In relating the case law to the Communication Act, it 
is submitted that an ISP‟s failure to discharge its obligations would be indicative of its intent. 
Intent may be inferred if, for instance, an ISP does not: 
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(a) give advice or information informing subscribers about how to obtain lawful access to 
copyright works;
267
 
(b) give advice or information informing subscribers about steps they can take to protect an 
Internet access service from unauthorized use;
268
 or 
(c) do anything else that the initial obligations code requires the notification to include.
269
 
5.7   Limitation of ISPs’ liability  
It is believed that for there to be limitation of liability, there is the presumption that there is 
primarily an establishment of liability, which implies that there is a breach of duty by the 
infringer. Recently, the Communication Act increased the obligations of ISPs in relation to 
online infringement of copyright.
270
  
The UK government did not introduce any specific exceptions or limitations into the 
CDPA to deal with the ECD. Rather, the ECR only sets out each safe harbour from liability for 
damages for any pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction. The exclusion from liability is 
not just for copyright, database-right or other intellectual-property infringement. An 
information society service is broadly defined as “any service normally provided for 
remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including 
digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of the recipient of the 
service”.
271
 
5.7.1   Duty of an ISP to identify unlawful activity 
Article 15 of the ECD prohibits member States from imposing a general obligation on ISPs to 
monitor the information transmitted or stored or to seek out facts or circumstances indicating 
illegal activities.
272
 Article 15 of the ECD has not been transposed into the ECR of 2002.
273
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The European Directive on Electronic Commerce thus states that “general monitoring 
of millions of sites and web pages would, in practical terms, be impossible and would result in 
disproportionate burdens on intermediaries and higher costs of access to basic services for 
users”.
274
 Similarly, the Communication Act does not oblige ISPs to monitor.  
However article 15 of the ECD does not prevent public authorities in the member States 
from imposing a monitoring obligation in a specific, clearly defined individual case. The 
reports and studies on the effectiveness of technical measures such as blocking and filtering 
applications” 
“appear to indicate that there is not yet any technology which could not be 
circumvented and provide full effectiveness in blocking or filtering illegal 
and harmful information whilst at the same time avoiding blocking entirely 
legal information resulting in violations of freedom of speech”.
275
  
The technical measures that may violate freedom of speech are also stipulated in section 
124G(3) of the Communication Act.  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently made a pronouncement on the 
privacy of users. In Productores de Música de España (“Promusicae”) v Telefónica de España 
SAU (“Telefónica”),
276
 the court held that article 13(1) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46 
creates an exception to the general rule in the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (Directive 2002/58) (Communication Directive). The general rule in the 
Communication Directive is that member States must safeguard the confidentiality of 
communications transmitted via public communications networks and publicly available 
electronic communication services and should prohibit the storage of such data by anyone other 
than the user unless consent is obtained.
277
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 The court noted that the Communication Directive contains some exceptions to the 
general rule that member States may disclose confidential communication. The exceptions 
apply when it is necessary, appropriate and proportionate in a democratic society to do so to 
safeguard national security, defence, public security or the prevention, investigation, detection 
and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorized use of the electronic communication 
system, as mentioned in article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC.
278
 Similarly, section 124A(8)(c) of 
the Communication Act provides for the identification of an infringing subscriber on the 
application of a rights-holder to court. 
Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46 enables member States to enact legislative measures to 
restrict the general obligation, where necessary, to protect rights and freedoms of others, which 
include the protection of fundamental rights – such as the right to property – in this case 
intellectual property.
279
 The ECJ concluded that the protection of property in civil proceedings 
was not excluded from the exceptions to the general rule set out in the Communications 
Directive.
280
 
In addition to the Data Protection Act 1988, the UK government enacted the Interception 
of Communication Act 1985 (IOCA) in response to article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).
281
 The IOCA created the offence of unlawful interception of 
communication but was repealed by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) 
which is the primary legislation regulating the interception of communication in the UK.
282
 As 
it was under the IOCA, it is an offence in the UK under the RIPA for anyone to intercept 
intentionally and without lawful authority a communication system, including private 
telecommunications over mobile telephones, pagers and electronic messages over the computer 
networks. 
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In section 2 of the RIPA, a person intercepts a communication in the course of its 
transmission when he or she makes “some or all of the contents of the communication 
available, while being transmitted, to a person other than the sender or intended recipient of the 
communication” by modifying or interfering with the transmission system or monitoring the 
transmission. Communication is defined as that which is “in the process of transmission” and 
“being stored on the transmission system”.
283
 
The Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 was enacted as part of the emergency 
counter-terrorism legislation aimed at ensuring that the UK government has the necessary 
powers to counter any threat to the UK.
284
 
All of this, one way or another, prohibits monitoring or interception; however, 
notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the lack of a duty to monitor or intercept does not 
cover the identification of illegal sound recordings, according to the findings in Chapter 2 of 
this study.
285
 It is submitted that identification of illegal sound recordings should be included as 
part of the prohibited acts by ISPs to limit their liability. 
5.7.2   Primary conditions for limiting the liability of an ISP acting as a mere conduit  
The limitation of liability of an ISP acting as a provider of an access network is set out in 
regulation 17(1) of the ECR, which implements article 12 of the ECD. Regulation 17(1) states 
that:  
“where an information society service is provided which consists of the 
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a 
recipient of the service or the provision of access to a communication 
network, the service provider . . . shall not be liable for damages or for any 
other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as a result of that 
transmission where the service provider – 
(a) did not initiate the transmission;  
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(b) did not select the receiver of the transmission; and  
(c) did not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.” 
Regulation 17(2) of the ECR stipulates that:  
“The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in [regulation 
17(1)] include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the 
information transmitted where:  
(a) this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the 
communication network, and  
(b) the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for 
the transmission.”
286
  
5.7.3   Other conditions for limiting the liability of an ISP acting as a mere conduit  
Since rights have reciprocal obligations to be carried out by the claimant of that right, we probe 
into the duty of a rights-holder in limiting liability of an ISP on the Internet. Furthermore, the 
ISP‟s duty to perform certain obligations in other conditions before the limitation occurs is 
examined notwithstanding the position that an ISP is not obliged to monitor information on the 
Internet according to article 15 of the ECD.  
5.7.3.1   Take-down and notification duty by the rights-holder  
The ECR does not provide for the take-down and notification that may be required by a rights-
holder with respect to the mere conduit service by ISPs. Regulation 22 of the ECR provides for 
only a notice for the purposes of actual knowledge required by regulations 18(b)(v) and 19(a)(i) 
of the ECR in relation to caching and hosting respectively. 
There are no rules regarding the components of actual knowledge or how it is obtained 
by ISPs,
287
 but there is a general guide in the case law to the effect that the acquisition of 
knowledge may in some circumstances also affect the underlying potential liability. In Byrne v 
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Deane,
288
 it was held that a person who has the right to remove defamatory material that 
someone else has put up on their property, but permits it to remain displayed, then becomes a 
participant in the publication.
289
  
Essentially, the notice referred to in regulation 22 of ECR 2002 does not apply to the 
general principle of “Take down and notification”. Moreover, notice of actual knowledge 
referred to in regulation 22 of ECR 2002 does not include the role of an ISP as a mere conduit. 
It is submitted therefore that there is no provision for take-down and notification for the 
purposes of limiting the liability of ISPs in the UK.  
Invariably, given the express mention of the instances of caching and hosting requiring 
actual knowledge in regulation 22 of ECR 2002 to the exclusion of the instance of a mere 
conduit, it means that the level of knowledge required in a mere conduit is, according to 
regulation 22 of ECR 2002, constructive knowledge.  
Even though there is no provision for a take-down notice in the ECR, a warning letter is 
now being served by the rights-holder on infringers after the infringement has been noticed.
290
 
The infringer must be given a reasonable amount of time to consider the information that must 
be detailed in the warning letter as to the nature of the work in question.
291
 However, it is 
important to note that there is a notification in section 124A(5) and (6) of the Communication 
Act which is prepared by an ISP based on the report from a copyrights-holder to an ISP under 
section 3(2) of the Act.  
5.7.3.2   The duty of an ISP to disclose the names of infringing users 
Notwithstanding the fact that an ISP does not have the duty to monitor the infringing activity 
on the network in article 15 of the ECD, there is an implied duty to disclose the names of 
infringing users once the rights-holder furnishes the particulars of the infringement and the 
infringer. The disclosure of a user‟s identity is also provided for in section 124A(8)(c) of the 
Communication Act but must be done with the approval of a court via an application.  
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However, in the case of Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd 
292
 citing Norwich 
Pharmaceutical Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners,
293
 the House of Lords decided that 
an order disclosing the identity of the third party could be issued through a person who was 
involved in the infringing activity notwithstanding the innocence of the latter in civil or 
criminal damage. The court noted that there was an “overwhelming likelihood” that a specific 
wrongdoing had been committed by an individual whose identity was unknown to the 
claimants.
294
 In UK law, what was demonstrated was the overwhelming likelihood or 
substantial probability that an infringing activity was committed by an individual whose 
identity is unknown to the rights rights-holder.
295
  
However, in section 124A(1) to (3) of the Communication Act, a rights-holder is 
expected to make a copyright-infringement report to an ISP if it appears to the rights-holder 
that a user of  an Internet access service has infringed the rights-holder‟s copyright by means of 
the service.
296
 It is difficult for a rights-holder to make a copyright-infringement report without 
an ISP making this its primary obligation to do so. Essentially, it becomes difficult for a rights-
holder who has no knowledge of infringement to make a claim of apparent knowledge of 
infringement.  
English courts would not issue a broad order; they would rather issue a specific order 
targeted at the identification of users of a file-sharing network who are suspected of infringing 
copyright.
297
 However, very recently, the ECJ has adopted a different view from the UK‟s 
position on the duty of an ISP to disclose the particulars of an infringer in a case referred to it 
by Spain. In Productores de Música de España (“Promusicae”) v Telefónica de España SAU 
(“Telefónica”)
298
 the ECJ rejected the decision of the Commercial Court of Madrid that an ISP 
was required to disclose the identification of people allegedly infringing copyright by illegally 
downloading content.
299
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In other words, in civil proceedings, an ISP is not bound to disclose the identity of a 
direct infringer in Europe, which includes the UK, of course. More particularly, in the absence 
of a court order, the disclosure of the identity of a third party would be in breach of both the 
Data Protection Act 1998 and the privacy agreement between ISPs and users.
300
  
However, in articles 17 and 18 of the ECD, member States must provide for effective 
resort to an out of court dispute settlement (in particular by electronic means) and must ensure 
that legal remedies (such as application for interim measures) are effectively available.
301
  
5.7.4   Conclusion 
Although English courts have not yet decided the Internet-based issues debated in the Napster 
or Grokster cases, it is submitted that UK judges may find reasons not to follow the home 
taping precedent in CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad. It could be argued that ISPs have the ability to 
prevent the downloading, transmission and distribution of copyright material.
302
 Further, the 
ECR is not broad enough in laying the statutory limitation in favour of ISPs, it gives ISPs little 
protection, in contrast with the US‟s DMCA and the South African Electronic Communication 
and Transaction Act 25 of 2002. The ECR focuses greater attention on general electronic 
commerce and on the protection of consumers rather than the protection of ISPs. 
However, according to Smith,
303
 it is easy to fall into the error of assuming that if the 
conditions for invoking a protection set out in the Directive are not met, then, an online 
intermediary is necessarily liable. This is position is not a correct one. The only consequence 
under the Directive is that the defence provided by the Directive is not available. It is usually 
necessary for a claimant to establish a cause of action against the intermediary.
304
  
Faced with the uncertainty in the liability of ISPs, the Gower Review of Intellectual 
Property published in December 2006 was opposed to the change in the law that will impose 
                                                          
 
300
 Conradi “ISP liability – UK” at 292–293. 
 
301
 See Akester “A practical guide to digital copyright law” at 32. 
 
302
 See Stokes Digital Copyright: Law and Practice at 134. 
 
303
 Smith Internet Law and Regulation, 4th ed., at 365, para. 5-030. 
 
304
 Ibid. 
144 
some form of liability for illegal P2P service operators, thereby promoting the development of 
industry protocols between ISPs and rights-holders.
305
  
However, although the Communication Act has prima facie brought some relief to the 
pains of rights-holders in the online world, some of this relief is futuristic, uncertain, 
unreasonable, unrealistic and vague. This is because some of the provisions can only come into 
force on the fulfilment of certain administrative, and bureaucratic conditions by the 
administrators, and politicians
306
 who may be done at their whims and caprices. Another 
noticeable defect in the Communication Act is the duty it imposes on rights-holders to make a 
copyright-infringement report under section 3 and submit it to the ISP; the situation should 
have been the reverse because ISPs have absolute control of their networks whereas rights-
holders do not.
307
 Although the Communication Act seems to be a solution to the problems in 
the digital world, it is more of a political gimmick or promise that was milled out for political 
reasons on the verge of the former prime minister‟s exit.  
     Finally, reference is made to the recommendation of the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee in its report on “Personal Internet Security”.
308
 It was suggested that it 
was time to “take a nibble out of blanket immunity” afforded by the “mere conduit” defence. 
The committee recommended that the mere conduit immunity should be removed once ISPs 
have detected or been notified of the fact that machines on their network are sending out spam 
or infected code.
309
 Although this recommendation is framed in the context of spam 
transactions, it points out the concept of detection in relation to all works.
310
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CHAPTER 6 
SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1   Introduction  
South Africa is a signatory to various international treaties and agreements on intellectual 
property in general and copyright in particular, most notably the Berne Convention
1
 and the 
TRIPs Agreement.
2
 In addition, South Africa has signed, but not yet ratified, the WCT and the 
WPPT.
3
 
The South African legal system can be described as an uncodified mixed legal system.
4
 
All matters relating to copyright are governed by the current Copyright Act 98 of 1978
5
 and 
regulations made under the Act.
6
 Hence, no protection of copyright exists in terms of the 
common law, as section 41(4) of the Copyright Act makes clear: “no copyright or right in the 
nature of copyright shall subsist otherwise than by virtue of this Act or of some other enactment 
in that behalf”.
7
  
Copyright law was introduced into South Africa in 1803 by the Dutch, colonisers of the 
Cape of Good Hope, by way of a variant of the Batavian Republic‟s Copyright Act of the same 
year.
8
 This copyright law also became part of the law in three other colonies in the region: the 
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Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal.
9
 The Cape of Good Hope, Transvaal and Natal later 
adopted their own provincial Copyright Acts.
10
 In 1910 the four colonies became the Union of 
South Africa, a self-governing dominion of the British Empire.  
In 1916, the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act 9 of 1916 was enacted in 
the Union of South Africa, repealing the previous provincial Copyright Acts. Section 143 of the 
1916 Act declared – subject to certain variations
11
 – the British Copyright Act of 1911 in force 
in the Union. In 1961 the Republic of South Africa came into existence. Soon thereafter the 
Copyright Act 63 of 1965 repealed the 1916 Act. The 1965 Copyright Act nonetheless bore a 
strong resemblance to British law due to the fact that substantial provisions of the newly 
introduced 1956 British Copyright Act were adopted.  
The current Copyright Act was adopted in 1978 and has been amended several times. It 
is closely based on the provisions of the Berne Convention.
12
 The Act protects literary works, 
musical works, artistic works, cinematograph films, sound recordings, broadcasts, programme-
carrying signals, published editions, and computer programs.
13
 
This chapter examines the South African copyright framework with respect to the 
protection of sound recordings, together with the rights of reproduction, distribution and 
communication to the public and the so-called needle-time right.
14
 Further, indirect copyright 
infringement will be discussed in terms of the principles of the law of delict as they relate to 
DP2P file-sharing. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitation of liability 
of ISPs in DP2P networks in terms of the Electronic Communication and Transaction Act 25 of 
2002 (ECTA), more particularly the Guidelines for Recognition of Industry Representative 
                                                          
 
9
 See Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law at 1-3 n. 4; Pistorius “The South Africa copyright law 
and language” at 1. 
 
10
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Bodies of Information Systems Service Providers
15
 (IRB Guidelines) and the Internet Service 
Providers Association Code (ISPA Code).
16
  
6.2   Rights in sound recordings  
Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the protection of 
copyright, although it did not create enforceable obligations regarding the administration of the 
declaration.
17
 However, this defect was cured by the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR). This cure is reiterated in article 15 of the 
International Covenant.
18
 The rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration, the ICESCR and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are widely recognised as 
fundamental.
19
Although South Africa does not support the Universal Declaration, it is party to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Dean argues that the right 
to intellectual property is a universally accepted fundamental right.
20
  
Regarding the protection of copyright in sound recordings section 9 of the Copyright 
Act states that copyright in sound recordings vests the exclusive right to do or to authorize the 
doing of any of the following acts in the Republic: 
(a) Making, directly or indirectly, a record embodying the sound recording; 
(b) letting, or offering or exposing for hire by way of trade, directly or 
indirectly, a reproduction of the sound recording;  
(c) broadcasting the sound recording; 
(d) causing the sound recording to be transmitted in a diffusion service, 
unless that service transmits a lawful broadcast, including the sound 
recording, and is operated by the original broadcaster; 
(e) communicating the sound recording to the public.  
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The communication right in section 9(e) was created in recognition of article 14 of the WPPT 
which provides for the right of making available to the public. In terms of this right, owners of 
copyright in sound recordings have the right to control transmission of their works over the 
Internet. This right covers the right to make sound recordings available to the public in 
situations in which members of the public can access the recordings on demand or interactively 
at different places and at different times, as they choose.
21
  
Among these five rights, those set out in section 9(a), (b) and (e) are examined.  
Copyright need not be registered for it to subsist or be enforceable.
22
 Although there are 
different provisions in relation to copyright and neighbouring rights, South African copyright 
law has traditionally not drawn a rigid distinction between copyright and neighbouring rights. 
Neighbouring rights are similarly protected like their copyright counterparts in the Copyright 
Act in view of the different provisions in relation to copyright ownership.
23
 The protection of 
the rights of performers of literary and artistic works is addressed in the Performers‟ Protection 
Act 11 of 1967 South African copyright law also protects neighbouring rights against direct and 
indirect infringement.
24
 
6.2.1   The right of reproduction  
The reproduction right in sound recordings is provided for in section 9(a) which restricts the act 
of „making, directly or indirectly, a record embodying the sound recording‟. Generally 
reproduction, in relation to any work, includes a reproduction made from a reproduction of 
sound recording.
25
 Reproduction can take place in any manner or form, as stated in section 6(a) 
of the Copyright Act,
26
 including non-material forms
27
 such as electronic reproduction. In 
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Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty: 
Commentary and Legal Analysis at 41, the expression “in any manner or form” in article 9 reflects a wider 
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Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd and another,
28
 the electronic reproduction 
of an ephemeral component was recognized by the court. This decision complies with the 
provisions of section 2(2) of the Copyright Act which give a wide meaning to the concept of 
“material form” by requiring that the work “be written down, recorded, represented in digital 
data or signals or otherwise reduced to a material form”.
29
  
In the words of Copeling,
30
 the concept of reproduction is capable of being used in two 
widely divergent senses: it could be used to mean a reproduction for the purposes of publication 
or for the purposes of legal proceedings or claim for an infringement of copyright. However, 
Visser
31
 argues that it is controversial whether the term “copies” includes ephemeral 
reproductions in a computer‟s RAM (Random Access Memory), although the controversy 
emphasizes unauthorized reproductions as an act of copyright infringement in relation to 
“making copies available as publications”.  
A “copy”, as defined in section 1(1) of the Act, means a reproduction of a work and 
generally covers all works. This definition has been interpreted as including digital formats 
whether of a permanent, temporary or transient nature. This interpretation is in keeping with 
section 2(2) of the Act which states that a work “represented in digital data or signals” complies 
with the requirement of material embodiment.
32
 However, Visser‟s submission on the 
controversy over the term “copies” should be taken into consideration when the term is being 
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interpreted.
33
 Further, it has been held that making temporary or permanent electronic copies of 
a work amounts to copyright infringement.
34
 
Given the importance of electronic communication and e-commerce, reproduction has a 
wider meaning. For instance, for purposes of the Copyright Act, downloading software and 
storing data on a computer, downloading material from the Internet, operating a computer 
program, displaying material on a computer screen – including material obtained from the 
Internet – and incorporating material in a website are all acts that create reproductions.
35
 
Dean
36
 argues that an ISP granting access to the Internet reproduces a work which is 
accessed via the ISP‟s server. He further states that an ISP through whose services an Internet 
user accesses unauthorized work on the Internet has probably unintentionally reproduced the 
work. According to Dean,
37
 in view of the new developments that electronic communication 
and the Internet have brought, it is essential to adapt or extend classical copyright concepts to 
cater for these developments in the electronic age. He says that an analysis must be made of 
commonplace activities that take place on the Internet so as to determine whether they involve 
making unauthorized reproductions of works and thus result in the infringement of copyright.
38
 
6.2.2   The right of distribution  
Section 9(b) of the Copyright Act provides that the “letting, or offering or exposing for hire by 
way of trade, directly or indirectly, a reproduction” of sound recordings is one of the restricted 
acts. Although the term “distribution” is defined in section 1(1) of the Act, it is not defined in 
terms of the distribution right set out in section 9(b); it is defined in relation to programme-
carrying signals only. 
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Although section 9 of the Copyright Act does not provide for the right of publication of 
sound recordings, that right is implied in the distribution right in section 9(b): because the 
distribution right is the right of first sale, it cannot be exercised without publication of a sound 
recording, for example, which is in consonance with section 1(5)(b) of the Act.
39
  
Visser
40
 submits that there are two elements to publication: (a) making copies of the 
work available and (b) doing so in such a way as to satisfy the reasonable demand of the public. 
However, the law is not settled on whether, with reference to the Internet, the location from 
which the author posts the work onto the website or the location where the user downloads the 
work should be the concrete point of reference.
41
 Pistorius
42
 notes that section 1(5) of the Act is 
clearly aimed at the issuing of tangible media such as books or disks to the public, but bearing 
in mind the meaning of the terms “copy”. Copies of a sound recording include copies in digital 
format whether of permanent, temporary or transient nature, in accordance with section 2(2) of 
the Act. It would include work in digital format.
43
  
What, then, is “making available”? According to Pistorius,
44
 making available to the 
public reproductions of a work in digital format amounts to “making available of copies” of 
that work in terms of section 2(2) of the Act. Smith argues that, “making a work available on a 
website does not amount to publication because the website proprietor plays a passive role”.
45
 
Pistorius
46
 argues that, even if the term “copies” refers to more permanent reproductions, 
making a work available on a website may still constitute publication because anyone who 
downloads that work can make or reproduce it in a permanent format either on the computer‟s 
hard disk or in printed form. Similarly, notwithstanding his earlier position, Visser
47
 argues that 
if one interprets the term “copies” in article 3(f) of the Berne Convention as connoting more 
permanent reproductions then making a work available on a website may constitute publication 
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in that the work is simultaneously published in every country of the world thus making it 
possible for users to download and store it in a permanent format, whether electronic or print.  
The closing remarks by Pistorius
48
 support my argument that making available should 
not be restricted. She submits that works that are first made available on the Internet qualify for 
copyright protection since certain works are made available by being published in digital 
format only. The holder of rights in such a work should not be denied his or her rights simply 
because the sound recording is published or distributed online as opposed to on a CD-ROM, for 
example.
49
  
  In summary, it is submitted that the right of distribution as set out in section 9(b) of the 
Copyright Act seems to interchangeably incorporate the right of publication into it in terms of 
the definition of publication in section 1(5) of the Act. The relationship between these two 
rights is such that one cannot publish without distributing; more particularly, in terms of section 
1(5)(a) there must be sufficient quantities of the work “to reasonably meet the needs of the 
public, having regard to the nature of the work”. It is further submitted, particularly with 
reference to copies, records, digital representation of data or signals and material embodiments 
that the term “public” in relation to publication and distribution rights means any person other 
than the transferor. In other words, the wider view applies to or encompasses DP2P file-
sharing. In fact, if an unpublished sound recording lies in the computer of a peer in DP2P 
network, the sound recording is already uploaded and made available to the public.  
Finally, it is submitted that in terms of the Act, the rights of publication and distribution 
in a sound recording are synonymous in South Africa in that the Act requires no formalities or 
notice, whereas the US regime (Copyright Act), specifically does.
50
  
A sound recording in a digital format is published and distributed once. However, the 
right of communication is exercised after publication. In other words, one cannot talk of 
publication and distribution of a sound recording after it is first made available where 
exhaustion of right exists because the right of communication takes over. 
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6.2.3   The right of communication to the public  
The control of the communication of digital works and copying of digital works is important in 
copyright protection.
51
 The Copyright Act accords a copyright holder the right to distribute his 
work by broadcasting it and transmitting it in a diffusion service.
52
 These two rights are limited 
to content that may be transmitted through broadcasts and programme-carrying signals.
53
 A 
programme-carrying signal is a broadcast during the up leg of a transmission.
54
 When the 
broadcast is transmitted through the satellite, there is a transformation of data from a broadcast 
to a programme-carrying signal. The broadcasting and programme carrying signal are two 
specific technologies
55
 and do not fall under on-demand systems. However, mobile-
communication protocols, both wired and wireless communication systems, converged 
communication platforms, webcasting and interactive on-demand systems do not fall, and 
cannot be grouped, within the realm of broadcasting and programme-carrying signals. 
Therefore, the need exists to provide for the right of transmission of works to the public over 
the Internet.
56
  
Article 14 of the WPPT effectively grants “Producers of phonograms” the exclusive right 
to authorize the transmission of sound recordings over the Internet. This right is a broad one 
and may be applied in a diverse range of communication techniques.
57
 Section 9(e) of the 
Copyright Act similarly provides for the exclusive right to authorize the communication of 
sound recordings to the public.  
Although section 9(e) is not worded in the same manner as article 14 of the WPPT, it is 
argued that, on the basis of the distinction between the specific technologies in broadcasting 
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and programme-carrying signals on the one hand and the Internet on the other, the meaning of 
the right of communication in article 14 of the WPPT is adopted in the discussion in this 
segment. Aside from the remarks made by Dean with respect to the Collecting Society 
Regulations administering the so-called “public playing right”,
58
 there is no case law or opinion 
in South Africa contradicting article 14.
59
  
Given the nature of online transmission by ISPs in DP2P networks, the right of 
communication in section 9(e) may include a “public playing right”.
60
 Communication on the 
Internet is not simultaneous and a user may make a public performance from the instantly 
downloaded copy. Moreover, to the extent that broadcasting and simulcasting occur on the 
Internet ISPs are indirectly involved in public performance. 
6.2.3.1   The needle-time right  
The needle-time right is applicable in the restrictive acts in section 9(c), (d) and (e) of the 
Copyright Act which consist of concept popularly known as “needle time” or “pay for play”.  
The needle-time concept was preceded by heated debates between broadcasters and 
record-producing companies.
61
 The debate centred on the protection of performance right 
concerning sound recordings and the remuneration of performers for public dissemination of 
their performances embodied in records. The needle-time provisions of the Copyright Act must 
be read with those of section 5 of the Performers‟ Protection Act 11 of 1967. In the end, an 
understanding was reached between the record companies and broadcasters to the effect that 
needle-time protection for sound recordings and performers would not give rise to an act 
absolutely restricted. Essentially, the right does not prohibit the right of performance of a sound 
recording from being enforced in other ways but requires the payment of a reasonable – 
compulsory – royalty.
62
 ISPs were not involved in the negotiation of this right, because it was 
not negotiated then.  
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The term “users” as adopted in section 9A of the Copyright Act expressly refers to the 
broadcasters who were involved in the debate before the enactment of the Copyright Act 
(Amendment Act 9 of 2002).  
6.2.3.2 Royalties pursuant to the needle-time right 
       
Section 9A of the Copyright Act provides that  “In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
no person may broadcast, cause the transmission of or play a sound recording as contemplated 
in section 9(9), (d) or (e) without payment of a royalty to the owner of the relevant 
copyright”.The amount of the royalty must be “determined by an agreement between the user 
of the sound recording, the performer and the owner of the copyright, or between their 
representative collecting societies”.
63
 If such an agreement cannot be concluded between the 
copyright owner and the indirect user, the dispute may be referred to the Copyright Tribunal or 
for arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.
64
 The Copyright Tribunal may grant a 
compulsory licence which would not infringe a copyright work.
65
  
The owner of the copyright in a sound recording who receives a needle-time royalty must 
share that royalty with “any performer whose performance is featured on the sound recording in 
question and who would have been entitled to receive a royalty” in terms of section 5 of the 
Performers‟ Protection Act.
66
 Consequently, section 9A(2)(d) of the Copyright Act stipulates 
that any payment made by the indirect user of a sound recording to the owner of copyright in 
that recording fulfils the obligation concerning the execution of a needle-time agreement.  
In terms of section 5(4)(a) of the Performers‟ Protection Act, a performer who authorizes 
the fixation of his or her performance – in the form of, for example, a sound recording of his or 
her performance – he or she is entitled to a share of the royalty payment received by the 
copyright owner of the sound recording.
67
 Essentially, it is contemplated by the legislature that 
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the copyright owner, namely the producer of the sound recording, will administer the needle-
time right generally.
68
  
If an indirect user makes a single royalty payment in the exercise of the needle-time right 
in terms of section 5 of the Performers‟ Protection Act, he or she is absolved from the 
obligation to pay a royalty to the copyright owner of the sound recording in terms of section 9A 
of the Copyright Act. However, Dean observes that this approach seems inconsistent in that the 
producer is entitled to administer the needle-time right for both parties. This inconsistency does 
not suggest there is only one rights-holder in section 9A; however, the right of payment of 
royalty benefits both parties.
69
  
6.2.3.3   Shortcomings of the needle-time right  
There is an inconsistency in the concept of needle time under the Copyright Act and the 
Performers‟ Protection Act in that the way in which the right is expressed in the Copyright Act 
is different from the way in which it is expressed in the Performers‟ Protection Act. Section 
9(c), (d) and (e) of the Copyright Act provides for exclusive restricted rights. The producer has 
to grant the right to the use of the work for needle-time purposes.  
On the other hand, in section 9A(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, the conclusion can be drawn 
that if the owner of copyright in a sound recording agrees that his or her work may be used for 
needle-time purposes a royalty must be paid unless the indirect user and the copyright owner 
come to a different agreement. In this regard, the right of a producer of a sound recording as 
regards needle time is not different from that of a performer.
70
 On this issue, it seems the 
understanding on the payment of royalty is inconsistent. The inconsistency is addressed by 
Dean who suggests that it makes the right non-exclusive or categorizes the work under a 
compulsory licence. Further, section 5 of the Performers‟ Protection Act does not contain an 
absolute right of a performance; it contains the right to claim a royalty in relation to the 
exercise of the needle-time right.  
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There is an unusual position inherent in needle-time royalty. When a sound recording is 
used without the copyright owner‟s permission, the owner‟s right is infringed and he or she can 
make a retrospective (an ex post facto) claim for a reasonable royalty in lieu of damages. The 
claim is not limited under the provisions of section 9A of the Copyright Act. However, if the 
producer seeks to make an arrangement under section 9A for the payment of a royalty, his or 
her arrangement is limited by the fact that he or she has to comply with the provisions of that 
section.
71
 Thus, it is submitted that a reasonable royalty should be an amount that would 
compensate the rights-holder, otherwise an indirect user would opt to pay damages in lieu of 
royalty, thereby frustrating the implementation of section 9A.  
6.3   Infringement 
In the historic case Donoghue v Stevenson,
72
 the court laid down the neighbourhood principle 
under the general concept of duty of care. Accordingly, the basic principles of the duty of care 
relating to infringement and liability are relevant to determining infringement of copyright in 
DP2P file-sharing.  
According to Pistorius,
73
 the role of an ISP will determine its liability. For instance, an 
ISP that makes an unauthorized reproduction of a copyright work for technical reasons such as 
caching may be liable for direct infringement, but an ISP that merely transmits or facilitates 
access to copyright work may be liable for infringement at common law.  
6.3.1   Direct infringement  
Direct infringement occurs when someone commits any of the acts of which the right to 
perform or authorize is restricted exclusively to copyright owners.
74
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Copying (not infringement) may be direct or indirect. It is direct if an original work is 
copied and indirect if an intervening copy of the original work is copied.
75
 In digital 
reproduction and distribution, an original copy cannot be distinguished or identified since 
digitization makes an exact copy of the work reproduced. However, because there is no 
distinction between an original copy and an intervening copy, it may be assumed that every 
copy reproduced or distributed in the digital world is an intervening copy since the master copy 
can only be regarded as the original copy stored by the producer of the sound recording. To 
believe otherwise would be to assume that all copies are original copies. According to 
Copeling, copying may also be carried out consciously or subconsciously.
76
  
Concerning sound recordings, a producer enjoys the right of reproduction by “making, 
directly or indirectly, a record embodying the sound recording” or “letting, or offering or 
exposing for hire by way of trade, directly or indirectly, a reproduction of the sound 
recording”.
77
 
6.3.2   Indirect infringement  
Indirect infringement occurs when an infringer, while not actually infringing in respect of any 
of the restricted acts, nevertheless knowingly does something in furtherance of the restricted act 
of reproduction, distribution and communication to the public or trading in infringing 
copies.
78
A person commits indirect infringement when he or she exploits copies of a work 
commercially in the knowledge that they were infringements at the time the works were 
made.
79
 
Conventionally, indirect infringement falls into two categories:
80
 unauthorized dealing 
with infringing copies of a work and unauthorized public performance of a literary or a musical 
work. Unauthorized dealing is committed by importing a copyright work into South Africa for 
a purpose other than the importer‟s private and domestic use, by selling, letting or by way of 
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trade offering or exposing for sale or hire of a copyright work or by distributing a copyright 
work for the purposes of trade, or for any other purpose, to such an extent that the copyright 
owner is prejudicially affected.
81
  
6.4 Application of principles of law to the indirect infringement of sound recordings 
6.4.1   Introduction  
Pistorius
82
 avers that the liability of ISPs for infringement of intellectual property remains 
controversial in copyright law. Electronic commerce has also compounded the liability of ISPs 
for the infringement of intellectual property rights. She further notes that when determining the 
liability of a particular ISP one should bear in mind that the law of delict and copyright law 
make provision for liability for acts or omissions.
83
 The law of delict may assist to determine 
when the impairment of a legally recognized interest constitutes a delict
84
 and how such a 
disturbance in the harmonious balance of interests may be restored.
85
 According to Pistorius,
86
 
contributory, vicarious or inducement liability may arise from an ISP‟s act or omission.  
6.4.2   Joint wrongdoing or contributory infringement  
When more than one person causes the same damaging consequences to a plaintiff, each culprit 
is according to the ordinary principles of delict liable for only the specific damage he or she has 
caused.
87
 Joint wrongdoing arises where more than one person is being involved in the 
commission of a wrongful act by instigating, aiding or advising its perpetration.
88
 Joint 
wrongdoers are persons who are jointly or severally liable in delict for the same damage. Joint 
wrongdoers may be sued in the same action.
89
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South African courts recognize the Aquilian liability principle. In McKenzie v Van der 
Merwe,
90
 the court held that under the lex Aquila principle two categories of people are held 
liable for damage caused: namely the persons who actually take part in the commission of a 
delict and those who assist them in any way.  
Dean submits that in contributory infringement an instigator of the infringing act 
commits a causal copyright infringement which ordinarily constitutes a material contribution to 
the infringing act.
91
 The general principles of common-law delict apply to copyright 
infringement – particularly regarding the question of joint wrongdoing or participation – unless 
the Copyright Act contradicts the common-law principles.
92
 In Atari, Inc and another v JB 
Radio Parts (Pty) Ltd,
93
 the applicants alleged that the respondent instigated or facilitated the 
making of unauthorized copies of the applicants‟ computer games by third parties. Even though 
there was no evidence of any actual reproduction of the applicant‟s games, the respondent was 
held to have infringed copyright.  
According to this case, if a copyright holder can prove that an ISP has facilitated file-
sharing of sound recordings in a DP2P network, he or she proves contributory infringement by 
the ISP. The proof of facilitation by ISPs of making unauthorised sound recordings by users on 
DP2P networks is strengthened by the main submission in this study which is to the effect that 
ISPs can identify illegal sharing of sound recordings on their network without intercepting or 
monitoring the transmission. The remedies available to the rights-holder in an Aquilian action 
are damages, injunctive relief and delivery up.
94
  
6.4.3   Vicarious liability  
6.4.3.1   Introduction  
Each person is usually responsible for his or her own actions only. However, there are 
situations in which the law imposes liability on a person who was not personally involved in 
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causing damage.
95
 According to Roos
96
 this is a type of strict liability on the part of the person 
who is finally liable for the delict committed by another person, or it is a liability without 
personal fault by another person.
97
  
Vicarious liability runs counter to the basic principles of the law of delict in that a 
defendant can be held vicariously liable without being at fault or wrongfully causing the 
damage. Thus, vicarious liability can be qualified as quasi-delictual.
98
 The rationale behind 
non-fault liability is premised on policy considerations. The factors determining vicarious 
liability include control over another‟s activity, the creation of risk,
99
 who benefits from the 
activity, and who can afford to pay for the damages incurred.
100
 
Commenting on vicarious liability, the court in S v Makwanazi refused to extend the 
Aquilian action to rescue the plaintiff who was in a position to avoid the risk of harm.
101
 In 
Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd,
102
 the court held that the 
approach of South African courts has been not to extend the scope of the Aquilian action to 
new circumstances unless public or legal policy considerations favour the extension.  
Of course, each case must be decided on its own merits. In Minister of Finance and 
others v Gore NO,
103
 the court reiterated that liability is decided on a case-by-case basis, as a 
matter of public policy.
104
 The public or legal policy considerations in the law of delict can be 
deduced from ISPs‟ exclusive and inherent technical right and ability to control their users‟ 
access. Moreover, it is difficult for copyright holders to provide proof of an infringement 
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because they do not have access to the records; they can only rely on the principle of 
constructive knowledge.  
The indiscriminate use of terminology makes determining legal rules complicated. 
The complication is because there is inconsistency in the ratio.
105
 The most common and 
significant category of vicarious liability is that of an employer‟s liability for the delicts of an 
employee committed in the course of the employee‟s employment.
106
  
Basically, vicarious liability applies when there is a particular relationship between 
parties. Three such relationships are the relationship between an employer and employee,
107
 the 
relationship between principal and agent,
108
 and the relationship between independent service 
provider and user. In this thesis, the relationship between ISPs and users will be considered. 
6.4.3.2   The relationship between an independent service provider and its users 
The relationship between ISPs and their users is essentially contractual. ISPs provide users with 
routine and specialized services such as Internet services. The ISP is vicariously liable for the 
wrongdoing of the user by virtue of its professional expertise, even though users can be held 
directly liable. 
(a) The relationship between ISPs and the users  
The approach of Van der Walt and Midgley
109
 will assist in determining the vicarious liability 
of ISPs. The relationship between the person who commits the delict and the person who is 
vicariously liable is important.
110
 Vicarious liability refers to a particular relationship between 
two persons.
111
 Their relationship on the Internet is such that a delict cannot be committed by 
the primary infringer (a user) without the facilities provided by the secondary infringer (an 
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ISP).
112
 On the other hand, one needs to establish a link between the delict and the activity of 
the person who is alleged to be vicariously liable.
113
 The link of liability is between the direct 
infringement of a copyright work (for instance sound recordings) by users in and the activity of 
ISPs in DP2P technology.  
(b) The ISP must be an expert in the area of specialization 
The business of providing Internet access is technical and cannot be operated by non-experts; 
great skill is required. ISPs are experts in this field. In this regard, Von Seidel submits that ISPs 
have the right and ability to control infringing acts.
114
  
Alheit argues that professionals should be dealt with separately under professional 
negligence from whom a higher standard of care is expected.
115
 In her submission, she referred 
to many YK2 consultants as mere opportunists and added that they should not be allowed to get 
away with professional negligence under the cloak of lack of experience. According to her, a 
person who undertakes activities that require particular skills that he or she does not possess is, 
in terms of the maxim imperitia culpae adnumeratur, negligent, and fraudulent if something 
goes wrong.
116
 
(c) The service provider must have the ability to change the network or modus operandi  
The changing of the network or modus operandi may be done so that only legal transactions 
can be carried out and that the rights of users and copyright owners are not infringed. The 
ability of ISPs to adjust the network is unequivocal.
117
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(d) The ISP neglects, refuses or omits to change the network or modus operandi
118
  
Although ISPs have the technical ability to reconfigure the network to disallow the use of 
DP2P applications or any unknown or foreign application on the network,
119
 they are 
prohibited from monitoring or intercepting their networks.  
(e) An ISP must derive a financial benefit from the infringing act  
ISPs must envisage or derive a financial benefit from the infringing activity. This benefit need 
not be direct. The benefit to an ISP could be a loss to a right holder. The lex Aquila is based on 
liability for economic loss
120
 which is what copyright owners suffer as a result of DP2P file-
sharing. Economists believe that individuals do not engage in activities that do not provide a 
positive expected return. Therefore, it is to be expected that sharers must receive some benefits 
for their efforts.
121
 Any form of benefit to the infringer that results in pure economic loss to the 
copyright owner is sufficient for infringement of copyright to occur. In CCP Record Co (Pty) v 
Avalon Record Centre,
122
 the court held that the defendant‟s benefit was the plaintiff‟s loss.  
Expanding on the practical meaning of financial benefit, Van der Walt and Midgley
123
 
argue that pure economic loss is “financial loss sustained without the interposition of a physical 
lesion or any injury to a person or corporeal property”. In Administrator, Natal v Trust Bank 
van Afrika Bpk,
124
 the Appellate Court, for the first time, recognized Aquilian liability for 
economic loss caused by negligence. However, notwithstanding this recognition, in Hoffman‟s 
opinion South African courts are more cautious when granting a delictual action for pure 
economic loss caused by negligence.
125
 In Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR 
Construction,
126
 the court noted that granting such a claim opens the floodgates to litigants with 
similar claims. This was probably the concern that culminated in the legislature‟s enactment of 
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the limitation clause in section 78(1) of ECTA and section 2 of RICA.
127
 These provisions limit 
the liability of ISPs.  
In Arthur E Abrahams & Gross v Cohen and others,
128
 it was held that a court in 
pronouncing on economic loss must satisfy itself that the possibility of pure economic loss was 
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant and that he or she was under a legal duty to prevent 
such loss. I submit that because ISPs do not owe a legal duty to monitor or intercept their 
networks for infringing copyright works under the ECTA, the limitation clause applies as a 
ground of defence for copyright infringement. 
In the opinion of Van der Walt and Midgley,
129
 the application or otherwise of Aquilian 
liability for negligently causing pure economic loss is the criterion of reasonableness, which 
depends on the circumstances of each case. Von Seidel argues that ISPs are liable for copyright 
infringement because they receive direct financial benefits from their subscribers.
130
  
6.4.4   Inducing infringement 
The term “inducement” is commonly used in the context of criminal law in relation to  bribery 
and other related criminal activities.
131
 In the civil-law context, inducement is significant in 
relation to unlawfulness in that, although it may not be a prerequisite to a successful action, 
certain factors are considered when the court decides whether the boni mores or the criterion of 
reasonableness would regard a particular conduct in a contractual relationship as unlawful.
132
 In 
Godongwana v Mpisana
133
 the court held in relation to the law of contract that in the case of an 
inducement to commit a breach of contract there is a direct interference with the contractual 
relationship.
134
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According to McKerron, the rule of inducement is that he who wilfully induces another 
to do an unlawful act which, but for his persuasion, would or might never have been 
committed, is answerable for the wrong which he has procured. In order to establish a prima 
facie cause of action, all that a plaintiff need show is that the defendant knowingly and 
intentionally interfered, and that the breach was a consequence of interference. However, it 
should be noted that nothing less than knowledge and intention will suffice.
135
 This description 
shows the presence of intent and knowledge when a party is induced to perform an act. In this 
regard Pistorius
136
 states that “The concept of inducement liability is applied to those who 
intentionally induce violation of copyright”. Thus, intent is fundamental to inducement liability 
which will be examined from the point of view of delictual liability since there is no South 
Africa copyright case law in this respect.  
Intent (dolus or animus iniuriandi) is a  
“legally-reprehensible state of mind or mental disposition encompassing 
two requirements, namely direction of the will to the attainment of a 
particular consequence and knowledge (consciousness) of the fact that 
such result is being achieved in an unlawful or wrongful manner”.
137
 The 
test for intent is subjective in that intent is established only if the 
defendant intended to bring about a particular result and was at the same 
time subjectively aware of the wrongful nature of his or her conduct. The 
notion of consciously wrongful intent applies throughout the law of 
delict.
138
  
6.4.4.1   Direction of the will in the infringement of sound recordings 
Three forms of intent exist: direct intent (dolus directus) or oogmerkopset,
139
 indirect intent 
(dolus indirectus)
140
 and dolus eventualis.
141
 Of these, indirect intent is most relevant to this 
study. Indirect intent is present when a wrongdoer directly intends his or her conduct to achieve 
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one consequence but at the same time knows that it will inevitably result in another 
consequence.
142
 According to Dean,
143
 indirect intent exists when an ISP unintentionally 
reproduces a work by making the work available to a user. 
6.4.4.2   Knowledge of wrongfulness  
It is insufficient for the wrongdoer merely to direct his or her will to causing a particular result; 
he or she must also know (realize) or at least foresee the possibility that his or her conduct is 
wrongful in that it is contrary to law or infringes another‟s rights.
144
In a similar vein, it is 
insufficient for the ISP merely to direct its will to infringing copyright in sound recordings; it 
must also know or at least foresee the possibility that its conduct is wrongful, that it is contrary 
to law. 
It is submitted that to prove intent a rights-holder must prove that an ISP knows or at 
least foresees the possibility that its conduct in copyright infringement on the Internet is 
wrongful.
145
 For instance, in Bosal Africa (Pty) Ltd v Grapnel (Pty) Ltd,
146
 the claim was 
dismissed because of a lack of proof of knowledge of infringement.   
Guilt is the fact or state of having committed a wrong; guilty is the state of being 
responsible for a civil wrong such as a delict or breach of contract.
147
 Dean
148
 points out that 
the test of guilty knowledge in cases of civil copyright infringement
149
 has been said to be 
primarily objective; in other words, a reasonable person in possession of the facts would 
conclude that copyright has in fact been infringed.
150
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According to Van Wyk et al.
151
 it is necessary to prove guilty knowledge on the part of 
the indirect infringer to constitute infringement in copyright. In Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation and another v Anthony Black Films (Pty) Ltd,
152
 it was held that persons who 
infringe copyright work are liable to an action for infringement if they do so knowingly. In 
Harnischfeger Corporation v Appleton,
153
 the court held that the indirect infringement 
governed by section 23(2) of the Copyright Act, covering the distribution of an article which is 
an infringing copy, depends on guilty knowledge. Further, in Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v A 
Roopanand Brothers (Pty) Ltd,
154
 the court held that the respondent had guilty knowledge and 
stated that it is no defence for an indirect infringer to argue that he or she believed that the 
infringing copies to which the claim of copyright infringement relates were not infringing 
copies when in fact they were.
155
  
(a) Constructive knowledge  
 According to Esselaar,
156
 information on the “Go-to list of prohibited sites” is available to 
anyone online. This list enumerates the particulars of illegal websites and warns users to be 
careful of undesirable contents, elements and activities on the Internet. Since this information is 
available on the Internet, it is known to the world, including ISPs.
157
 In Gramophone Co Ltd v 
Music Machine (Pty) Ltd
158
 the court held that guilty knowledge of the infringing nature of an 
article entails notice of facts which would suggest to a reasonable person that a breach of 
copyright law was being committed. This knowledge amounts to constructive knowledge. This 
position was followed in Paramount Pictures Corporation v Video Parktown North (Pty) 
Ltd.
159
  
In Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v A Roopanand Brothers (Pty) Ltd,
160
 the court held that it is 
no defence for the defendant to claim ignorance of the infringement despite possessing all the 
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relevant facts.
161
 In the opinion of Wyk et al.,
162
 knowledge of the infringement does not mean 
that it has to be shown conclusively that the infringer knew that the work infringed copyright 
but simply that the infringer had reasonable grounds to have knowledge of the infringement of 
copyright on the basis of which the infringer could or should have made inquiries into whether 
copyright subsisted or not.
163
 In sum, further to the submissions on the identification of 
infringing sound recordings in DP2P networks,
164
 it is safe to conclude that constructive 
knowledge of infringement applies in the sense of being sufficient to establish knowledge.  
(b) Actual knowledge  
From the perspective of the IRB Guidelines and the ISPA Code, actual knowledge of 
infringement is required.
165
 In the view of Van der Merwe,
166
 the South African Constitution, 
particularly the Bill of Rights,
167
 is a factor to be taken into consideration as to whether a 
particular conduct was wrongful.
168
 The question that a rights-holder needs to answer is, are all 
sound recordings transmitted on the Internet illegal? The answer is “no”. This is because, while 
there may be some cases of infringement of copyright in DP2P technology, there is also 
evidence that the technology can be used legitimately. However, such legitimate use constitutes 
only a tenth of all DP2P file-sharing activity.
169
  
Finally, the statutes (Copyright Act, ECTA and RICA) require actual knowledge of 
infringement while common law requires constructive knowledge. Whether it is actual or 
constrictive knowledge, it is my submission in this thesis that ISPs know of the copyright 
infringement of sound recordings on their networks.
170
  
                                                          
 161
 See also Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law at 1-47. 
 
162
 Van Wyk et al “South Africa” at 314. 
 163
 Ibid.  
 164
 See paras 2.3 and 2.7 of this study. 
 165
 See paras 5.4.2 and 5.7 of the IRB Guidelines and para. 23 of the ISPA Code. See also Dean Handbook of 
South African Copyright Law at 1-46, para. 8.15. 
166
 Van der Merwe Computers and the Law at 152. 
 167
  See section 14(d) of the 1996 Constitution, paras 4,5.6, 6.6.2 and 6.6.4 of part 1 of the IRB Guidelines, 
Government Notice 29474 No 1283 of December 14, 2006 and chapters 4 and 5 of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000. 
 
168
 See Van der Merwe Computers and the Law at 152. 
 
169 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) at 1158 and Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster Ltd 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) at 2778 revealed that only 10% of the total files 
shared by means of DP2P software were legal and that sound recordings were the most frequently infringed 
type of work. 
 
170
 See paras 2.3 and 2.7 of this study. 
170 
6.5 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act’s limitation of ISP liability for 
DP2P file-sharing 
ECTA neither provides for fair dealing in copyright works in favour of ISPs nor excludes the 
liability of ISPs for indirect infringement of copyright. In addition, there is no South African 
case law establishing the limits of ISPs‟ liability for such infringement. ECTA applies to all 
statutory law, also the Copyright Act.
171
    
Aside from the requirements in section 73(1)(a) to (d) of the ECTA which limit the 
liability of ISPs acting as mere conduits, several other criteria must be met before an ISP can 
claim or benefit from this safe-harbour law. Thus, the limitation law is not automatic.  
6.5.1   Threshold conditions for limitation of an ISP’s liability  
In terms of section 72(a) of the ECTA the limitation on an ISP‟s liability applies only if an ISP 
is a member of a representative body referred to in section 71 of the ECTA which is the 
Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA).
172
 In addition, an ISP must have “adopted and 
implemented the official code of conduct of ISPA before the limitation applies.
 173
 
6.5.2   Recognition of the ISPA  
For ISPs to take advantage of the liability-limiting provisions of the ECTA they must be 
recognized as a “representative body under section 71 of ECTA. Section 71 of the ECTA 
provides that:  
“the Minister of Communication “may, on application by an industry 
representative body for service providers [i.e. the ISPA] by notice in 
the Gazette, recognise such body for purposes of section 72” of the 
Act.
174
  
In essence, recognition of an IRB is not automatic since the body must apply for recognition and 
the decision to recognize it must be gazetted. The word “may” in section 71(1) suggests that it is 
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171 
at the discretion of the minister to accord such recognition which I submit, must not be 
unreasonably withheld if the conditions are met. The four conditions are: subjecting ISPs to a 
code of conduct;
175
 subjecting ISPA membership to “adequate criteria”
176
 continued adherence to 
adequate standards of conduct
177
 and IRB‟s capability to monitor and enforce its code of 
conduct.
178
  
6.5.3   Lack of obligation to monitor or actively seek facts or circumstances indicating an 
unlawful activity on the Internet by ISPs  
Section 78(1) of the ECTA states that an ISP providing the services contemplated in Chapter XI 
of the Act is not generally obliged to monitor the data it transmits or stores or “actively seek 
facts or circumstances indicating an unlawful activity”. This provision is reiterated in the ISPA 
Code.
179
 It limits the liability of ISPs with regard to ECTA monitoring or actively seeking for 
facts or circumstances indicating an unlawful activity on the Internet. Furthermore, section 2 of 
the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act 70 of 2002 (RICA) prohibits ISPs from intercepting communications.  
The legislative intervention in section 78(1) was informed by the boni mores principle 
and by justification of protection of ISPs by the statutory authority
180
 in the online world. The 
boni mores
181
 balance the interests that ISPs actually promote by their acts and those they 
actually infringe (the rights of rights-holders, for example). Courts must weigh the conflicting 
interests of rights-holders and ISPs in the light of all relevant circumstances and in view of all 
the pertinent factors to decide whether infringement of the rights-holders‟ interests was 
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reasonable. Under the statutory authority principle, ISPs do not act wrongfully when they carry 
out an act under statutory authority which act would otherwise have been wrongful.
182
 Harmful 
conduct authorized by statute is thus reasonable (or justified) and consequently lawful.  
However, even though ISPs are not obliged to monitor their networks they are subject to 
such other statutory duties as may be directed by the minister under section 78(2) of the ECTA. 
Section 78(2) applies when illegal activities take place on an ISP‟s network. Accordingly, the 
minister may, subject to section 14 of the Constitution, prescribe procedures by means of which 
ISPs must inform “competent public authorities” of alleged illegal activities and “communicate 
to the competent authorities” information that will identify users.  
Section 79 of the ECTA provides that statutory limitation of ISPs‟ liability does not 
affect:
183
  
(a) any obligation founded on an agreement: for instance, a group of right 
holders may agree to supply a TPM (Technical Protection Measure) free 
in order to prevent the infringement of copyright in sound recordings. 
ISPs may agree on the condition that infringement of copyright in sound 
recording does not occur within a specified period during which the 
statutory limitation clause will not affect the parties;  
(b) the obligation of a service provider acting as such under a licensing or 
other regulatory regime established by or under any law: for example, a 
collecting society may issue license to an ISPs free to explore sound 
recording and pay an agreed royalty (either in advance or arrears) and 
thereafter ISPs will appropriate to themselves any other income that they 
earn. During the agreed period, the statutory limitation clause will not 
affect the parties; 
(c) any obligation imposed by law or by a court to remove, block or deny 
access to any data message: for instance, where a right holder in sound 
recording has been able to prove that his work has been infringed by an 
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ISP, the court will in pursuance of section 73(3) of ECTA order such ISP 
to terminate or prevent unlawful activity. With an order of court, the 
statutory limitation clause will not affect the parties;  
(d) any right to limitation of liability based on the common law or the 
Constitution: for example, where the common law imposes a duty of care 
on ISPs to prohibit illegal sharing of sound recordings on their networks 
in furtherance of the protection of rights copyright in sound recordings. 
Another instance is where section 25(4)(b) of the Constitution 
categorically states that the rights of sound recordings in the online world 
are protected under copyright.   
6.5.4   Conditions for limiting the liability of an ISP as a mere conduit  
The ECTA makes provision for the limitation of liability of ISPs that act as mere conduits, 
cache, host, or link data messages.
184
 Most relevant to this study of the liability of ISPs in DP2P 
file-sharing is section 73 of the ECTA which concerns ISPs serving as mere conduits. Section 
73(1) states that an ISP is not liable for providing access to or for operating facilities for 
information systems or transmitting, routing or storage of data messages via an information 
system under its control, as long as the service provider – 
(a) does not initiate the transmission; 
(b) does not select the addressee; 
(c) performs the functions in an automatic, technical manner without 
selection of the data; and 
(d) does not modify the data contained in the transmission. 
Section 73(2) throws more light on the intent behind the legislation. It states that the acts of 
transmission, routing and of provision of access referred to in subsection (1) include the 
automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted in so far as this 
takes place – 
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(a) for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the information 
system; 
(b) in a manner that makes it ordinarily inaccessible to anyone other than 
anticipated recipients; and 
(c) for a period no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission. 
The requirements in section 73(1) and (2) that ISPs must satisfy in order to enjoy the limitation 
clause are not stringent or impossible to meet. This is because, equitably speaking, ISPs are 
shielded from owing copyright owners a duty to monitor infringing activity. In fact, in 1998, 
before the invention of DP2P software applications, Von Seidel
185
  recommended the use and 
implementation of an automatic screening device on the Internet to prevent infringement.  
6.5.5   Take-down and notification  
Section 77 of the ECTA sets the following requirements for a take-down notice with respect to 
unlawful activity. The notification must be in writing and must be addressed by the 
complainant to the service provide or its designated agents which includes:
186
 the full names 
and address of the complainant; the written or electronic signature of the complainant; 
identification of the right that has allegedly been infringed; identification of the material or 
activity that is claimed to be the subject of unlawful activity; remedial action required to be 
taken by the service provider in respect of the complainant; telephonic and electronic contact 
details, if any, of the complainant, a statement that the complainant is acting in good faith and  
a statement by the complaint that the information in take-down notification is to his or her 
knowledge true and correct. 
6.5.6   Other observations on the limitations in the ECTA  
1. The effect of compliance with the notice and take-down procedure in the US Copyright 
Act is more limited than that of compliance with the take-down procedure in the ECTA. 
Compliance with the former does not exclude liability generally or for damages only; 
                                                          
 185
 Von Seidel (ed.) Intellectual Property–The John & Kernick Guide at 88. 
 
186
 See Visser “A new online service provider liability regime- The Electronic Communication and Transaction 
Act 2002 now applies” JBL vol. II part 1 at 43. 
175 
rather, it authorizes only limited injunctive relief against ISPs who comply with the 
requirements of denying access to infringers and blocking infringing content.
187
  
2. There are no similar limitations in favour of non-educational profit institutions that carry 
out Internet services for student use. This exposes them to liability like that to which any 
other direct infringer of copyright on the Internet is exposed.
188
 
3. The ISPA Code does not provide for any penalty when the ISPA code is contravened by 
ISPs. It only provides for co-operation with the ISPA in accordance with the complaints 
and disciplinary procedures and for compliance with any decision taken with respect to the 
ISPA code and the complaints and disciplinary procedure.
189
 
6.6   Conclusion 
In view of the lex Aquila principle, an ISP would be held liable in contributory infringement 
because it assists users to infringe the rights in sound recording in DP2P technology by not 
detecting infringing sound recordings in their network.
190
 With regards to vicarious liability, the 
new concepts canvassed in this study would hold ISPs liable because of the presence of the 
following: there is a relationship between an ISP and users in DP2P technology; ISPs are 
experts in their area of specialization; ISPs have the ability to change the network or modus 
operandi to prevent infringement which they neglect, refuse or omit to change the network and 
ISPs derive financial benefit from the infringing act.
191
 Concerning inducing infringement, an 
ISP is liable for infringement of copyright based on the indirect intent of an ISP coupled with 
the knowledge of wrongfulness which may either be constructive or actual.
192
 
Notwithstanding that chapter XI of ECTA seeks to protect ISPs from online liability, the 
legislation did not take into consideration the special features in sound recordings. Sound 
recordings are not capable of being monitored or intercepted but capable of being filtered, 
identified, and detected save private sound recordings (such as recordings carried out for 
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security and business purposes for quality purposes), therefore, ISPs are not exempt from 
liability in this regard based on the principles of law of delict.
193
 Further, it is submitted that 
there are circumstances in which the protection accorded ISPs may not apply under the section 
79 of the ECTA. 
It is important to note that the IRB Guidelines and the ISPA Code cure the defects in the 
ECTA, albeit with some inadequacies such as failure to protect non-profit organizations that 
carry out Internet services and lack of uniform rules for take-down notices. 
However, were the principles of indirect liability applied to ISPs in DP2P file-sharing, 
those ISPs would not be able to survive in the market; hence the need to amend the ECTA to 
include filtering, identification and detecting as part of the words under monitoring and 
interception. Further, there is the need to interpret section 25(4)(b) of the Constitution in 
favour of ISPs and to protect the skill and labour used in granting access on the Internet 
access to users in much the same way as copyright holders are protected. This protection 
should be read in conjunction with section 25(1) of the Constitution which generally 
recognizes the right property.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS 
7.1   Introduction 
In the course of examining the liability of ISPs in the three jurisdictions considered in the 
previous chapters in this study, I referred to some sui generis principles in the law of delict or 
tort. These principles generally transcend all borders and jurisdictions.  
7.2   Approach to innovation  
The first approach on innovation was postulated by Anns,
1
 which says that a duty of care need 
not be limited to the facts of previous situations, but that one should establish whether 
recognized principles apply to the situations. The historic Donoghue case
2
 is a statement of 
principle which ought to apply in new situations unless there is a compelling reason for its 
exclusion.
3
  
In resolving the application of the statement of principle to new situations of duty of 
care, two questions must be addressed:
4
  
(a) First, is there a “sufficiently close relationship” between the parties to warrant the duty of 
care based on the “neighbourhood concept”?
5
 It is submitted that an ISP, being a “go-
between” and gatekeeper between “right-holders and users”, is in a sufficiently close 
relation between the adverse parties.  
(b) Secondly, is there any public-policy consideration which may negate or limit the scope of 
the duty, the category of persons to whom it is owed, or the damages to which a breach of 
it may arise?
6
 I submit that public policy must be objective and in the interests of all 
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copyright stakeholders. It should also examine the role of quasi service providers or non-
professional participants in DP2P file-sharing to determine to whom a duty of care is owed.  
The second approach is called the “incremental” approach.
7
 The approach is based on the belief 
that it is preferable that the law should expand new categories of infringement incrementally 
with “analogy in special categories”
8
 rather than applying a prima facie duty of care generally.
9
 
DP2P application is a special category upon which the law of delict should expand. 
7.3   ISPs’ duty of care  
It is possible for infringement to occur when a duty of care is not owed to the claimant. Duty of 
care concerns the person to whom one owes care.
10
 The question that arises is to whom does 
the infringer owe a duty of care?
11
 Liability must end somewhere. Lord Atkins believes that 
there must be “some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care”.
12
  
Duty of care is based on ISPs‟ ability to control activities on the Internet. This is further 
complicated by the disputes relating to the capability and responsibilities of ISPs. ISPs 
characterize their role as that of common “carriers”.
13
 They argue that they only transmit, and 
have no control over the Internet; others believe that ISPs should be treated as conventional 
distributors or publishers who adopt a higher level of responsibility than that of a mere 
conduit.
14
 In countries where the “safe harbour rule” or limitation clause has been enacted to 
protect ISPs from liability, no duty is placed on ISPs to monitor or seek facts about infringing 
activities although they are expected to implement “standard technical measures”.  
Generally, liability is flows from the commission of an act or omission to engage in an act. 
That party bears a prima facie duty of care in a transaction emanating from statute, contract or 
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the sui generis principle of law. Some believe that ISPs have the potential to carry out 
regulatory functions on the Internet and prevent civil and criminal infringements.
15
 In this 
regard, I have attempted to show that ISPs are duty-bound to detect infringing sound 
recordings.  
The duty of care is open in principle
16
 given that the forms of negligence are never 
foreclosed.
17
 For instance, a new theory has been introduced in copyright infringement: the 
inducement theory. This theory was introduced in response to further protect the interests of 
rights-holders in the developments in the digital world.  
In addition, the role of ISPs has changed. In the early 1990s, ISP services were restricted 
to providing public Internet access, but today they provide a wide range of access services 
(such as dial-up, high speed Internet connectivity, content, discussion forums, Internet guides), 
software, and phone services. Thus, ISPs may not be easily categorized, and their responsibility 
in the overall regulatory framework should reflect their evolving role.
18
  
This position has been upheld by the courts. For instance, in the Shapiro case
19
 the court 
held that infringers are expected to make enquiries before they can be exonerated from liability, 
otherwise the infringer, who has an opportunity to guard against the infringement by diligent 
inquiry, or at least the ability to guard against the infringement, must suffer.  
7.4   Standard of care  
The standard of care is pivotal in determining infringement and liability. The action of a 
defendant is not expected to be below the standard of care required in the circumstances; failure 
to meet this standard will render the defendant liable.
20
 
The standard of care is the degree of care that a reasonable person should exercise
21
 in 
the performance of his or her duty. It refers to the conduct required of a person in particular 
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circumstances and includes the “expected level of attention” a person should give to potential 
damage, mistakes and pitfalls and to preventing the materialization of risks.
22
 In other words, it 
is the expected level of attention ISPs should give to, among other things, preventing 
infringement of copyright in the process of providing Internet services.  
This standard applies only to defendants who have demonstrated their will in action.
23
 
Liability is not imposed on those who “behave”, but on those who have elected or chosen to act 
in an illegal manner.
24
 ISPs provide users with access but do not control or supervise the 
content of what is distributed by users. The inability to control the content amounts to action 
and ultimately an illegal act. The inability to control becomes an action when an ISP does not 
take necessary precautions to prevent the materialization of risk and knows that the unique 
nature of digitization and the consequential infringements that may occur in DP2P networks 
will expose copyright owners to risks.  
Action may be defined as conduct over which a person has the required degree of 
control
25
 to act according to the requirements. With reference to copyright infringement on the 
Internet, I submit that ISPs have the required degree of control over infringing actions 
performed through or in their networks.  
One may argue that ISPs exercise their free will and self-determination by engaging in 
the business of providing Internet service and that they thereby become morally responsible and 
answerable to stakeholders, particularly the holders of copyright in sound recordings.  
Furthermore, the moral issue is premised on the “neighbourhood” principle in terms of 
which an ISP is morally responsible for taking reasonable care of the people in its 
neighbourhood. For a long time, ISPs have exercised their free will and self-determination in 
favour of Internet users by turning a blind eye to infringements committed by users on their 
networks. However, ISPs have a moral responsibility to act in favour of copyright holders in 
accordance with the neighbourhood principle.  
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Furthermore, with regards to the standard of care, the action is influenced by the ISP‟s 
“level of knowledge”
26
 of any infringement by users. The level of knowledge is not a new 
principle, as was mentioned in passing with reference to constructive and actual knowledge of 
digital distribution in the historic Grokster case
27
 which introduced several principles of DP2P 
file-sharing to the law.  
According to Williams and Das,
28
 there is a course of action against a person dealing 
with “articles”
29
 specifically designed or adapted for making copies of a work when that person 
knows or has reason to believe that the articles are to be used to make infringing copies. 
However, they admit that it may be difficult to prove the infringing use because it is believed 
that the “main purpose”
30
 of the software application is to locate files for copying and that the 
actual copies are made by other means.
31
  
7.4.1   Objective standard  
An objective standard is meant to strike a balance between participants, although sometimes the 
standard may be adjusted to preserve equality between them.
32
 The parties in this respect are 
the rights-holders, ISPs and users. ISPs also serve as the “go-betweens” of the parties.  
The objective-standard test generally boils down to what would be expected of a person of 
“ordinary prudence”.
33
 Case law has been able to contribute to the meaning of a person of 
ordinary prudence. For instance, in the English case RCA Corp v Custom Cleared Sales Pty 
Ltd 
34
 the court, in examining the knowledge requirement, considered the Australian case Albert 
v Hoffnung & Co Ltd 
35
 in which section 2(2) of the Australian Copyright Act was considered. 
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In the RCA case, the Court of Appeal dealt with the Australian provision identical to section 
5(3) of the UK Copyright Act 1956, saying that “the true position is that the court is not 
concerned with the knowledge of a reasonable man but is concerned with reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from a concrete situation disclosed in the evidence as it affects the particular 
person whose knowledge is in issue”.
36
  
The objective-standard test mediates between the conflicting interests of parties by 
laying down a “neutral standard” by which a defendant‟s liability is determined from his or her 
actions.
37
 An ISP‟s prudence is decided with reference to the way in which people‟s ordinary 
acts would be regulated, not actually between the parties but with regard to third parties. An 
ISP‟s act of providing access to the Internet would be regulated with regard to a third party‟s 
“neutral standard”.   
In terms of the objective standard defendants are not expected to do more than an 
ordinary reasonable person in particular circumstances.
38
 The particular circumstances at the 
core of this study are those relating to Internet access and DP2P file-sharing. As has been 
argued by technical experts and scholars with regard to Internet security,
39
 ISPs are not asked to 
monitor infringing sound recordings but to “detect” infringing sound recordings in DP2P file-
sharing.  
The objective test is friendlier to defendants than it is to claimants. This is because the 
criteria for making such decisions are equitable and clearly stated. In some cases, the syndrome 
of “winner takes all”
40
 tilts towards the defendant, although sometimes it benefits claimants too. 
For instance, the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 – like other limitation laws in 
this study – benefits ISPs more than it does right-holders to the extent that it reduces ISPs‟ 
liability.  
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7.4.2   Reasonable care  
Reasonable care is a test for liability for negligence. According to Garner, it is the degree of 
care that “prudent and competent persons engaged in the same line of business or endeavour 
would exercise under similar situations”.
41
 According to Garner‟s definition, ISPs who are in 
the same line of business (of providing access to networks) would still be said to be exercising 
reasonable care in their industry even though they are not able to prevent the illegal file-sharing 
in DP2P networks. However, the prudence and competence required of ISPs are the filtering, 
identification and detection of the illegal sharing of sound recordings on their networks.
42
 
ISPs should exercise reasonable care in providing network services as there is a 
“sufficiently close” relationship
43
 between ISPs and right-holders.  Furthermore, ISPs‟ serve as 
“go-betweens” between right-holders and users; ISPs gain financial benefits through the 
sharing of sound recordings; and   various limitation laws limit ISPs‟ liability.
44
 
7.4.3   Unreasonable risk  
An unreasonable risk is one “the probability of which multiplied by its seriousness is greater 
than the burden of its elimination”.
45
 It is submitted that ISPs that create such risks should be 
held liable for indirect infringement in that the risk is both foreseeable and actual.
46
  
The risks start from ISPs‟ irrebuttable ab initio knowledge that the digitization results in 
multiple copies‟ being made available to the world through uploading, transmission and 
downloading of works. Mee and Watters
47
 submit that it is wrong to hold that the current 
technology in P2P networks cannot detect copyright infringement. They submit that ninety nine 
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(99) percent of file transfers can be detected at the router level and that detection can be 
undertaken without imposing a great burden on ISPs.
48
  
As far as I know, amongst the ISPs that are taking steps to control and supervise their 
networks none has adduced cost as a hindrance to their inability to tackle the problem of 
controlling infringement of copyright in sound recordings. According to Mee and Watters,
49
 
ISPs generally present the difficulty as being that of not being able to control the rate of 
infringement on the Internet because of the enormous number of users. However, it is 
submitted that this general defence does not absolve ISPs of responsibility.  
7.4.3.1   Actual risk  
Actual risk is risk that exists in fact and is real as opposed to merely foreseeable.
50
 Actual 
present harm need not be shown nor is it compulsory to show that harm will result. What is 
essential is proof on the preponderance of evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future 
harm exists.
51
 ISPs that breach their duty to exercise a reasonable standard of care create actual 
risk for copyright holders.  
The doctrine of “actual risk” in relation to online copyright infringement is premised on 
the fact that copyright infringement takes place in DP2P networks. In essence, there is a causal 
link between the activities of ISPs offering networks services to peers in DP2P networks and 
the infringement arising from those activities.  
Actual risks exist for two reasons. The first is the ISPs‟ foreknowledge of the real risk of 
copyright infringement at the commencement of their Internet operations. Secondly, in the case 
of DP2P file-sharing the preponderance of evidence indicates that some meaningful likelihood 
of future harm will occur in. It is submitted that an ISP that deems Internet business 
economically viable and decides to enter into such a venture would have considered the risks or 
loss in the venture when drafting the feasibility study or projection. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that the ISP should have considered the actual risk in mind and neglected to exercise a 
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duty of reasonable care ab initio which the sufficiently close relationship between the ISP and 
right-holders would have made necessary or equitable.  
Intent is “the state of mind accompanying an act, particularly a restricted act, as well as 
the mental resolution or determination to do an act”.
52
 The positive intent of an ISP entering 
into the venture is to make profit and nothing but profit. Profit cannot be made without costs. 
ISP should incur the cost of taking reasonable care and to lessen the risks that their networks be 
used for illegal purposes, including the infringing of copyright owners‟ rights. ISPs should be 
held responsible if they failed to act without the requisite degree of reasonable care. A question 
closely related to the foregoing is not how great the risk was in fact, but how great the risk 
would have appeared to be to a reasonable person.
53
 Regarding both foreseeable and actual risk, 
the nature of digitization, Internet operations and DP2P file-sharing is sufficient to indicate to a 
reasonable person that the risks of copyright infringement is enormous. In summary, actual risk 
existed on the Internet prior to the invention of DP2P file-sharing. The risk is likened to that 
related to the “egg skull” doctrine
54
 which holds that at every point in time anyone who carries 
out an activity should bear in mind the special circumstances surrounding the likely victim. The 
special circumstances present in DP2P networks is relevant 
7.4.3.2   Foreseeable risk  
ISPs can foresee risk of copyright infringement because their role is usurped and eroded in 
DP2P networks. Foreseeability is also premised on the fact that ISPs have not taken adequate 
steps, if any at all, despite the fact that the rate of copyright infringement of sound recordings is 
on the increase.  
7.4.4   Vulnerability of rights-holders  
In Beever‟s view,
55
 the court will impose a duty of care on the infringer when the claimant 
suffers an economic loss. He notes that negligence should not generally be based on 
vulnerability to economic loss but should be determined on an ad hoc basis.
56
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Copyright owners suffer economic loss as a result of illegal file-sharing.  
7.5 Breach of duty of care by ISPs 
The responsibility of ISPs for DP2P file-sharing is a new issue and the debate is still in its 
infancy.
57
 Those in favour of exoneration ISPs from liability for infringing acts of users argue 
that ISPs are unable to fully control the large amount of data transferred on their networks; bar 
or prohibit the transfer of infringing material on their networks, or police or act against 
infringers who operate on an international level.
58
 They submit that the duty of care has not 
been breached as it seems technically impossible to stop these illegal acts.
59
  
Courts recognize the challenges posed by new technologies and they are not opposed to 
the application of new theories to new circumstances. However, the courts exercise caution in 
restructuring liability theories; it is their view that such matters should be left to legislatures.
60
  
7.6   Causal connection  
Other than when fault is not a requirement for liability, a causal connection must be proved 
between a person‟s action or inaction and the harm caused by it before that person can be held 
liable. Basically, the issue for consideration is whether the act or omission was a prerequisite 
for the damage to occur. This is determined by the “but for” test in terms of which a right-
holder must prove that the harm would not have occurred “but for” the infringer‟s conduct. 
This proof would establish “factual causation” or “cause in fact”.
61
  
For there to be a causal connection, however, there must also be a legal cause. An 
infringer can only escape liability if the factual cause of the harm is not regarded as the “legal 
cause” of the harm. At common law, negligence is founded on the test of “foreseeability”, or 
the proximate cause, and not on the “remote” cause of damages.
62
 Basically, a person can be 
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held liable for the damages suffered as a result of his or her act or omission if there is factual 
causation or cause in fact. The rationale behind the test of casual connection is to limit the 
extent of liability for wrongful acts. A causal connection must be proved between ISPs‟ 
inaction and the harm caused by D2P2 file sharers before ISPs can be held liable for indirect 
copyright infringement. 
7.7   Fault  
Fault requires the application of the ethical principle that people are morally and 
psychologically responsible for their actions or omissions because they possess free will and 
self-determinism.
63
  
7.7.1   With-fault liability 
Essentially, a person is held liable if he or she is to blame for his or her actions and omissions. 
With-fault liability is premised on the requirement of intent.
64
 Specific intent emanates from 
consciousness (knowledge) and the direction of the will. Sometimes, mere inadvertence may be 
sufficient to prove fault against an infringer.
65
 
7.7.2   Without-fault or strict liability 
Strict liability does not require proof. It is premised on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Beever
66
 says that an objective test is appropriate in strict liability because it accords equal 
importance to both right-holders and infringers in deciding whether the infringer unlawfully 
infringed the work. In support of Beever‟s position, Garner
67
 submits that strict liability is that 
liability which does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm; rather it is premised on 
the breach of the absolute duty to make something safe.  
Bently and Sherman
68
 assert that strict liability (also referred to as absolute liability 
without fault) is often applied to ultra-hazardous activity such as product-liability cases.
69
 On 
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this score Internet operations in relation to copyright infringement are generally risky, whereas 
DP2P file-sharing may be typified as an ultra hazardous activity, hence a strict liability is most 
likely to be applied.  
7.7.3   Intermediate-fault liability  
Intermediate-fault liability possesses an element of reverse burden of proof. Although fault is 
required, because of the reversal of the onus of proof, intermediate-fault liability may come 
close to strict liability.
70
 The element is such that instead of a rights-holder proving his case, the 
ISP has to show to some extent justification for its willingness or inability to control 
infringement. Intermediate liability balances the other two approaches which are with-fault and 
without-fault.
71
  
In view of the overall submissions made so far, an ISP offering DP2P file-sharing will 
have to justify its failure to curb copyright infringement through file sharing in accordance with 
the principles of intermediate-fault liability. 
7.8 Conclusion  
An ISP in a DP2P network is liable when it breaches its duty of care by consenting to the 
illegal sharing of sound recordings by granting access to users without “detecting” and 
identifying illegal sharing of files containing sound recordings. Detecting files containing 
infringing sound recordings would enable the ISP to exercise its right to deny access to or to 
block infringing sound recordings on the basis of its prior agreement with or notice to users 
regarding the penalty for infringing copyright. It is submitted that such actions should form the 
basic threshold requirements with which ISPs must comply before a limitation of liability 
clause can apply in their favour.
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    CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1   Introduction 
In this study, I have examined several controversial issues regarding the indirect liability of 
ISPs for the copyright infringement of sound recordings in DP2P file-sharing. I examined 
whether ISPs have the right and ability to identify infringing sound recordings in DP2P 
networks without monitoring or intercepting users‟ communications. This study reviewed the 
copyright protection of sound recordings under domestic law and international copyright 
conventions and agreements. A comparative study was made of the protection afforded to 
sound recordings in the US, the UK and South Africa, and the statutory limitations on ISPs‟ 
liability as applied to the illegal sharing of sound recordings in DP2P networks.  
In many ways there is a conflict between ISPs and holders of copyright in sound 
recordings, a conflict complicated by the involvement of users.
1
 Obviously right-holders 
believe that their rights must be maximally protected by ISPs because the works are vulnerable 
to multiple reproductions in the digital world.
2
 Sound recordings are “the Cinderella of the 
copyright family” being the most patronised work in copyright.
3
 The creation of sound 
recordings is motivated by the work‟s ultimate use by end users. Copyright owners have the 
exclusive right to reproduce to distribute and to communicate the works to the public.  
At the same time, ISPs contest their liability for copyright infringement when they did not 
know or could not reasonably have been expected to know of the infringing acts. There is no 
doubt that ISPs face potential liability for the transmission of digital works on the Internet in 
contravention of the copyright owner‟s exclusive rights.
4
 The importance of the role ISPs play 
on the Internet cannot be overemphasized; therefore, there should be a comprehensive effort by 
the authorities to ensure that the limitation of the liability of ISPs is based on the correct 
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premise. In this chapter, I shall draw attention to some of the findings and conclusions in this 
study and recommend ways in which the interests of the two groups could be balanced.
5
  
8.2   The Internet as a channel of file-sharing  
The thrust of this study is on the finding that sound recordings can easily be identified on the 
network of ISPs.
6
 Given the description of DP2P technology,
7
 it is fallacious to contend that 
ISPs cannot detect or identify unauthorised copies of sound recordings on their networks 
without monitoring or intercepting.
8
 
DP2P software can be used for both infringing and non-infringing purposes, although it 
is more often put to infringing use. I concur with Conradi,
9
 namely that it is high time that ISPs 
acknowledged the fact that the transmission of sound recordings in DP2P networks can be 
easily identified without monitoring or intercepting communications.  
It is imperative that a legal duty be imposed on ISPs to install and use software 
applications that will identify illegal transactions involving sound recordings in subscribers‟ 
accounts;
10
 ISPs should deny such an identified account holder access to their networks. In 
view of the increasing threat of copyright piracy, copyright holders are availing themselves of 
technical protection measures (TPMs) to protect their rights. These measures include anti-copy 
devices, access control, electronic envelopes, proprietary viewer software, encryption, 
passwords, watermarking, user authentication (fingerprinting), metering and monitoring of 
usage, and remuneration systems.
11
 
Another option in limiting the liability of ISPs is to implement what is called “traffic 
shaping”, a process by which the bandwidth allocated for file-swapping is limited thus slowing 
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 See “Digital Britain – The interim report” at 41. 
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down the time taken to download files. This will discourage or frustrate users that want to share 
files containing infringing copies of sound recordings. Defaulting ISPs who facilitate the 
transmission of infringing copies of sound recordings by failing to install and use software 
applications that will identify illegal transactions involving sound recordings should not be able 
to limit their liability for copyright infringement. An ISP can also be banned from offering 
network services if a specified number of warnings has been issued to such ISP by the 
regulatory authorities. This approach imposes a severe punishment for contributing to copyright 
infringement on the Internet, forcing ISPs to be alert to their responsibilities.
12
 Further, with the 
awareness that ISPs could be banned, ISPs may become self-evaluating and conscious of the 
rate of infringement on their networks. They would thus limit the risks of being liable for 
infringement or be banned from offering network services and consequently take steps to limit 
their own liability.  
Finally, international best practices amongst ISPs should dictate the adoption of software 
applications and policies to curb on-line copyright infringement. 
8.3 Rights in sound recordings 
Beginning with the right of reproduction in sound recordings, the various jurisdictions 
considered in this dissertation have extended the notion of tangible copies to include electronic 
copies; consequently, distribution now includes intangible copies transmitted on the Internet via 
ISPs‟ networks. It should be noted that there is no definition of distribution in either the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) or the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT).
13
  
This lack of clarity has led to uncertainty in the implementation of inter alia the norms 
relating to the distribution right.
14
 Also with respect to the right of communication, the meaning 
of “making available” as adopted in the US differs from the “making available” right adopted 
in the other countries considered in this study.
15
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An approach was contemplated at the 1996 Diplomatic Conference on the Scope of the 
Reproduction Right namely limiting the liability of ISPs without regard to end use. 
Accordingly, it was proposed that temporary reproduction does not constitute reproduction 
within the meaning of article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. This approach was premised on the 
fact that temporary reproduction is undertaken for the purpose of transmission (as part of a 
technical process incidental to the act of transmission) of the work.
16
  
The uncertainties in the scope in the meaning of terms created uncertainties and 
subsequently some errors in the adoption of the treaties. 
8.4 The position of ISPs reconsidered  
8.4.1 The balance of rights between ISPs and copyright owners 
The major premise upon which ISPs‟ liability for copyright infringement of sound recordings 
in DP2P networks is based, is the breach of protocol in the closed P2P network on the Internet. 
One would have thought that the technical breach in the Internet protocol by users in DP2P 
networks
17
 would be a source of concern to ISPs, but it has proved not to be so. In the near 
future the law would be complicated further when the role of ISPs in AP2P networks becomes 
a reality.
18
  
The special skill and labour of ISPs are necessary for the provision of Internet access and 
network-related services. Because ISPs are indispensible to the functioning of the Internet their 
rights (which are highlighted below) ought to be protected otherwise we run the risk of 
exposing them to more harm as rights holders in sound recordings are exposed to. A revenue-
sharing or collective licensing scheme between ISPs and rights-holders would serve as an 
incentive to act against copyright infringement
19
 and it would recognise the complexities of the 
role that ISPs play in the value chain. Such a remuneration right would make ISPs a valuable 
                                                          
 
16 
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stakeholder. The ISPs would also then have an economic incentive to use all technical means at 
their disposal to curb copyright infringement activities on their networks and to ensure that only 
authorised copies of, for example, sound recordings, are distributed..  
However, no significant collective attempt has been made at the international and 
domestic levels to renegotiate the rights conferred and duties imposed by copyright law to 
ensure a new balance of interests in favour interests of ISPs.
20
 
  8.4.2   Network levies 
It is obvious that rights-holders will not be able to control the invention and development of 
new technologies which could adversely affect them.
21
 In view of this, one of the measures to 
protect the interest of rights holders in sound recording is the imposition of blank network levy 
or fee. A levy is a payment for empty recording equipment. They are a desirable alternative 
model to copyright works from which parties will reasonably benefit or to compensate 
copyright owners for the copying and distribution of infringing works on the Internet.
22
  
      A levy is determined by law or public authority
23
 and is imposed on the sale of digital audio 
recording devices and media.
24
 For instance, the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA)
25
 of the 
US requires all digital audio devices to implement serial copy management systems (SCMS), a 
technology should ensure that two copies cannot be made from a downloaded sound recording. 
Should additional copies of a sound recording be needed, the user would need to make another 
royalty payment aside from the first payment made to gain access to the sound recording.
26
  
In view of the problems they pose, however, blank network levies should be considered as 
a last resort. First is the problem of determining the amount to be levied. Secondly, the 
collection and allocation of levies would be complicated and costly, as is evident from the 
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administration of existing compulsory licences. Thirdly, how do you determine the distribution 
of the levies (royalties) to copyright holders and fourthly, international treaties would be 
violated were current compulsory licence systems replaced with levy schemes.
27
 
8.4.3 Implementation of Potato System 
An alternative recommendation to the ISP incentive and network levy systems is the 
implementation of the “potato” system.
28
 This system allows every user to be a mini-distributor 
on the Internet and get rewarded monetarily which has the tendency of discouraging illegal file 
sharing of sound recordings.
29
 The potato system is a motivational one in which users play an 
active role in the distribution of sound recordings: they redistribute sound recordings for which 
they are paid online and earn income from them on a percentage basis. The potato system pays 
for any redistributed file through the user who acts as a sub-distributor.
30
  
Every transaction in the potato system records date of purchase, name of the content 
owner, content‟s description, audio ID of the content, name of the last buyer, price and price 
model, sell link, and further information.
31
 When a sub-distributor sells, he or she acquires 
points which are credited to his or her account and which can be used to buy new sound 
recordings or converted to cash.
32
  
 8.5   Theories on infringement  
Basically, ISPs are not liable for direct copyright infringement because the unauthorised copies 
of sound recordings that pass through their networks are transmitted in the course of their 
business operations. In some countries, however, ISPs may be directly liable for copyright 
infringement. For instance, in the UK, authorizing a person to perform an act restricted by 
copyright, without the permission of the right-holder, is classified as a direct infringement.
33
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Classifying ISPs as direct infringers is to implement the negative–positive approach;
34
 thus, 
ISPs would be directly liable for copyright infringement in sound recording because there is a 
common intent by both ISPs and users to infringe copyright in sound recordings. 
With reference to indirect infringement, I have shown that given the features of DP2P 
technology, constructive knowledge is applicable under the requirement of knowledge for 
contributory infringement.
35
  
An examination of actual knowledge of infringement shows that even if a right holder 
proves constructive knowledge, the particulars of claim must show the details of the 
infringement. The detailed facts will ultimately constitute actual knowledge
36
 hence, the 
submission by Daly that there is no clear-cut distinction between the constructive and actual 
knowledge.
37
     
In the light of the findings in this study, liability of ISPs under the three forms of 
infringement (i.e. contributory, vicarious and inducing) has been interpreted differently by 
courts and countries, thereby making the application of the theories of infringement 
inconsistent with the features of Internet services and sound recordings.  
It is my recommendation therefore that when practicable and affordable, special courts 
be set up in every jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters of IT and intellectual-property law, if the 
normal courts are unable to do substantial justice to the issues in copyright. Special courts are 
created for many reasons ranging from the need for specialization, competence to speedy 
dispensation of justice. For instance, in South Africa, the Copyright Tribunal is one such court 
established to adjudicate on copyright conflicts including but not limited to disputes arising 
between licensing bodies
38
 and payment of royalties to rights holders.
39
  
The need for these specialized courts was highlighted in the US when a court expressed 
its lack of knowledge in the areas of Internet technology and copyright law. In Interscope v 
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Duty,
40
 the court noted that it possessed an “incomplete understanding” of the Kazaa 
technology and marked its opinion as not for publication.
41
  
In addition, in view of the virtual nature of the Internet, I recommend that there is a need 
at international level (preferably WIPO) for the provision of universally applicable liability 
clauses for member states of WIPO to use as guides for their domestic legislation on copyright 
or related areas. In this way some level of international uniformity in the enforcement of the 
law would be achieved.  
8.6   Limitation of ISPs’ liability  
The law limiting the liability of ISPs – particularly law not imposing on them a duty to 
monitor, intercept or actively seek infringing facts – was enacted for the purpose of protecting 
ISPs from general liability, although there are instances in which ISPs may be held liable.
42
  
ISPs may also be held liable at common law when they are not prohibited from 
identifying illegal transactions in copyright sound recordings. The ability of ISPs to identify 
illegal transactions in sound recordings exposes them to more liability, which legislators in the 
three jurisdictions examined did not take into account either before or during the drafting of the 
limitation law.
43
 Worse still, the limitation law in the three jurisdictions is erroneously 
understood as excluding liability to identify illegal transactions in sound recordings, whereas 
the law in these jurisdictions provides for circumstances in which ISPs are held liable for non-
compliance with the law. Liability for non-compliance by ISPs implies that there is no 
exclusion of liability on the part of ISPs.  
Essentially, if the legislatures in the various jurisdictions intended limiting the liability of 
ISPs in respect of all works, they would have amended the limitation law to include filtering, 
identification and detection as terms designed to prohibit ISPs from monitoring  or intercepting.  
In this context the idea behind identification is enabling ISPs suo moto to use one of the 
remedies in the limitation clause against a user who has, for example, committed more than an 
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acceptable number of infringements. Identifying culprits by identifying illegal sound recordings 
on the Internet can be achieved with the support of  ISPs.  
Some jurisdictions do not stipulate procedure for the issuing of take-down and counter take-
down notices by right-holders and users respectively, or stipulate an adequate procedure. For 
instance, the UK has not formulated such a procedure, while the US relies on civil-procedure 
rules. In South Africa the ISPA has issued to its members a directive instructing them to devise 
individual take-down-notice procedures. As a result there is no uniform procedure. In the light 
of these international and domestic disparities, I recommend that a uniform procedure be 
adopted at international level for domestic implementation so that ISPs, right-holders and users 
can become acquainted with and use one procedure. 
8.7 Conclusion 
The various domestic laws and copyright treaties (TRIPS, WCT and WPPT) do not provide for 
all needs on the Internet as examined in this study. In view of this, and for the smooth operation 
of the Internet as a public good, parties involved in the enforcement of copyright and 
functioning of the Internet ought to come to an agreement, and understanding to cure the 
defects in the treaties as examined in this study and set an international machinery in motion to 
evaluate developments, interpretation and compliance with such agreements. This would assist 
the courts in the jurisdictions to formulate, and adopt uniform measures to deal with ISPs 
liability for infringements in DP2P networks. 
In terms of the principles to be applied in dealing with infringement of sound recordings 
in the online world, South Africa should adopt with pragmatism the three principles of 
infringement as examined in the South African chapter in line with the laws of delict and 
copyright and the dynamism of Internet technology with a view to balance all the interests at 
stake. Over protection of one party against the other would encourage abuse by the former.      
South Africa should adopt the following models on the recognition of the role and 
limitation of liability of ISPs in the following ways: 1) the regulatory authorities should amend 
the ECTA vide the regulations by including the words “filter, identify and detect” in the 
category of the phrase “monitoring, intercepting or actively seeking for facts” in section 78 of 
ECTA; 2) ISPs should adopt measures (software) to filter, identify and detect illegal sharing of 
198 
sound recordings ISPs and should accommodate and not interfere with “standard technical 
measures”
44
 notwithstanding the foregoing paragraph; 3) ISPs should adopt and implement a 
policy that provides for termination of the accounts or subscriptions of infringers who 
frequently infringe copyright and contravene the ISPs‟ policy on digital copyright 
transmission;
45
 4) ISPs should inform their subscribers and account holders of their policy on 
digital copyright transmission;
46
 5) ISPs should limit their liability by electronically pasting 
warning notices around computer terminals and on the screen, monitor access to electronic 
materials and generally educate users about copyright law and the importance of respecting 
copyright works;
47
 6) regulatory authorities and ISPs should also promote the development of 
non-legal measures ranging from age-verification systems and user awareness to other 
preventive measures;
48
 7) a voluntary agreement between record companies and ISPs is another 
approach to protecting sound recordings. Such an agreement could serve as the ISP industry‟s 
norm and standard on the Internet; and 8) ISPs should have a better understanding of the law of 
copyright as it pertains to electronic publishing. They should also ensure that the electronic 
content they transmit is not misused.
49
   
Aside from the recommendations in this study, other measures that could be put in place 
to recognize the role ISPs play are the recognition and protection of entrepreneurial rights of 
ISPs for granting access to users on the network in similar way as broadcasting organizations 
are recognized
50
 and the execution of an insurance policy with regards to sound recordings.     
Finally, I strongly believe that if these recommendations are equitably and reasonably 
implemented, the wrongs committed against rights-holders would be effectively remedied and 
the liability of ISPs limited in the lawful and equitable exploitation of copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
50
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